Advisory

GHSA-73cv-556c-w3g6

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Suggested remediation

Two independent hardenings, both recommended:

A. Refuse to start in an insecure default, in server.py main(), fail-closed when:

  • transport != "stdio"
  • server_config.oauth_enabled is False
  • server_config.host is not a loopback address (e.g. not in {"127.0.0.1", "::1", "localhost"})

Sample:

def _is_loopback(host: str) -> bool:
    return host in {"127.0.0.1", "::1", "localhost"}

def main():
    ...
    if server_config.transport != "stdio" and not server_config.oauth_enabled and not _is_loopback(server_config.host):
        raise SystemExit(
            "Refusing to start: HTTP transport bound to non-loopback host "
            f"({server_config.host}) without OAuth. Set OAUTH_ENABLED=true or "
            "set MCP_HOST=127.0.0.1 for local-only access."
        )
    ...

B. Default `oauth_enabled` to `True` and require explicit opt-out for local development. This matches the principle of secure-by-default for network-facing services.

C. Document the threat model in README under a "Production deployment" section, including:

  • Explicit warning that the server should not be exposed to untrusted networks without OAuth
  • Recommendation to set MCP_HOST=127.0.0.1 for stdio/local-only deployments

Resources

  • mcp_pinot/server.py lines 26-46, 248-269
  • mcp_pinot/config.py lines 56-65, 318-330
  • FastMCP auth parameter behavior when None: https://github.com/jlowin/fastmcp
  • The Register, May 13 2026: MCP database flaws across Doris, Pinot, RDS

Reporter

Independent security researcher. Disclosed via GitHub Security Advisory, 2026-05-23.

Sources & licences