assemblyline-service-client
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed4.6.0.stable11(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
4.6.0.stable11
Fix
- Fixed version
4.6.0.stable11pip install --upgrade assemblyline-service-client==4.6.0.stable11
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2025-55013, PYSEC-2026-1194
Assemblyline 4 service client vulnerable to Arbitrary Write through path traversal in Client code
Path-Traversal -> Arbitrary File Write in Assemblyline Service Client
IMPORTANT: This vulnerability is valid if you decide to use the assemblyline-service-client outside of the normal practice to using Assemblyline in a production environment. In practice, this code should always be executed within a containerized environment such as assemblyline-v4-service which ensures filesystem-level permissions of what the running user is allowed to access. Furthermore, there is fewer chances for a MiTM compromise when deployed properly in a Docker or Kubernetes deployment where the platform will assign the correct network policies to secure connections between containers instead of relying on the user to set this up manually.
See https://github.com/CybercentreCanada/assemblyline/issues/382 for further discussion.
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1. Summary
The Assemblyline 4 service client (task_handler.py) accepts a SHA-256 value returned by the service server and uses it directly as a local file name.
> No validation / sanitisation is performed.
A malicious or compromised server (or any MITM that can speak to client) can return a path-traversal payload such as ../../../etc/cron.d/evil
and force the client to write the downloaded bytes to an arbitrary location on disk.
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2. Affected Versions
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Component | assemblyline-service-client |
| Repository | CybercentreCanada/assemblyline-service-client |
| Affected | All releases up to master branch. |
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3. CVSS 3.1 Vector & Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
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4. Technical Details
| Field | Content |
|---|---|
| Location | assemblyline_service_client/task_handler.py, inside download_file() |
| Vulnerable Line | file_path = os.path.join(self.tasking_dir, sha256) |
| Root Cause | The sha256 string is taken directly from the service-server JSON response and used as a file name without any validation or sanitisation. |
| Exploit Flow | 1. Attacker (service server) returns HTTP 200 for GET /api/v1/file/../../../etc/cron.d/evil.<br>2. Client writes the response body to /etc/cron.d/evil.<br>3. Achieves arbitrary file write (code execution if file is executable). |
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5. Impact
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6. Mitigation / Fix
import re
_SHA256_RE = re.compile(r'^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}\Z')
def download_file(self, sha256: str, sid: str) -> Optional[str]:
if not _SHA256_RE.fullmatch(sha256):
self.log.error(f"[{sid}] Invalid SHA256: {sha256}")
self.status = STATUSES.ERROR_FOUND
return None
# or your preferred way to check if a string is a shasum.
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Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 4.6.0.stable11 (ecosystem)4.6.0.stable11
4.6.0.stable11pip install --upgrade assemblyline-service-client==4.6.0.stable114.6.1.dev0, fixed 4.6.1.dev138 (ecosystem)4.6.1.dev138
4.6.1.dev138pip install --upgrade assemblyline-service-client==4.6.1.dev138Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0