rdiscount
Affected
- introduced
1.3.1.1, fixed2.2.7.4(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
2.2.7.4
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-35201
rdiscount has an Out-of-bounds Read
Summary
A signed length truncation bug causes an out-of-bounds read in the default Markdown parse path. Inputs larger than INT_MAX are truncated to a signed int before entering the native parser, allowing the parser to read past the end of the supplied buffer and crash the process
Details
In both public entry points:
ext/rdiscount.c:97ext/rdiscount.c:136RSTRING_LEN(text) is passed directly into mkd_string():
MMIOT *doc = mkd_string(RSTRING_PTR(text), RSTRING_LEN(text), flags);
mkd_string() accepts int len:
ext/mkdio.c:174Document * mkd_string(const char *buf, int len, mkd_flag_t flags)
{
struct string_stream about;
about.data = buf;
about.size = len;
return populate((getc_func)__mkd_io_strget, &about, flags & INPUT_MASK);
}
The parser stores the remaining input length in a signed int:
ext/markdown.h:205struct string_stream {
const char *data;
int size;
};
The read loop stops only when size == 0:
ext/mkdio.c:161int __mkd_io_strget(struct string_stream *in)
{
if ( !in->size ) return EOF;
--(in->size);
return *(in->data)++;
}
If the Ruby string length exceeds INT_MAX, the value can truncate to a negative int. In that state, the parser continues incrementing data and reading past the end of the original Ruby string, causing an out-of-bounds read and native crash.
Affected APIs:
RDiscount.new(input).to_htmlRDiscount.new(input).toc_contentPoC
Crash via to_html:
RUBYLIB=lib:ext ruby -e 'require "rdiscount"; n=2_200_000_000; s = "a" * n; warn "built=#{s.bytesize}"; RDiscount.new(s).to_html"'
result:
built=2200000000[BUG] Segmentation faultCFUNC :to_htmlsame result with toc_content
Impact
This is an out-of-bounds read with the main issue being reliable denial-of-service. Impacted is limited to deployments parses attacker-controlled Markdown and permits multi-GB inputs.
Fix
just add a checked length guard before the mkd_string() call in both public entry points:
ext/rdiscount.c:97ext/rdiscount.c:136ex:
VALUE text = rb_funcall(self, rb_intern("text"), 0);
long text_len = RSTRING_LEN(text);
VALUE buf = rb_str_buf_new(1024);
Check_Type(text, T_STRING);
if (text_len > INT_MAX) {
rb_raise(rb_eArgError, "markdown input too large");
}
MMIOT *doc = mkd_string(RSTRING_PTR(text), (int)text_len, flags);
The same guard should be applied in rb_rdiscount_toc_content() before its mkd_string() call.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
1.3.1.1, fixed 2.2.7.4 (ecosystem)2.2.7.4
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0