Advisory

GHSA-66m4-5jjr-2rg5

Also known as: CVE-2026-58440, GO-2026-6033

Summary

Gitea: Webhooks created by a collaborator keep firing after their repo access is revoked → ongoing real-time exfiltration of private repo content

Details

Affected product
Gitea — services/repository/collaboration.go (DeleteCollaboration) + webhook delivery

Summary
When a collaborator with admin permission on a private repo creates a webhook, that webhook keeps firing
after the collaborator's access is revoked. Gitea's revocation cleanup DeleteCollaboration removes the
collaboration record, recalculates accesses, drops watches, and unassigns issues — but it does not
remove or disable webhooks the user created, and webhook delivery never re-checks whether the creator still
has repo access. The former collaborator therefore receives the full payload (issue/comment bodies, commit
data) of all future repository events at their controlled endpoint, indefinitely and invisibly.

Affected code

  • services/repository/collaboration.go → DeleteCollaboration() — cleans watches/assignees only; no webhook cleanup.
  • Webhook delivery path — fires on repo events without re-validating the creator's current access.

Steps to reproduce
Using the provided reproduction materials:

  1. Attacker (admin collaborator) creates a webhook → revoke access.
  2. Control: GET /api/v1/repos/admin/wh-repo (attacker) → 404.
  3. GET .../hooks → webhook still active=true.
  4. Admin creates a new issue after revocation → the catcher receives action:"opened", issue.title:"CRITICAL SECRET: …", issue.body (sentinel private key), repository.private:true.

(Runtime-confirmed on gitea/gitea:1.25.4. Catcher is an internal sentinel listener; the payload is a
planted sentinel, not real data; nothing is sent to any external/metadata endpoint.)

Impact
Authenticated former admin-collaborator → ongoing real-time exfiltration of private content created after
revocation; invisible to the owner; scope crosses from the application boundary to data the user should no
longer access.

Suggested remediation

  1. On revocation, delete/disable webhooks created by the removed collaborator (or hand them to the owner).
  2. Re-validate the creator's current repo access before each webhook delivery.
  3. At minimum, warn admins on revocation if the user created webhooks.

Credit
Reported as part of an incomplete-patch / authorization-residue measurement study (responsible disclosure).

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-07-21 20:11 UTC
Modified
2026-07-22 21:11 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

gitea.dev

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 1.27.0 (semver)

Fixed versions

1.27.0

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

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View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences