Advisory

GHSA-6757-hggm-hp2w

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

# vllm/distributed/device_communicators/shm_object_storage.py
    def get(self, address, monotonic_id, capability=None, key=None):
        if not self.is_writer:
            # Reject forged handles before dereferencing the supplied address.
            self.validate_capability(key, address, monotonic_id, capability)
        with self.ring_buffer.access_buf(address) as (data_view, buf_metadata):
            self._validate_monotonic_id(address, monotonic_id, buf_metadata)
            obj = self.ser_de.deserialize(data_view[self.flag_bytes :])
            ...

where validate_capability recomputes the HMAC with hmac.compare_digest and raises Missing server-issued SHM capability for cache key. / Invalid server-issued SHM capability for cache key. on any mismatch. The fix applies cleanly to v0.25.1 and ships regression tests asserting the generate path rejects an invalid handle and that the receiver requires a matching sender handle (and a capability issued after the current clear()) for the cache key.

Credit

Reported by: Patch the Planet (Trail of Bits + OpenAI collaboration)

This vulnerability was discovered using GPT-5.5-Cyber as part of the Patch the Planet security initiative.

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Proposed fix: a proposed change for this issue is up for review in this advisory's temporary private fork: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm-ghsa-6757-hggm-hp2w/pull/1

This advisory was fixed in MR59357.

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