@aborruso/ckan-mcp-server
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.4.112(semver)
Fixed versions
0.4.112
Fix
- Fixed version
0.4.112npm install @aborruso/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-73846
CKAN MCP Server: Cache-key canonicalization collision enables cache confusion / poisoning
Summary
The response cache derives its key from an ambiguous string serialization of the request parameters. canonicalizeParams joins sorted ${key}=${value} pairs with & and does not escape &, =, or the | field separators used in buildCacheKey. Two different logical parameter sets can therefore serialize to the same key and share one cache entry. Because the cached value is whatever the upstream returned for whichever request populated the entry first, an attacker can prime a colliding key so a victim's distinct query (same server_url) is served the attacker's cached response.
Affected code
// src/utils/cache.ts
export function canonicalizeParams(params) {
const keys = Object.keys(params).sort();
const pairs = [];
for (const key of keys) {
const value = params[key];
if (value === undefined || value === null) continue;
const serialized = typeof value === "object" ? JSON.stringify(value) : String(value);
pairs.push(`${key}=${serialized}`); // value not escaped
}
return pairs.join("&"); // '&' delimiter, injectable
}
export async function buildCacheKey(serverUrl, action, params) {
const raw = `${serverUrl}|${action}|${canonicalizeParams(params)}`; // '|' also unescaped
return sha1Hex(raw);
}
Confirmed collisions (identical key):
{ q: "budget", rows: 10 } ≡ { q: "budget&rows=10" } → both canonicalize to q=budget&rows=10{ filters: { a: "b" } } ≡ { filters: '{"a":"b"}' } → both canonicalize to filters={"a":"b"} (object-vs-string ambiguity)An attacker can reproduce any target canonical string by injecting it into the alphabetically-first parameter, so the collision is general, not incidental.
Impact
caches.default, and a Node HTTP instance shares one in-process LRU across all clients), an attacker primes a colliding entry so that another client's genuinely different query receives the attacker-chosen response for the same portal.notes/title); the victim's benign query then serves that poisoned content to the model — delivering prompt injection via the cache, without the victim ever querying the malicious dataset.Confidentiality impact is low (same-portal public data); the primary damage is
integrity. AC:H reflects the need for caching to be enabled and a shared
instance plus priming before the victim's request populates the entry.
Proof of concept
poc/cache-collision-poc.mjs primes a single-param request and shows a victim's
distinct two-param request being served the attacker-primed entry:
attacker canonical : q=budget&rows=10
victim canonical : q=budget&rows=10
same cache key : true
victim served from cache: true
victim RECEIVED : RESULT_FOR({"q":"budget&rows=10"})
victim EXPECTED : RESULT_FOR({"q":"budget","rows":10})
Remediation
{a:{...}} (object) and {a:"..."} (string) never coincide.Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 0.4.112 (semver)0.4.112
0.4.112npm install @aborruso/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0