Advisory

GHSA-7x63-xv5r-3p2x

Also known as: BIT-oauth2-proxy-2026-40575, BIT-oauth2-proxy-2026-76835, CVE-2026-40575, CVE-2026-76835, GO-2026-5236

Summary

OAuth2 Proxy has an Authentication Bypass via X-Forwarded-Uri Header Spoofing

Details

Impact

A configuration-dependent authentication bypass exists in OAuth2 Proxy.

Deployments are affected when all of the following are true:

  • OAuth2 Proxy is configured with --reverse-proxy
  • and at least one rule is defined with --skip_auth_routes or the legacy --skip-auth-regex

OAuth2 Proxy may trust a client-supplied X-Forwarded-Uri header when --reverse-proxy is enabled and --skip-auth-route or --skip-auth-regex is configured. An attacker can spoof this header so OAuth2 Proxy evaluates authentication and skip-auth rules against a different path than the one actually sent to the upstream application.

This can result in an unauthenticated remote attacker bypassing authentication and accessing protected routes without a valid session.

Patches
This issue is addressed as part of the newly introduced --trusted-proxy-ip flag in v7.15.2. If you leave it unset, OAuth2 Proxy will continue to trust ALL source IPs (0.0.0.0/0) for backwards compatibility, which means a client may still be able to spoof forwarded headers. Therefore after upgrading we urge you to use the new --trusted-proxy-ip flag to set the IPs or CIDR ranges of the reverse proxies that are allowed to send X-Forwarded-* headers and furthermore implement the mitigation steps outlined below to properly configure your load balancer infrastructure.

Mitigation

  • Strip any client-provided X-Forwarded-Uri header at the reverse proxy or load balancer level
  • Explicitly overwrite X-Forwarded-Uri with the actual request URI before forwarding requests to OAuth2 Proxy

Example nginx mitigation for the auth subrequest:

    location /internal-auth/ {
      internal; # Ensure external users can't access this path
  
      # Make sure the OAuth2 Proxy knows where the original request came from.
      proxy_set_header Host       $host;
      proxy_set_header X-Real-IP  $remote_addr;
      # set the value to the actual $request_uri and therefore strip any user provided X-Forwarded-Uri
      proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Uri $request_uri;
  
      proxy_pass http://oauth2-proxy:4180/;
    }
  • Restrict direct client access to OAuth2 Proxy so it can only be reached through a trusted reverse proxy
  • Remove or narrow --skip-auth-route / --skip-auth-regex rules where possible

Severity

Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL

Dates

Published
2026-04-15 19:21 UTC
Modified
2026-09-25 14:25 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 7.5.0, fixed 7.15.2 (semver)

Fixed versions

7.15.2

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences