code.vikunja.io/api
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.4.0(semver)
Fixed versions
2.4.0
Fix
- Fixed version
2.4.0go get code.vikunja.io/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-55066, GO-2026-6308
Vikunja has cross-tenant IDOR in kanban move-task endpoint via unauthorized body task_id
Summary
The kanban endpoint POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket}/tasks
moves a task into a bucket. The task is identified by task_id in the **request
body**. The endpoint's authorization check (TaskBucket.CanUpdate) only verifies
that the caller may update the *project/view/bucket named in the URL* — it never
checks any permission on task_id.
Any authenticated user can therefore supply another user's task ID (task IDs are
a global, sequential integer space) against a kanban bucket in their own
project. The server loads that victim task with no authorization check, returns
its full contents in the response, and — when the target bucket is a "done"
bucket — writes to the victim task's row.
This is the same vulnerability class Vikunja has already remediated for task
relations (CVE-2026-33676), task attachments (CVE-2026-33678), task comments
(CVE-2026-33313) and CalDAV task read (CVE-2026-35598). TaskBucket is the
task-child operation that was missed.
---
Root cause
1. task_id is body-controlled and never permission-checked
pkg/models/kanban_task_bucket.go:32:
type TaskBucket struct {
BucketID int64 ... json:"bucket_id" param:"bucket"
TaskID int64 ... json:"task_id" // body-bound only — no param tag
ProjectViewID int64 ... json:"project_view_id" param:"view"
ProjectID int64 xorm:"-" json:"-" param:"project"
...
}
The web handler UpdateWeb (pkg/web/handler/update.go) populates the struct viactx.Bind, which binds both URL path params (param: tags) and the JSON body.BucketID, ProjectViewID, ProjectID come from the trusted URL; TaskID comes
entirely from the attacker-controlled body.
2. CanUpdate authorizes the URL, not the task
pkg/models/kanban_task_bucket.go:52:
func (b *TaskBucket) CanUpdate(s *xorm.Session, a web.Auth) (bool, error) {
bucket := Bucket{ID: b.BucketID, ProjectID: b.ProjectID, ProjectViewID: b.ProjectViewID}
return bucket.canDoBucket(s, a)
}
canDoBucket (pkg/models/kanban_permissions.go:46) resolves the bucket/view and
ends in Project{ID: pv.ProjectID}.CanUpdate(s, a) — a permission check on the
project from the URL. b.TaskID is never referenced. The attacker owns that
project, so the check passes.
3. The task is loaded and mutated with no authorization
updateTaskBucket (pkg/models/kanban_task_bucket.go:119):
task := &Task{ID: b.TaskID}
err = task.ReadOne(s, a) // loads ANY task by ID — no permission check
Task.ReadOne (pkg/models/tasks.go:1967) calls GetTaskByIDSimple +addMoreInfoToTasks; it performs no authorization (authorization normally lives
in the separate Task.CanRead, which this internal call path bypasses).
b.Task (line 227) and returned by the Update handler in the response "task" field.view.DoneBucketID == b.BucketID && !task.Done, line 141), the handler sets task.Done = true and persists it to the victim's task row: _, err = s.Where("id = ?", task.ID).
Cols("done", "due_date", "start_date", "end_date", "done_at").
Update(task)
---
Proof of Concept
The attacker is any normal authenticated user. They first create their own kanban
project/view/bucket (free for every user), then:
POST /api/v1/projects/{ATTACKER_PROJECT}/views/{ATTACKER_VIEW}/buckets/{ATTACKER_BUCKET}/tasks HTTP/1.1
Host: TARGET
Authorization: Bearer {ATTACKER_JWT}
Content-Type: application/json
{"task_id": {VICTIM_TASK_ID}}
The 200 response body contains the victim task in full under "task" — title,
description, dates, assignees, labels, attachment list, reactions. Task IDs are a
global sequential counter, so iterating task_id enumerates every task on the
instance.
If ATTACKER_BUCKET is the done bucket of ATTACKER_VIEW, the same request also
flips the victim task to done (done = true, done_at set).
---
Impact
Any authenticated low-privilege user can:
done_at.Vikunja's permission model is built specifically to isolate projects between
users; this endpoint defeats that isolation. It is the same impact and class that
warranted CVEs for task relations, attachments and comments.
---
Suggested fix
In TaskBucket.CanUpdate, after the bucket/project check, also verify the caller's
permission on the body-supplied task — mirroring the remediation already applied
to task relations and attachments:
task := &Task{ID: b.TaskID}
canUpdateTask, err := task.CanUpdate(s, a)
if err != nil || !canUpdateTask {
return false, err
}
(Use CanRead if moving a readable-but-not-writable task into a bucket is intended;CanUpdate is the safer default since the operation can change the task's done
state.)
---
References
TaskBucket sibling.Additional notes
/api/v2/..., and both versions route through the shared model TaskBucket.CanUpdate / updateTaskBucket in pkg/models/kanban_task_bucket.go. A model-level fix closes v1 and v2 simultaneously; the regression test should assert both.task_id in TaskBucket.CanUpdate (task.CanUpdate/CanRead). A broader fix makes Task.ReadOne itself permission-aware, which also hardens other internal call paths that rely on it — higher blast radius, weigh accordingly.done rewrites done_at/due_date/start_date/end_date, inserts a task_buckets row, propagates done-state to other kanban views with a done bucket in the victim's project, and triggers updateDone rescheduling for repeating tasks.High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 2.4.0 (semver)2.4.0
2.4.0go get code.vikunja.io/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0