9router
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.5.8(semver)
Fixed versions
0.5.8
Fix
- Fixed version
0.5.8npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-56681
9Router has an Authentication Bypass in Public LLM API via Spoofable X-9r-Real-Ip Header
Summary
9router determines whether an incoming request originates from localhost by trusting the X-9r-Real-Ip HTTP request header. This header is intended to be produced and sanitized exclusively by the bundled custom-server.js layer from the TCP socket address. In deployment modes where requests reach Next.js directly (the header is never stripped/regenerated), a remote, unauthenticated attacker can simply send X-9r-Real-Ip: 127.0.0.1 and be treated as a local client. This bypasses the API-key requirement on the public LLM API (/api/v1/*), granting unauthenticated access to the instance owner's configured provider resources.
Affected Component
Root Cause
The authorization layer makes a security decision based on a client-controllable HTTP header. isLocalRequest() reads X-9r-Real-Ip and, if its value is a loopback address (127.0.0.1), classifies the request as local. The design assumes this header can only be set by the trusted custom-server.js wrapper (which derives it from the unspoofable socket address and strips any inbound copy). When the application is served without that wrapper, Next.js passes the attacker-supplied header through unchanged, so the trust assumption is violated:
Untrusted Client Input
↓
X-9r-Real-Ip: 127.0.0.1
↓
isLocalRequest() → true
↓
canAccessPublicLlmApi() → allowed (API key not required)
↓
200 OK
Attack Scenario
Proof of Concept
Baseline Request
<img width="1211" height="402" alt="Screenshot 2026-06-19 174727" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/170b635f-1bd6-4dfd-ad85-30a03a9f6f72" />
Exploit Request
<img width="1207" height="816" alt="Screenshot 2026-06-19 174844" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b7b4efde-c071-4aa2-ab13-9bde7c88a7b8" />
The only difference between the two requests is the addition of X-9r-Real-Ip: 127.0.0.1.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker who can reach the service can bypass API-key enforcement on the public LLM API and act as a trusted local client. Consequences include:
Remediation
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 0.5.8 (semver)0.5.8
0.5.8npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0