rack
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.2.20(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
2.2.20
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2025-61919
Rack is vulnerable to a memory-exhaustion DoS through unbounded URL-encoded body parsing
Summary
Rack::Request#POST reads the entire request body into memory for Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded, calling rack.input.read(nil) without enforcing a length or cap. Large request bodies can therefore be buffered completely into process memory before parsing, leading to denial of service (DoS) through memory exhaustion.
Details
When handling non-multipart form submissions, Rack’s request parser performs:
form_vars = get_header(RACK_INPUT).read
Since read is called with no argument, the entire request body is loaded into a Ruby String. This occurs before query parameter parsing or enforcement of any params_limit. As a result, Rack applications without an upstream body-size limit can experience unbounded memory allocation proportional to request size.
Impact
Attackers can send large application/x-www-form-urlencoded bodies to consume process memory, causing slowdowns or termination by the operating system (OOM). The effect scales linearly with request size and concurrency. Even with parsing limits configured, the issue occurs *before* those limits are enforced.
Mitigation
query_parser.bytesize_limit, preventing unbounded reads of application/x-www-form-urlencoded bodies.client_max_body_size, Apache LimitRequestBody).High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 2.2.20 (ecosystem)2.2.20
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
3.0, fixed 3.1.18 (ecosystem)3.1.18
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
3.2, fixed 3.2.3 (ecosystem)3.2.3
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0