Details
Axios version: 1.15.2 (latest patched release)
Node.js version: v20.20.2
OS: macOS Darwin 25.4.0
Reproduction Steps
# 1. Install axios 1.15.2
npm pack [email protected]
tar xzf axios-1.15.2.tgz && mv package axios-1.15.2
cd axios-1.15.2 && npm install
# 2. Save PoC as poc.mjs (code from Section 7 above)
# 3. Run
node poc.mjs
Verified PoC Output
=== Axios 1.15.2: PP → Proxy-Authorization Injection ===
[1] Normal request with proxy (no auth):
Proxy-Authorization: none
[2] Prototype Pollution: Object.prototype.username = "attacker"
Proxy-Authorization: Basic YXR0YWNrZXI6c3RvbGVuLWNyZWRz
Decoded: attacker:stolen-creds
→ PP injected proxy credentials: attacker:stolen-creds
[3] Impact:
✗ Attacker injects Proxy-Authorization into all proxied requests
✗ If proxy logs auth, attacker credential appears in proxy logs
✗ If proxy authenticates based on this, attacker controls proxy identity
✗ Works on 1.15.2 despite null-prototype config fix
✗ Root cause: proxy object is plain {} from utils.merge, NOT null-prototype
Confirming the Bypass Mechanism
Direct PP (config.proxy) — BLOCKED by 1.15.2:
Object.prototype.proxy = { host: 'evil' }
config.proxy = undefined ← null-prototype blocks ✓
Nested PP (proxy.username) — BYPASSES 1.15.2:
Object.prototype.username = 'attacker'
config.proxy = { host: 'legit', port: 8080 } ← user-set, own properties
config.proxy own keys: ['host', 'port'] ← username NOT own
config.proxy.username = 'attacker' ← inherited from Object.prototype!
hasOwn(config.proxy, 'username') = false
## Impact Analysis
- **Proxy Identity Spoofing:** The injected `Proxy-Authorization` header authenticates all requests to the proxy as the attacker. If the proxy enforces authentication-based access control or logging, the attacker controls the identity.
- **Proxy Log Poisoning:** Proxy servers that log authenticated usernames will record "attacker" instead of the real user, enabling audit trail manipulation.
- **Credential Injection Amplification:** If the proxy forwards the `Proxy-Authorization` header upstream (some transparent proxies do), the attacker's credentials propagate through the proxy chain.
- **Universal Scope When Proxy Is Configured:** Affects every axios request that uses a proxy configuration without explicit auth — a common pattern in corporate environments.
### Prerequisite
- Application must use `config.proxy` (explicit proxy configuration)
- A separate prototype pollution vulnerability must exist in the dependency tree
- `Object.prototype.username` or `Object.prototype.auth` must be polluted
## Recommended Fix
### Fix 1: Use `hasOwnProperty` in `setProxy()`
```javascript
function setProxy(options, configProxy, location) {
let proxy = configProxy;
// ...
if (proxy) {
const hasOwn = (obj, key) => Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(obj, key);
if (hasOwn(proxy, 'username')) {
proxy.auth = (proxy.username || '') + ':' + (proxy.password || '');
}
if (hasOwn(proxy, 'auth')) {
// ... existing auth handling ...
}
}
}
Fix 2: Use null-prototype objects in utils.merge()
// lib/utils.js line 406
function merge(/* obj1, obj2, obj3, ... */) {
const result = Object.create(null); // ← null-prototype for nested objects too
// ...
}
Fix 3 (Comprehensive): Apply null-prototype to all objects created by getMergedValue()
References