Advisory

GHSA-6vqf-6fhm-7rc6

Also known as: CVE-2026-25525

Summary

OpenMage LTS has a Path Traversal Filter Bypass in Dataflow Module

Details

The Dataflow module in OpenMage LTS uses a weak blacklist filter (str_replace('../', '', $input)) to prevent path traversal attacks. This filter can be bypassed using patterns like ..././ or ....//, which after the replacement still result in ../. An authenticated administrator can exploit this to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem.

| Metric | Value | Justification |
| ------------------------ | --------- | ------------------------------------- |
| Attack Vector (AV) | Network | Exploitable via admin panel |
| Attack Complexity (AC) | Low | Simple bypass pattern |
| Privileges Required (PR) | High | Requires admin authentication |
| User Interaction (UI) | None | No additional user interaction needed |
| Scope (S) | Unchanged | Impacts the vulnerable component |
| Confidentiality (C) | High | Can read sensitive system files |
| Integrity (I) | None | Read-only vulnerability |
| Availability (A) | None | No impact on availability |

Affected Products

  • OpenMage LTS versions < 20.16.1
  • All versions derived from Magento 1.x with these code paths

Affected Files

| File | Line | Vulnerable Code |
| ------------------------------------------------------------ | ---- | ---------------------------------------- |
| app/code/core/Mage/Dataflow/Model/Convert/Parser/Csv.php | 67 | str_replace('../', '', urldecode(...)) |
| app/code/core/Mage/Dataflow/Model/Convert/Parser/Xml/Excel.php | 63 | str_replace('../', '', urldecode(...)) |

Vulnerability Details

The Dataflow module allows administrators to import data from files. The files parameter specifies which file to import from the var/import/ directory. To prevent path traversal, the code uses str_replace() to remove ../ sequences:

$file = Mage::app()->getConfig()->getTempVarDir() . '/import/'
    . str_replace('../', '', urldecode(Mage::app()->getRequest()->getParam('files')));

However, str_replace() only performs a single pass, making it trivially bypassable:

Bypass Examples

| Input | After str_replace('../', '', ...) | Result |
| ------------------------------ | ----------------------------------- | --------- |
| ..././ | ../ | Bypass |
| ....// | ../ | Bypass |
| ..././..././..././etc/passwd | ../../../etc/passwd | File read |

Attack Scenario

  1. Attacker gains admin access (via compromised credentials, social engineering, etc.)
  2. Navigate to System > Import/Export > Dataflow Profiles
  3. Create or modify an import profile
  4. Set the files parameter to: ..././..././..././etc/passwd
  5. Run the profile to read the contents of /etc/passwd

Proof of Concept

# Request to Dataflow with bypass pattern
GET /admin/system_convert_gui/run/id/1/?files=..././..././..././etc/passwd

# The str_replace removes '../' leaving:
# ..././..././..././etc/passwd -> ../../../etc/passwd

# Final path resolves to:
# /var/www/html/var/import/../../../etc/passwd -> /etc/passwd

Remediation

Replace the weak str_replace() filter with basename() to extract only the filename:

// Before (vulnerable)
$file = Mage::app()->getConfig()->getTempVarDir() . '/import/'
    . str_replace('../', '', urldecode(Mage::app()->getRequest()->getParam('files')));

// After (fixed)
$file = Mage::app()->getConfig()->getTempVarDir() . '/import/'
    . basename(urldecode(Mage::app()->getRequest()->getParam('files')));

Using basename() ensures only the filename portion is used, completely preventing any path traversal regardless of the input pattern.

Workarounds

If immediate upgrade is not possible:

  1. Restrict admin access: Limit Dataflow access to trusted administrators only
  2. Disable Dataflow: If not in use, disable the Dataflow module entirely
  3. Web Application Firewall: Block requests containing path traversal patterns
  4. File permissions: Ensure the web server user has minimal filesystem permissions
  5. Monitor admin activity: Alert on suspicious Dataflow profile execution

Impact

An attacker with admin access can read sensitive files including:

  • /etc/passwd - System user information
  • app/etc/local.xml - Database credentials
  • .env files - Environment secrets
  • Log files - Potentially sensitive application data
  • Configuration files - Server and application configuration

Credit

This vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed by blackhat2013 through HackerOne.

Timeline

  • 2025-12-31: Vulnerability reported via HackerOne
  • 2026-01-21: Fix developed and tested

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-04-21 14:35 UTC
Modified
2026-04-21 14:56 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

openmage/magento-lts

Packagist · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 20.17.0 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

20.17.0

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences