openmage/magento-lts
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed20.17.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
20.17.0
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-25525
OpenMage LTS has a Path Traversal Filter Bypass in Dataflow Module
The Dataflow module in OpenMage LTS uses a weak blacklist filter (str_replace('../', '', $input)) to prevent path traversal attacks. This filter can be bypassed using patterns like ..././ or ....//, which after the replacement still result in ../. An authenticated administrator can exploit this to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem.
| Metric | Value | Justification |
| ------------------------ | --------- | ------------------------------------- |
| Attack Vector (AV) | Network | Exploitable via admin panel |
| Attack Complexity (AC) | Low | Simple bypass pattern |
| Privileges Required (PR) | High | Requires admin authentication |
| User Interaction (UI) | None | No additional user interaction needed |
| Scope (S) | Unchanged | Impacts the vulnerable component |
| Confidentiality (C) | High | Can read sensitive system files |
| Integrity (I) | None | Read-only vulnerability |
| Availability (A) | None | No impact on availability |
Affected Products
Affected Files
| File | Line | Vulnerable Code |
| ------------------------------------------------------------ | ---- | ---------------------------------------- |
| app/code/core/Mage/Dataflow/Model/Convert/Parser/Csv.php | 67 | str_replace('../', '', urldecode(...)) |
| app/code/core/Mage/Dataflow/Model/Convert/Parser/Xml/Excel.php | 63 | str_replace('../', '', urldecode(...)) |
Vulnerability Details
The Dataflow module allows administrators to import data from files. The files parameter specifies which file to import from the var/import/ directory. To prevent path traversal, the code uses str_replace() to remove ../ sequences:
$file = Mage::app()->getConfig()->getTempVarDir() . '/import/'
. str_replace('../', '', urldecode(Mage::app()->getRequest()->getParam('files')));
However, str_replace() only performs a single pass, making it trivially bypassable:
Bypass Examples
| Input | After str_replace('../', '', ...) | Result |
| ------------------------------ | ----------------------------------- | --------- |
| ..././ | ../ | Bypass |
| ....// | ../ | Bypass |
| ..././..././..././etc/passwd | ../../../etc/passwd | File read |
Attack Scenario
files parameter to: ..././..././..././etc/passwd/etc/passwdProof of Concept
# Request to Dataflow with bypass pattern
GET /admin/system_convert_gui/run/id/1/?files=..././..././..././etc/passwd
# The str_replace removes '../' leaving:
# ..././..././..././etc/passwd -> ../../../etc/passwd
# Final path resolves to:
# /var/www/html/var/import/../../../etc/passwd -> /etc/passwd
Remediation
Replace the weak str_replace() filter with basename() to extract only the filename:
// Before (vulnerable)
$file = Mage::app()->getConfig()->getTempVarDir() . '/import/'
. str_replace('../', '', urldecode(Mage::app()->getRequest()->getParam('files')));
// After (fixed)
$file = Mage::app()->getConfig()->getTempVarDir() . '/import/'
. basename(urldecode(Mage::app()->getRequest()->getParam('files')));
Using basename() ensures only the filename portion is used, completely preventing any path traversal regardless of the input pattern.
Workarounds
If immediate upgrade is not possible:
Impact
An attacker with admin access can read sensitive files including:
/etc/passwd - System user informationapp/etc/local.xml - Database credentials.env files - Environment secretsCredit
This vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed by blackhat2013 through HackerOne.
Timeline
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 20.17.0 (ecosystem)20.17.0
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0