github.com/canonical/lxd
Affected
- introduced
4.0, fixed5.21.4(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
5.21.4
Fix
- Fixed version
5.21.4go get github.com/canonical/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2025-54288, GO-2025-4001
Canonical LXD Source Container Identification Vulnerability via cmdline Spoofing in devLXD Server
Impact
In LXD's devLXD server, the source container identification process uses process cmdline (command line) information, allowing attackers to impersonate other containers by spoofing process names.
The core issue lies in the findContainerForPID function in lxd/api_devlxd.go.
This function identifies senders through two steps as shown below:
[lxc monitor], extract the project name and container name from that process name in the format projectName_containerName.https://github.com/canonical/lxd/blob/43d5189564d27f6161b430ed258c8b56603c2759/lxd/api_devlxd.go#L166-L276
Attackers can exploit Step 1 processing to impersonate arbitrary containers across projects by spoofing process names.
Reproduction Steps
root@EEEE:~# curl --unix-socket /dev/lxd/sock http://lxd-host/1.0/meta-data
instance-id: 9f928574-2561-4eff-af82-a68e57d3c68b
local-hostname: EEEE
root@EEEE:~# bash -c "exec -a '[lxc monitor]' curl --unix-socket /dev/lxd/sock http://lxd-host/1.0/meta-data -x 'test-project_DDDD'"
instance-id: 1bb2f1c3-3ad2-4cd6-9965-67b14c3582cc
local-hostname: DDDD
This attack successfully obtains metadata (instance-id, local-hostname) of another container
DDDD from within container EEEE.
Risk
This vulnerability allows attackers to perform the following actions:
Obtaining other containers' information via devLXD API's /1.0/meta-data endpoint:
https://github.com/canonical/lxd/blob/43d5189564d27f6161b430ed258c8b56603c2759/lxd/devlxd.go#L295-L304
https://github.com/canonical/lxd/blob/43d5189564d27f6161b430ed258c8b56603c2759/lxd/devlxd.go#L175-L221
https://github.com/canonical/lxd/blob/43d5189564d27f6161b430ed258c8b56603c2759/lxd/devlxd.go#L228-L267
https://github.com/canonical/lxd/blob/43d5189564d27f6161b430ed258c8b56603c2759/lxd/devlxd.go#L377-L395
Particularly in environments where multiple projects run containers on the same LXD host,
inter-project information leakage may occur. The attack prerequisite is root privileges within
any container.
Countermeasures
While containers basically run in separate PID namespaces, based on investigation, the [lxc monitor] process runs in the same PID namespace as the LXD execution process. Therefore, the problem can be resolved by modifying the implementation to use cmdline information only when the PID namespace of the target process matches the PID namespace of the process running LXD.
Patches
| LXD Series | Status |
| ------------- | ------------- |
| 6 | Fixed in LXD 6.5 |
| 5.21 | Fixed in LXD 5.21.4 |
| 5.0 | Ignored - Not critical |
| 4.0 | Ignored - EOL and not critical |
References
Reported by GMO Flatt Security Inc.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
4.0, fixed 5.21.4 (ecosystem)5.21.4
5.21.4go get github.com/canonical/[email protected]6.0, fixed 6.5 (ecosystem)6.5
6.5go get github.com/canonical/[email protected]0.0.0-20200331193331-03aab09f5b5c, fixed 0.0.0-20250827065555-0494f5d47e41 (semver)0.0.0-20250827065555-0494f5d47e41
0.0.0-20250827065555-0494f5d47e41go get github.com/canonical/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0