Details
- Victim imports the typebot into their workspace.
- Victim previews the bot in the builder. The rating block renders, triggering:
onerrorfires becausesrc=xfails to loadfetch()exfiltrates the victim's session cookies from the builder origin- Script blocks in the same bot would be sandboxed in a Worker due to
isUnsafe, but the rating SVG bypasses this entirely
Attack Vector 2: Malicious Workspace Collaborator
- Collaborator with editor access modifies a rating block's custom icon SVG.
- Workspace owner or admin previews the bot.
- Attacker's payload executes in the admin's builder session.
Impact
- Session hijacking: Attacker can exfiltrate authentication cookies and session tokens from the builder origin
- Privilege escalation: A collaborator with editor access can execute code in the session of workspace admins/owners
- Sandbox bypass: Completely circumvents the
isUnsafeWeb Worker sandbox designed to protect against imported/untrusted bots - Account takeover: With stolen session tokens, the attacker can access the victim's full workspace, modify bots, access integrations, and view collected data
- Defense inconsistency: The codebase sanitizes innerHTML in
StreamingBubble.tsxbut not inRatingForm.tsx, indicating this is an oversight rather than a design choice
Recommended Remediation
Option 1: Sanitize with DOMPurify at the rendering layer (Preferred)
Apply the same DOMPurify sanitization pattern already used in StreamingBubble.tsx. This protects all paths regardless of where the data originates:
// packages/embeds/js/src/features/blocks/inputs/rating/components/RatingForm.tsx
import domPurify from "dompurify";
// In the RatingButton component:
<div
class="flex justify-center items-center rating-icon-container"
innerHTML={
props.customIcon?.isEnabled && !isEmpty(props.customIcon.svg)
? domPurify.sanitize(props.customIcon.svg)
: defaultIcon
}
/>
This is the preferred fix because it applies defense at the lowest layer, protecting all callers (builder preview, viewer, embeds).
Option 2: Validate SVG content at the schema/API layer
Add SVG-specific validation in the Zod schema or in sanitizeBlock:
// In sanitizers.ts sanitizeBlock function, add a case for rating blocks:
if (block.type === InputBlockType.RATING && block.options?.customIcon?.svg) {
const cleanSvg = domPurify.sanitize(block.options.customIcon.svg, {
USE_PROFILES: { svg: true },
});
return {
...block,
options: {
...block.options,
customIcon: { ...block.options.customIcon, svg: cleanSvg },
},
};
}
Note: This option alone is insufficient — it only protects data entering through the API, not data already in the database. Combine with Option 1 for defense-in-depth.
Additional Recommendation: Audit other innerHTML usages
FileUploadForm.tsx:234 also renders props.block.options?.labels?.placeholder via innerHTML without sanitization — this should be audited for the same vulnerability class.
Credit
This vulnerability was discovered and reported by bugbunny.ai.