Advisory

GHSA-62fc-8686-hfmq

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

$ go test -run TestPoC_CrossNamespaceServiceBypass ./pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/ -v

HTTP routers:  [attacker-attacker-svc-route-7df4381938699bd21215]
HTTP services: [victim-whoami-victim-80 victim-backend]
CONTROL OK: cross-ns MIDDLEWARE ref (victim-mw@kubernetescrd) rejected -> router dropped
BYPASS CONFIRMED: attacker router bound to cross-ns service "victim-backend" despite AllowCrossNamespace=false

The control route (middleware reference) is dropped even though it has a valid local service, confirming that the isolation control is active for middlewares; the service route survives and its Service field resolves to victim-backend, with the victim's services pulled into the generated configuration and reachable through the attacker's router.

The harness also runs two corroborating cases. With AllowCrossNamespace=false and CrossProviderNamespaces=["someotherns"] (an allowlist that excludes the attacker), the service reference is blocked, which proves that the only gate ever applied to an @kubernetescrd service name is crossProviderNamespaces (inert by default) and that allowCrossNamespace=false is never consulted. With AllowCrossNamespace=true, both the service and middleware references are accepted, as expected when isolation is intentionally disabled.

Impact
In a multi-tenant cluster relying on allowCrossNamespace=false for namespace isolation, a tenant confined to their own namespace can attach their own router (their own Host rule and entrypoint) to another tenant's TraefikService backend, exposing an otherwise internal-only service on the data plane under the attacker's hostname, and can route or mirror traffic to another namespace's backend that they should not be able to reference.

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