mcp
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.23.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
0.23.0
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-67431
MCP Ruby SDK: Ruby SSE Session Poisoning
Summary
Vulnerability: Missing Session Ownership Validation in the Ruby MCP SDK's Streamable and SSE HTTP transport implementation. Any attacker with a stolen session ID can execute tools with the victim's session. This is a silent attack - the victim's session is compromised and being used for unauthorized actions, but it is hard to know for the victim
Details
https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/ruby-sdk/blob/main/lib/mcp/server/transports/streamable_http_transport.rb#L260-L278
Victim starts a legitimate MCP session and receives session ID abc-123
Attacker obtains the session ID (various means - network sniffing, logs, etc. out of scope for this analysis)
Attacker sends POST to /messages/abc-123 with a tool call
Server accepts the request (no ownership validation!)
Server executes the tool and sends response to victim's SSE stream
Victim receives attacker's response, thinking it's legitimate
PoC
attacker_client.py
legitimate_client.py
Prerequisites
requestsRunning the Demo
ruby streamable_http_server.rb
Makes use of https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/ruby-sdk/blob/main/examples/streamable_http_server.rb
This server has a tool call notification_tool which the clients call
python3 legitimate_client.py
Copy the session ID from Terminal 1 and run:
python3 attacker_client.py abc-123-def-456
Impact
Additional Details
Session Hijacking Protection in MCP Implementations
The MCP specification recommends - "MCP servers SHOULD bind session IDs to user-specific information".
User Binding - Comparison other SDKs
csharp-sdk
Go-sdk
Comparison with the Stream Replacement vulnerability
Stream Replacement
https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/ruby-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-qvqr-5cv7-wh35
Session Poisoning
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 0.23.0 (ecosystem)0.23.0
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0