github.com/akuity/kargo
Affected
- introduced
1.9.0, fixed1.9.3(semver)
Fixed versions
1.9.3
Fix
- Fixed version
1.9.3go get github.com/akuity/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-27111, GO-2026-4515
Kargo has Missing Authorization Vulnerabilities in Approval & Promotion REST API Endpoints
Summary
Kargo's authorization model includes a promote verb -- a non-standard Kubernetes "dolphin verb" -- that gates the ability to advance Freight through a promotion pipeline. This verb exists to separate the ability to _manage_ promotion-related resources from the ability to _trigger_ promotions, enabling fine-grained access control over what is often a sensitive operation.
The promote verb is correctly enforced in Kargo's legacy gRPC API. However, three endpoints in the newer REST API omit this check, relying only on standard Kubernetes RBAC for the underlying resource operations (patch on freights/status or create on promotions). This permits users who hold those standard permissions -- but who were deliberately _not_ granted promote -- to bypass the intended authorization boundary.
The affected endpoints are:
POST /v1beta1/projects/{project}/freight/{freight}/approve Approves Freight for promotion to a specific Stage.
The endpoint is intended to require both patch permission on Freight status and promote permission on the target Stage, but asserts only the former.
POST /v1beta1/projects/{project}/stages/{stage}/promotions Promotes Freight to a specific Stage.
The endpoint is intended to require both create permission on Promotion resources and promote permission on the target Stage, but asserts only the former.
POST /v1beta1/projects/{project}/stages/{stage}/promotions/downstream Promotes Freight to all Stages immediately downstream of a given Stage.
The endpoint is intended to require both create permission on Promotion resources and promote permission on each downstream Stage, but asserts only the former.
Base Metrics
The following sections provide the rationale for the values selected for each of CVSS v4's base metrics.
Attack Vector (AV): Network
The affected endpoints are part of Kargo's newer REST API, which is served over HTTP/HTTPS. (The analogous endpoints of the legacy gRPC API correctly check promote permission and are not affected.) No local or physical access is required.
Attack Complexity (AC): Low
The attack requires only well-formed API requests to the affected endpoints.
Attack Requirements (AT): None
No specific environmental conditions are required beyond those that are typical for any Kargo instance.
Privileges Required (PR): Low
The attacker must hold permissions to patch Freight status and/or create Promotion resources. These are standard operational permissions commonly granted to some Kargo users and do not represent what CVSS formally considers administrative or elevated access.
User Interaction (UI): None
The attack is fully automated via API calls. No other user needs to take any action.
Confidentiality Impact to Vulnerable System (VC): None
The vulnerability does not expose any data from the Kargo control plane.
Integrity Impact to Vulnerable System (VI): Low
The attacker can coerce a Stage into a state it might not otherwise transition to. This constitutes bounded state corruption within a single Project. Kargo itself continues to function correctly.
Availability Impact to Vulnerable System (VA): None
Promotion resources created by exploitation of this vulnerability consume the same controller resources as a legitimate Promotion would. A user with proper promote permissions could generate identical load. The vulnerability does not introduce any new avenue for resource exhaustion.
Confidentiality Impact to Subsequent Systems (SC): None
The vulnerability does not provide any mechanism for the attacker to read data from downstream systems.
Integrity Impact to Subsequent Systems (SI): Low
Critically, the attacker does not control the _content_ of Freight resources without artifact repositories also having been compromised. In isolation, which is how vulnerabilities are scored, the worst consequence of a successful attack is downstream systems (e.g. Argo CD) deploying incorrect revisions of artifacts, which in some cases should have been rejected by bypassed segments of the promotion pipeline. Though the operational consequences land on subsequent systems, they are bounded by the attacker's inability to inject arbitrary content.
Availability Impact to Subsequent Systems (SA): None
The attack does not provide any mechanism to degrade the availability of downstream systems beyond what could be achieved with legitimately promoted Freight.
Mitigating Factors
promote permission check and are not vulnerable.patch on freights/status or create on promotions). Anonymous or minimally privileged users cannot exploit this vulnerability.promote bypass does not enable cross-Project access or escalation beyond the namespace in which the attacker already holds the prerequisite permissions.Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
1.9.0, fixed 1.9.3 (semver)1.9.3
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0