Advisory

GHSA-62gx-5q78-wrvx

Also known as: None

Summary

obsidian-local-rest-api: Authenticated path traversal via URL-encoded %2F in /vault/{path} — arbitrary host file read/write/delete

Details

Summary
The Local REST API's /vault/{path} endpoints (GET/PUT/PATCH/POST/DELETE) percent-decode the request path *inside the handler — after* Express has already routed and normalized it, then hand it to the Obsidian vault adapter with no confinement check. A literal ../ is resolved/rejected at the routing layer (→ 404), but %2F is not a separator there, so ..%2F..%2F survives routing and is only turned into a real / by the handler's decodeURIComponent, reconstituting a ../ traversal that walks out of the vault. An authenticated client can read, write, or delete arbitrary files on the host with the Obsidian process's privileges.

Details
Framework: Express (import express from "express"; routes registered via this.api.route("/vault/*")…).

The vulnerable line — in src/requestHandler.ts, every vault handler (vaultGet, vaultPut, vaultPatch, vaultPost, vaultDelete) derives the path like this:

  const rawPath = decodeURIComponent(
    req.path.slice(req.path.indexOf("/", 1) + 1),
  );

The path is decodeURIComponent'd after Express routing. A literal ../ is collapsed/rejected at the routing layer, but %2F isn't a separator there — so ..%2F..%2F reaches the handler intact and this decodeURIComponent turns it into a real ../../. The string routing saw (`…%2F…`) is not the string the handler uses (`…/…`), and %2e%2e behaves the same way.

No confinement on the decoded path. The handlers pass rawPath straight to the vault adapter — e.g. this.app.vault.adapter.readBinary(filePath) / this.app.vault.getAbstractFileByPath(filePath) — with no path.resolve + vault-root prefix check, so the reconstituted ../../ escapes.

The fix already exists in your code — for MOVE only. vaultMove confines correctly:

  const syntheticRoot = "/vault";
  const resolved = posix.resolve(syntheticRoot, normalized);
  if (resolved !== syntheticRoot && !resolved.startsWith(syntheticRoot + "/")) {
    this.returnCannedResponse(res, { errorCode: ErrorCode.PathTraversalNotAllowed });
    return;
  }

GET/PUT/PATCH/POST/DELETE lack this guard. Apply the same `posix.resolve(syntheticRoot, …)` + `startsWith` check to the decoded path in every vault handler, and reject any segment that decodes to ...

PoC
Prereq: a running Obsidian with the Local REST API plugin enabled and its configured API key ($API_KEY). Targets below are Unix; adjust per OS (e.g. ..%2F..%2FWindows%2Fwin.ini on Windows).

  # READ outside the vault (returns 200 + the target file's real bytes):
  curl --path-as-is -k -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" \
    "https://127.0.0.1:27124/vault/..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd"

  # WRITE outside the vault (creates a file on disk outside the vault root):
  curl --path-as-is -k -X PUT -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" --data "pwned" \
    "https://127.0.0.1:27124/vault/..%2F..%2F..%2Ftmp%2Fcanary.txt"

--path-as-is stops curl from collapsing .. client-side. A plain ../ (unencoded) request returns 404 — only the %2F/%2e%2e encoded form bypasses, confirming the decode-after-routing gap.

Impact
Authenticated arbitrary file read / write / delete outside the Obsidian vault, with the OS privileges of the Obsidian process — typically the user's home directory (SSH keys, browser profiles, dotfiles, credentials). Amplified in MCP/LLM-agent deployments: this API is widely used as an MCP server, so a prompt-injection in vault content (or a malicious MCP client) can make an agent emit a %2F path — turning "the agent can edit my notes" into "the agent can read/write any file on the host," with no user intent to grant filesystem access beyond the vault.

This vulnerability was reported by Caleb Brisbin through responsible disclosure.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-07-15 21:56 UTC
Modified
2026-11-02 19:30 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

obsidian-local-rest-api

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 4.1.3 (semver)

Fixed versions

4.1.3

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences