Details
Observed output:
=== RUN TestLocalPoCDDNSUpdatePipelineReachesLoopback
ddns_ssrf_local_poc_test.go:76: observed loopback request through DDNS update pipeline: POST /internal nezha-ddns-pipeline-ssrf {"ip":"203.0.113.10","domain":"host.example.com","type":"ipv4"}
--- PASS: TestLocalPoCDDNSUpdatePipelineReachesLoopback (0.00s)
PASS
ok github.com/nezhahq/nezha/pkg/ddns 0.009s
A lower-level provider-only confirmation was also run with go test ./pkg/ddns/webhook -run TestLocalPoCDDNSWebhookReachesLoopback -v and observed:
observed loopback request: POST /internal nezha-ddns-ssrf {"ip":"203.0.113.10","domain":"host.example.com","type":"ipv4"}
Cleanup:
- Both temporary PoC test files were removed by shell
trap. find . -path './.git' -prune -o \( -name 'ssrf_local_poc_test.go' -o -name 'ddns_ssrf_local_poc_test.go' \) -printreturned no files.
Impact
An authenticated dashboard user can cause the Nezha dashboard process to send arbitrary HTTP requests to services reachable from the dashboard host, including loopback and private network targets. The confirmed path allows attacker-controlled method, URL path/query, headers, and request body.
Potential impacts depend on deployment and reachable internal services, but include:
- Blind probing of internal HTTP services from the dashboard network location.
- Triggering state-changing internal endpoints that trust localhost or private network origins.
- Reaching services not exposed to the attacker directly.
- Interaction with cloud metadata or control-plane endpoints if reachable and not otherwise protected.
The response body is not returned to the attacker in the confirmed code path, so this should not be described as direct arbitrary internal file/secret read without an additional response-disclosure primitive.