nltk
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed3.10.4(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
3.10.4
Fix
- Fixed version
3.10.4pip install --upgrade nltk==3.10.4
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-128134
NLTK dot2img runs Graphviz 'dot' without the trusted-exec chokepoint, enabling local code execution via a writable PATH element
Summary
nltk.parse.dependencygraph.dot2img invokes the Graphviz dot executable without the trusted-execution guarantees that NLTK applies to its other native-tool wrappers. The function resolves dot by bare name and then runs the resolved absolute path with a raw subprocess.run, omitting the ownership/writability check and the loader-environment scrub that nltk.pathsec.spawn_trusted provides. On a POSIX host, a local, unprivileged actor who can write to any group/world-writable directory that appears on the victim's PATH can plant a trojan dot; when the victim later renders a DependencyGraph (for example in a Jupyter notebook, which auto-invokes _repr_svg_) or calls dot2img directly, the planted binary executes as the victim. The advisory GHSA-6hwm-xvph-95vm (CVE-2026-78680) addressed the same untrusted-search-path class for the Graphviz dot invoker in nltk/translate/api.py, but dot2img received only part of that remediation and remains exploitable.
Root Cause
NLTK's native-tool security model layers four defenses (documented in nltk/EXTERNAL_TOOL_SECURITY.md): (1) find_binary refuses a current-working-directory-relative match; (2) resolve_trusted_executable verifies the resolved file is a regular file that no other unprivileged user can replace (private parent directories, owner is the user or root, no group/world write bit); (3) shell execution is refused; (4) safe_env scrubs loader and interpreter environment variables before exec. Layers 2, 3, and 4 are reached only through nltk.pathsec.spawn_trusted. dot2img calls find_binary("dot") (layer 1 only), then executes the result with subprocess.run([dot_binary, ...]) and no env= argument. Layer 1 rejects only non-absolute matches, so an absolute path returned by the which search stage survives even when the file lives in a writable directory. Because dot2img never calls spawn_trusted, the ownership check and environment scrub never run.
nltk/parse/dependencygraph.py:626 dot_binary = find_binary("dot") # layer 1 only
nltk/parse/dependencygraph.py:631 subprocess.run([dot_binary, "-T%s" % t], ...) # no trust check, no env=
nltk/parse/dependencygraph.py:638 subprocess.run([dot_binary, "-T%s" % t], ...) # binary-format branch, same gap
nltk/internals.py:1034 if searching_bare_name and not os.path.isabs(path): continue # skips only relative matches
nltk/translate/api.py:145 process = spawn_trusted(dot_binary, [f"-T{output_format}"], ...) # hardened sibling
Impact
Prerequisites: a POSIX host on which the attacker is a local, unprivileged user (or code) able to write to a group/world-writable directory that appears on the victim's PATH. This includes the commonly cited case of a Homebrew /usr/local/bin with drwxrwxr-x permissions, or a writable directory placed early on PATH. The attacker plants a trojan dot there. When the victim renders a DependencyGraph (notebook _repr_svg_ auto-invocation) or calls dot2img directly, the trojan executes as the victim, yielding arbitrary local code execution in the victim's account: a local privilege-escalation and lateral-movement primitive. Because the child environment is not scrubbed, loader-injection variables (for example LD_PRELOAD, DYLD_*, GCONV_PATH) also reach the child, providing an additional execution surface. No control over NLTK inputs is required.
Proof of Concept
Requires: POSIX host, an importable NLTK build from the affected tree, and Python 3. No third-party dependencies.
dot script into it that drops a marker and emits fake SVG.PATH and run from a neutral working directory (so this is not the current-working-directory vector).resolve_trusted_executable refuses the planted binary (so the hardened path would raise) while dot2img executes it.import os, stat, tempfile, subprocess, sys
d = tempfile.mkdtemp()
dot = os.path.join(d, "dot")
with open(dot, "w") as f:
f.write("#!/bin/sh\ntouch " + os.path.join(d, "MARKER") + "\necho '<svg><!-- planted dot ran --></svg>'\n")
os.chmod(dot, 0o777)
os.chmod(d, 0o777)
os.environ["PATH"] = d + os.pathsep + os.environ["PATH"]
os.chdir("/")
from nltk.pathsec import resolve_trusted_executable
from nltk.parse.dependencygraph import dot2img
print("resolve_trusted_executable(planted dot):", resolve_trusted_executable(os.path.join(d, "dot")))
out = dot2img("digraph G { a -> b }")
print("dot2img stdout:", repr(out))
print("planted dot executed (marker created):", os.path.exists(os.path.join(d, "MARKER")))
resolve_trusted_executable(planted dot): None
dot2img stdout: '<svg><!-- planted dot ran --></svg>\n'
planted dot executed (marker created): True
Attack Chain
PATH (for example a writable directory early on PATH, or a Homebrew /usr/local/bin with group-write). The attacker writes a trojan dot into it.dot file; no control over NLTK inputs is needed.DependencyGraph (notebook display triggers _repr_svg_ at nltk/parse/dependencygraph.py:209, which calls dot2img) or calls dot2img directly.find_binary("dot") applies layer 1 only (nltk/internals.py:1034), which discards a relative current-working-directory match but returns the attacker's absolute path from the which stage; dot2img never invokes resolve_trusted_executable (layer 2) or safe_env (layer 4), unlike the hardened sibling nltk/translate/api.py:145.subprocess.run([dot_binary, "-T%s" % t], ...) (nltk/parse/dependencygraph.py:631 and :638) executes the untrusted absolute path with the full inherited environment.Bypass Evidence
Canonical prior advisory: GHSA-6hwm-xvph-95vm (CVE-2026-78680), "Uncontrolled search path when invoking the Graphviz 'dot' binary" (CWE-426/CWE-427), patched at >= 3.10.3. That remediation was two-part: a uniform layer-1 current-working-directory refusal in find_binary, and a routing of native-tool dot invocations through nltk.pathsec.spawn_trusted (layers 2 and 4). Inspection of the current released tree (nltk 3.10.3) shows dot2img received the layer-1 change (the function was rewritten from a bare subprocess.run(["dot", ...]) to find_binary("dot") plus a run of the absolute path, with a CWE-426/427 comment at nltk/parse/dependencygraph.py:622-625) but did NOT receive the spawn_trusted routing. The sibling nltk/translate/api.py:145 does route through spawn_trusted, and nltk/EXTERNAL_TOOL_SECURITY.md lists Graphviz dot only under translate/api.py; dot2img is absent from the hardened-wrapper inventory. Attempts to invalidate the finding all failed: (a) the claim that the fix covers all dot resolution is refuted because layer 1 filters only non-absolute matches and dot2img never reaches layers 2/4; (b) the duplicate hypothesis is refuted by a negative control, planting ./dot in the working directory with none on PATH makes find_binary("dot") raise LookupError, so the prior fix's working-directory guard still fires and this is the distinct residual ownership/environment gap; (c) the "system dot shadows the trojan" objection is refuted because realistic exploitation prepends the writable directory on PATH or replaces a dot already living in a writable PATH directory; (d) both the text and binary format branches share the identical unguarded exec, so it is not format-specific. A fresh PoC on the examined tree confirms resolve_trusted_executable refuses the planted binary while dot2img executes it.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 3.10.4 (ecosystem)3.10.4
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0