praisonai
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.7.3(semver)
Fixed versions
1.7.3
Fix
- Fixed version
1.7.3npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-61426
PraisonAI: AgentOS defaults to network-exposed no-auth mode, allowing unauthenticated agent invocation and instruction disclosure
Summary
The AgentOS server in the praisonai TypeScript/npm package ships an insecure default: it binds 0.0.0.0, sets no API key, and uses CORS * with credentials. The API-key middleware is only registered when an API key is configured, so the documented quickstart (new AgentOS({agents:[...]}).serve({port})) exposes, unauthenticated, GET /api/agents (which leaks agent names/roles/instructions, i.e. system prompts) and POST /api/chat (which invokes agents). Any network peer can read agent system prompts and drive the agent. Runtime-confirmed; severity High.
Details
Affected component
praisonai (npm / TypeScript). Files src/praisonai-ts/src/os/config.ts and src/praisonai-ts/src/os/agentos.ts (AgentOS).Vulnerable code / root cause
Path:src/praisonai-ts/src/os/config.ts
Class/const:DEFAULT_AGENTOS_CONFIG / mergeConfig
Snippet:
export const DEFAULT_AGENTOS_CONFIG = {
host: '0.0.0.0',
corsOrigins: ['*'],
apiKey: '',
// ...
};
// mergeConfig: apiKey = userConfig?.apiKey ?? process.env.PRAISONAI_AGENTOS_API_KEY ?? '';
Issue: defaults bind all interfaces, with an empty API key and wildcard CORS. apiKey stays empty unless the developer explicitly sets it.
Path:src/praisonai-ts/src/os/agentos.ts
Function:serve / _registerRoutes (Express app)
Snippet:
if (this.config.apiKey) { // auth middleware ONLY added when apiKey is set
app.use((req,res,next) => { /* 401 unless Bearer/x-auth-token matches */ });
}
// routes:
app.get(`${apiPrefix}/agents`, ...) // returns name/role/instructions
app.post(`${apiPrefix}/chat`, ...) // calls agent.chat(message)
Issue: the only auth gate is conditional on a non-empty apiKey. With the default empty key, no auth middleware is registered, and GET /api/agents (system-prompt disclosure) and POST /api/chat (agent invocation) are served to any network client. CORS sets Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true with a wildcard origin.
Attack flow
apiKey/PRAISONAI_AGENTOS_API_KEY.GET /api/agents → receives agent instructions/system prompts.POST /api/chat → invokes the agent.Why existing protection is bypassed
There is no protection in the default config — the auth gate is skipped when apiKey is empty (the default), and the server binds all interfaces.
Security boundary
Unauthenticated network access to agent metadata + invocation. This is the CVE-2026-44338 anti-pattern recurring in the TS package, and worse (0.0.0.0 is the default).
Proof of Concept
Environment
Real AgentOS from src/praisonai-ts run via ts-node in a node container with default config (stub agent, no LLM needed). 127.0.0.1:18000. Runnable assets: PraisonAI-Runtime-Repro\runtime-files\ (docker-compose.agentos.yml).
Steps to reproduce
PRAI-01-01-AgentOS-Agents-NoAuth: GET /api/agents (no Authorization) → 127.0.0.1:18000.PRAI-01-02-AgentOS-Chat-NoAuth: POST /api/chat {"message":"hello from attacker"} (no Authorization).Expected result
Non-loopback exposure should require authentication; agent instructions should not be disclosed unauthenticated.
Actual result
GET /api/agents → 200, leaks "instructions":"SYSTEM PROMPT SECRET ... PRAISONAI_INTERNAL_SECRET_CANARY_7f3a91"; response header Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true.POST /api/chat → 200, agent invoked ("response":"...PRAISONAI_AGENTOS_CANARY_7f3a91...").Screenshots
Unauthenticated `/api/agents` leaks agent instructions
A GET request to /api/agents succeeds without an Authorization header. The response exposes agent metadata and instructions, including the canary system-prompt value.
<img width="1535" height="829" alt="01-AgentOS-Agents-NoAuth" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/705087e1-8017-46f6-9a91-edb8312e2f26" />
Unauthenticated `/api/chat` invokes the agent
A POST request to /api/chat succeeds without an Authorization header. The response confirms that the attacker-controlled message was processed by the configured agent.
<img width="1537" height="833" alt="02-AgentOS-Chat-NoAuth" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5cdf8f56-b8d8-498b-87bd-44834f39998c" />
Reproduction assets
The attached archive contains the local Docker runtime used to reproduce the issue with controlled canary values only. It does not contain real secrets, third-party API keys, or production credentials.
Impact
Unauthenticated disclosure of agent configuration/system prompts; unauthenticated agent invocation; LLM cost abuse; possible tool abuse depending on the configured agent's tools; permissive CORS-with-credentials.
Suggested remediation
host to 127.0.0.1; require apiKey (fail closed) when binding non-loopback.corsOrigins to ['*'], especially with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true.instructions on an unauthenticated endpoint.High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 1.7.3 (semver)1.7.3
1.7.3npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0