Details
Impact
- Arbitrary file read of any file readable by the Node process from any CSS-processing context that accepts attacker-influenced CSS. PostCSS has hundreds of millions of weekly npm downloads and is the standard CSS processor for build tools (webpack
postcss-loader, vite, parcel, Next.js, Gatsby, etc.) and for runtime CSS-handling libraries (CSS Modules tools, CSS minifiers, theme processors). Any pipeline that runs untrusted user CSS — CMS theme uploads, user-styled blog posts, browser-extension/userstyle services, multi-tenant build farms, third-party-package build pipelines — is exposed. - Confidentiality leak of the first ~10 bytes of the targeted file via
JSON.parseSyntaxError. This is enough to recover SSH-key headers, environment-variable prefixes (API_KEY=sk…),/etc/passwdrecords, the start of/proc/self/environ, and other high-value secrets, and to fingerprint the host (Debian-tri…from/etc/hostname). - File-existence oracle with three distinguishable response states (silent success,
JSON.parseerror, no-such-file silence), enabling reconnaissance of the host filesystem layout and confirmation of installed software, user accounts, and configuration files. - DoS by targeting
/dev/zero,/proc/kcore, very large files, or named pipes —readFileSyncis a synchronous, unbounded read. - Default-on: triggered with
postcss().process(css)and no options. The only configuration that disables the bug is the explicit, undocumented-for-this-purpose{ map: false }.
Recommended Fix
The root cause is that loadFile accepts any path the attacker supplies inside a CSS comment. The annotation is meant for tooling, not for production CSS processing of untrusted input. Two layered fixes:
- Refuse traversal/absolute paths in `loadMap` (defence-in-depth):
// lib/previous-map.js
loadMap(file, prev) {
if (prev === false) return false
if (prev) { /* unchanged */ }
else if (this.inline) {
return this.decodeInline(this.annotation)
} else if (this.annotation) {
let annotation = this.annotation
// Reject schemes (other than data:, handled above) and absolute paths.
if (/^[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9+.-]*:/.test(annotation)) return
if (require('path').isAbsolute(annotation)) return
if (!file) return // No base path → cannot safely resolve.
const base = require('path').resolve(require('path').dirname(file))
const resolved = require('path').resolve(base, annotation)
// Refuse anything that escapes the base directory.
if (resolved !== base && !resolved.startsWith(base + require('path').sep)) {
return
}
return this.loadFile(resolved)
}
}
- Require explicit opt-in to follow on-disk source-map annotations: gate the
loadFile(map)call inloadMapbehind an option such asopts.map.annotation === trueoropts.map.followAnnotation === true. Today, the only way to opt out is{ map: false }, which also disables in-memory previous-map handling. Inverting the default — only follow disk-resident annotations when explicitly asked — eliminates the entire attack surface for callers that pass untrusted CSS, while preserving build-tool use cases where the annotation is trusted.
A user-facing changelog entry should warn that postcss().process(untrustedCss) previously read attacker-controlled paths, and recommend auditing applications that surfaced PostCSS errors to end users.