github.com/patrickhener/goshs
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected1.1.4(semver)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: GO-2026-5232
Unauthenticated Open Redirect, Arbitrary HTTP Response Header Injection, Missing CSRF, and Invisible-Mode Bypass in goshs /?redirect endpoint
Summary
The GET /?redirect endpoint in goshs v2.0.0-beta.6 performs an HTTP redirect to any attacker-supplied url= value and writes any attacker-supplied header=Name: Value pair into the response, without scheme/host validation, without a header-name allow-list, without authentication in the default deployment, and without the checkCSRF() guard that GHSA-jrq5-hg6x-j6g3 added to the other state-changing GET routes (?mkdir, ?delete). The same dispatcher also lacks an fs.Invisible branch, so the endpoint stays responsive in -I stealth mode and reliably fingerprints an "invisible" goshs deployment with a single request.
Detailshttpserver/handler.go:222-228 — the dispatcher gates ?redirect only with denyForTokenAccess (which only blocks share-token callers). It does not check fs.Invisible and does not call checkCSRF:
if _, ok := req.URL.Query()["redirect"]; ok {
if denyForTokenAccess(w, req) {
return true
}
fs.handleRedirect(w, req)
return true
}
httpserver/handler.go:753-787 — handleRedirect:
func (fs *FileServer) handleRedirect(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
q := req.URL.Query()
target := q.Get("url") // (1) no scheme/host validation
if target == "" { /* 400 */ }
status := http.StatusFound
if s := q.Get("status"); s != "" { // (2) only constrained to 3xx
code, err := strconv.Atoi(s)
if err != nil || code < 300 || code > 399 { /* 400 */ }
status = code
}
for _, h := range q["header"] { // (3) arbitrary header set
parts := strings.SplitN(h, ": ", 2)
if len(parts) != 2 || strings.TrimSpace(parts[0]) == "" { /* 400 */ }
w.Header().Set(strings.TrimSpace(parts[0]), parts[1])
}
http.Redirect(w, req, target, status) // (4) attacker Location
body := fs.emitCollabEvent(req, status)
logger.LogRequest(req, status, fs.Verbose, fs.Webhook, body)
}
httpserver/server.go:85-100 — BasicAuthMiddleware is registered only when fs.User != "" || fs.Pass != ""; the default goshs invocation has neither, so ?redirect is open to anyone on the network._Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer._
PoC
poc.zip
Please extract the uploaded compressed file before proceeding
<img width="1379" height="197" alt="스크린샷 2026-04-13 오후 8 04 20" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a557846f-47c7-4640-9fc5-34aa099d1a57" />
Impact
Set-Cookie: …; Domain=.corp.com lands a fixed session on every sibling app on the parent domain.Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=0 invalidates prior HSTS state for the origin, enabling MITM on subsequent visits.Low Basis: The source's own band: LOW
0, last affected 1.1.4 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
0, last affected 2.0.0-beta.6 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0