Details
7. Alternative entry via filters query parameter
# The filters parameter accepts Python literal syntax via ast.literal_eval().
curl -s -k \
-H "X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $TOKEN" \
-H "Accept: application/x-json-stream" \
'https://rucio.example.org/dids/user.testuser/dids/search?filters=%5B%7B%22custom_key%22%3A%20%22x%27%20OR%20%271%27%3D%271%22%7D%5D'
# URL-decoded: filters=[{"custom_key": "x' OR '1'='1"}]
---
Impact
Vulnerability type: SQL Injection (CWE-89)
CVSS v3.1: 9.9 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)
Who is impacted:
- Rucio deployments that have explicitly configured the
postgres_metametadata plugin.
What an attacker can do:
- Data modification: PostgreSQL stacked queries enable arbitrary
INSERT/UPDATE/DELETEoperations. - Remote code execution: Via PostgreSQL's
COPY ... FROM PROGRAMif the database user has superuser orpg_execute_server_programprivileges. - File system access: Via
COPY ... TO/FROM '/path'if filesystem permissions allow.
Further elevation when the same postgres database and access is used for metadata and for Rucio itself
- Full database read access: Extract any table including
identities(password hashes and salts),tokens(active authentication sessions),accounts(user enumeration),rse_settings(storage endpoint credentials), andrules(data management policies) could be extracted. - Password hash extraction: Combined with Rucio's use of single-iteration SHA-256 for password hashing (no KDF), extracted hashes can be cracked at GPU speed.
- Authentication token theft: Active bearer tokens can be extracted and used for immediate session hijacking.
Required attacker privileges: Any authenticated Rucio user. Authentication tokens can be obtained via any supported method (userpass, x509, OIDC, SAML, SSH, GSS). No special roles or administrative permissions are required. The GET /dids/<scope>/dids/search endpoint is available to all authenticated users.