Advisory

GHSA-6j3h-rp73-6rvf

Also known as: CVE-2026-102339

Summary

Telepresence: Tunnel endpoint accepts caller-supplied session ID with no ownership proof — active client sessions hijackable

Details

Summary

The Traffic Manager Tunnel gRPC streaming endpoint accepts a session ID from the first bytes of the client-controlled message payload. No verification confirms the caller owns the session. An attacker supplying a valid active session ID receives a fully routed tunnel for that session, gaining the network routing capabilities of the legitimate Telepresence client. Tested on HEAD v2.28.0, commit b2231a4.

Details

The Tunnel handler reads identity from a client-provided binary payload rather than from a verified credential or prior authenticated gRPC call:

// cmd/traffic/cmd/manager/service.go:1057-1063
func (s *service) Tunnel(server grpc.BidiStreamingServer[...]) error {
    stream, err := tunnel.NewServerStream(ctx, tunnel.ClientToManager, server)
    return s.state.Tunnel(ctx, stream)  // stream.SessionID() is client-controlled
}

state.Tunnel looks up the session ID in the sessions map with no ownership proof:

// cmd/traffic/cmd/manager/state/state.go:698-703
func (s *State) Tunnel(ctx context.Context, stream tunnel.Stream) error {
    id := stream.SessionID()   // from client payload bytes
    if cs, ok := s.clients.Load(id); ok {
        return s.clientTunnel(ctx, cs, stream)  // full dialer granted
    }
    return grpcErrors.Errorf(codes.NotFound, ...)
}

The session ID is parsed from the wire message with no binding to the transport-level identity of the caller (pkg/tunnel/message.go:209-214).

Proof of Concept

Precondition: a valid active session ID (obtainable via ArriveAsClient, which has no auth either).

conn, _ := grpc.NewClient("traffic-manager.ambassador:8081",
    grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials()))
mgr := rpc.NewManagerClient(conn)

tunnelStream, _ := mgr.Tunnel(ctx)

// Send StreamInfo with victim session ID in payload
tunnelStream.Send(&rpc.TunnelMessage{Payload: buildStreamInfo(victimSessionID, ...)})

// Traffic Manager routes tunnel traffic for victimSessionID
// through this attacker-controlled bidirectional stream

Impact

A caller supplying a valid session ID of an active Telepresence client obtains a tunnel endpoint for that session's network routing context. Session IDs are UUID4s, making cold brute-force impractical; exploitation materialises when session IDs are obtainable via log leakage or cluster-internal channels. Combined with the unauthenticated ArriveAsClient endpoint, an attacker can
create their own sessions and pivot to impersonate active developer sessions.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-11-09 21:58 UTC
Modified
2026-11-09 22:15 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/telepresenceio/telepresence/v2

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 2.31.0 (semver)

Fixed versions

2.31.0

Fix

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences